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Synopsis 
This is a study about ~e ways in which pictures can be interpreted and the 
ways in which they are interpreted; the latter, specifically, in a relatively remote 
part of Peru. 
Chapter II reviews an assortment of picture tests which bring to light 
differences in the ways pictures are perceived. Chapter III examines the specific 
cultural context in which a fairly informal picture test was administered. 
Chapter IV presents some results and asks what cultural and situational factors 
may have contributed to the variety in interpretations evident. 
The drawing of firm conclusions is precluded by the absence of any systematic 
approach to the interpretations or to the pictures themselves, and it is this which 
the second half of the study attempts to remedy; by providing a theoretical 
framework for the assessment of verbalized responses to pictures. 
Chapter V offers a definition of "picture" and locates it within a typology of 
indices. It also examines the notion of "visual resemblance", eventually 
adopting the view that any picture is infinitely ambiguous. Chapter VI 
introduces two methodological necessities consequent on this ambiguity: a 
stipulation as to the identity and the taxonomic specificity of any signified 
object; and a stipulation as to the spatial extension of its signifier. No other 
methodological content is presented. Chapter VII classifies types of verbalized 
responses in terms of their visual motivation, and the degree to which they 
interrelate the stipulated pictorial units. Chapter VIII acknowledges that 
signification may continue beyond the representational level. Further, post-
representational, types of responses are classified in terms of the nature of the 
link maintained with the representational signified. 
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1 The communicative context 
CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
There is nothing very mysterious, apparently, about the understanding of a 
picture. To adults living in a modern, urban environment it seems a trivial 
matter of look-and-see. The pictorial message is a fundamentally self-evident 
message; so self-evident in fact, that the picture is brought to the assistance of 
many another medium of communication which is failing in its task. Where an 
encyclopaedia's verbal definition succeeds only in outline, for instance, a picture 
fills in the gaps; where foreign exchange students struggle with their vocabulary, 
the picture breaks the language barrier; and where the claim that "PERSIL 
WASHES WHITER" is no proof in itself, the picture corroborates. Cautiously 
wielded, of course, pictures may also be used to diagnose psychiatric disorders, 
to rate level and type of intelligence, and to investigate the mechanisms of 
seeing. But to the rest of us they are a lingua franca, worth a thousand words at 
least; a feast for the eyes, with no risk of indigestion for the intellect. 
The aim of this study is to put some of the above - the incautious wieldings, 
perhaps - to the test. It is intended as an examination of the picture's 
communicative potential, and of its appropriateness in a particular cultural 
environment. It begins with certain observations I made concerning the extent 
to which pictures seemed to "say something" to a particular group of individuals; 
and goes on to explore the extent to which the picture has the capacity to "say" 
something at all, whether that something is indeed PERSIL WASHES WHITER, or 
CHRIST HEALS THE SICK, or WEAR YOUR SAFETY VISOR AND AVOID EYE 
INJURIES, or even just A DOG HAS FOUR LEGS. In attempting to reconcile what 
appeared to be a discrepancy between having the capacity to say, and actually 
saying, I realized the need to establish a theoretical framework for the description 
of verbalized responses to pictures. 
Figure 1 illustrates the potential for a discrepancy between saying and being 
intended to say. It is a reproduction of a "Pictorial Proclamation" issued around 
1828 by the Governer of Tasmania. The gist is this: "The Natives of this Island 
being under the protection of the same Laws which protect the Settlers, and 
Violation of those Laws, on the Persons or Property of Natives, shall be visited 
with the same Punishment as though committed on the Person and Property of 
any other" (Bonwick 1870: 72). 
This, it should be noted, is not accompanying text; nor is it merely what the 
Governor would have written, had the native Tasmanians - forcibly expelled 
from their lands and understandably hostile - been able to read. Rather, this 
piece of legalese approaches a direct translation of what the Proclamation was 
considered adequately to have communicated; ignorance of which, moreover, 
was considered no defence. 
Figure 1 (taken from Bonwick 1870: 85) 
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If this is rather alanning, at least it is also rather old. Yet it is not out of date in 
so far as there are now more would-be communicators than ever who do indeed 
assume that a message as specific as that above is within the picture's power to 
convey. 
Some of these would-be communicators, moreover, subsume within their target 
audience the inhabitants of Amantani, an island lying in a remote Peruvian comer 
of Lake Titicaca, where I spent five months in 1987-88. Yet I had not gone to 
Peru to study pictures at all; I had gone to study the role of musical instruments 
in legend - an interest fostered during a brief expedition to Chile in 1986 (Boot 
1987). This is no slight shift of focus, to be sure, and its rather erratic history 
bears some mention here. 
2 The viewers 
My visit to Amantani was arranged through a friend who had spent nine weeks 
there in 1986, and it was with her own former hosts, Juan Mamani and his wife 
Erminigelda, that I lodged. The island was to have been a short-term haven 
where I would muster courage for the task ahead and attempt to render my 
limited Quechua conversational. The first weeks were spent receiving ad hoc 
Quechua lessons (sometimes in return for ad hoc English lessons), providing 
clumsy help in the fields, going to church, walking the island, shadowing Juan 
as he attended various meetings, and striking up relationships with his family 
and friends. 
More to orient myself than with the specific aim of gathering data at this point, I 
would ask about musical instruments and other physical objects with, 
potentially, conventionally symbolic meaning: the whips carried by the island's 
civic officials; the motifs woven into hats and shawls; the designs being carved 
on to some near-completed stone arches, etc. 
The dearth of those traditional associations I had been led to anticipate was 
disconcerting. In fact, so frequently disappointing were the replies to my naIve 
questions that I began to despair of my topic. Yet I knew that vast works have 
been written on the meaning of woven motifs, and that there exist at least a few 
Titicacan tales of charango-playing mermaids and the like. Purely on the off 
chance that this particular problem was, after all, a problem of translation, I put 
pen to paper and drew one such mermaid. When I showed the picture to Juan's 
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elderly mother, it yielded - in place of the now familiar shoulder-shrug - three 
sad songs, four sad stories, and, for me, the conviction that pictures were the 
key to all mysteries. 
There followed the feverish concoction of a set of visual aids: pictures of 
musical instruments, woven motifs, ceremonial knives, crosses, skulls and 
crossbones, and the innards of the Peruvian flag. The mermaid episode, it turns 
out, may simply have been a happy encounter with a kind and knowledgeable 
woman, since these pictures did not live up to my hopes. Nevertheless the 
damage was done, and the seeds of a new topic were sown. 
For some people, the pictures did indeed trigger an outpouring of knowledge; 
but far more numerous were those for whom they did not. This disparity, 
however, seemed a phenomenon worthy of study in itself. That is to say, in 
place of the content of traditional and conventionally symbolic associations, I 
might instead investigate their prevalence. 
Further motivation was provided by the informal observation that, contrary to 
expectations, it was not, on the whole, the elderly, the conservative and those 
who had little contact with the outside world who readily wielded these 
traditional items of information, but the young and the better educated. One 
implication might be that some of the "exotic symbolicity" the literature (whether 
tourist brochures or scholarly articles) leads us expect of alien cultures is not 
indigenous but constructed and propagated from without; and that knowledge 
that, say, a jaguar symbolizes an aspect of Wiracocha is not replaced by 
knowledge that a lion signifies St. Mark, or a tiger Esso Petrol, but is acquired 
through essentially the same channels. It might be interesting, therefore, to ask 
not only what proportion of individuals think of the condor as a symbol of 
Andean identity, for example, but also wlw these people are (much as Garro 
(1986) investigated intracultural variation in folk medical knowledge). 
This idea took on a particular relevance, moreover, in consideration of what 
might be termed the island's "visual environment". One only had to look at the 
rather abstruse posters pasted to the walls of the community hall to realize that 
the knowledge my excursions had shown me to be not generally possessed by, 
or not readily forthcoming from, my informants was precisely that knowledge 
relied upon by the producers of the posters, whoever they might be. 
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3 The communicators 
Who indeed? For who is in the business of communicating with communities of 
the size, isolation, education and limited buying power of Amantanf? Peruvian 
banks, Peruvian and foreign aid organizations, campesino federations, 
schoolteachers, missionaries, politicians, health workers, agricultural advisers, 
consumer goods advertising companies .... In fact just about every type of 
organization to be found in most other parts the world - although in some 
instances clearly the potential profitability of the encounter might not seem 
enough to justify the effort. 
The difference, however, between the function of these pictures and that of 
many similarly abstruse posters here in Britain, for instance, comes down to the 
fact that many campesinos cannot read. Certainly many of those who can may 
not read sufficiently fluently to plough through great quantities of written 
information. There is, therefore, considerably more for the picture to achieve. 
And yet, in the light of the very superficial soundings above, one might well 
wonder what chance of success the picturers believed they had - and on what 
grounds they believed they had it. 
My next step was to take a boat to Puno, Amantani's nearest mainland town. I 
spent five hectic days attempting to find those responsible for the posters, their 
reasons for using the pictures they did, and the officially "correct" interpretations 
of the posters I had already seen. The establishments I approached included the 
Banco Agrario, the Proyecto Experimental de Educaci6n Bilingiie Puno, the aid 
organization CORPUNO, the magazine Hojas Escritas , the Puno branch of 
Jehovah's Witnesses, the Oficina de los Obispos del Sur-Andino, along with the 
painters of Puno's revivalist mural (Photograph 8 in Appendix B), and a 
randomly selected publicity agency. I later added to this list in Cuzco, Lima, and 
in Chile. All of these have an interest, if not always a specific interest, in 
communicating visually with campesinos. I asked representatives from each 
what concessions - in particular, visual concessions - they made to a largely 
illiterate target audience. 
What emerged was clear confirmation that, where Peruvian campesinos are 
concerned, whether the product advertised is a pump, a solar panel, loans, 
education, human rights or eternal salvation, it is the pictures which are intended 
to do the work - not only in their capacity to encourage and maintain interest, or 
to make a more permanent impression upon a receptive memory, but also to 
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carry independently as much of the message as possible. Crucially, moreover, 
these pictures should be simple. 
4 The pictures 
I was given a vast collection of "simple" posters and pamphlets which I carried 
back to Amantani. From these I put together a second, rather haphazard array of 
pictures which included posters, drawings of posters, advertising pamphlets, 
newspaper cartoons, the Jehovah's Witness extravaganza described below, 
photographs chopped from magazines, and collages made from the choppings. 
The number of pictures in this set grew and diminished as the focus of my 
interest changed. Only some of them have survived to appear in Appendix A. 
On the whole, these pictures differed significantly from the first set. Most 
appeared to contain more than one element, and many incorporated depth 
information (such as occlusion). Others made use of more specialized graphic 
devices. One CORPUNO brochure, for example, shows a manual water pump in 
cross-section underground; a CCP Human Rights poster features extreme 
perspective foreshortening (Supplementary Picture 1, reproduced in Appendix 
D); and the Banco Agrario's exclusively campesino-oriented pamphlet uses 
falling calendar pages to indicate the passing of time (Supplementary Picture 2). 
The interpretations offered in response to these pictures only increased my 
doubts as to their likely communicative value in this particular context. 
The pump cross-section, for instance, was frequently misidentified: 
Kayta mana allinta intendinichu. Hornochus kanman. No st, imachd. Mana 
intendinichu allinta 
I don't understand this very well. Would it be an oven perhaps. I don't know what 
it might be. I don't understand it very well 
Supplementary Picture 1 elicited information about the hand: 
Mano. Moo. Para trabajar 
A hand. A hand. (It's) for working 
without reference to either its diminutive owner or the crowd of similarly 
diminutive protesters behind him. 
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As for the falling calendar pages (Supplementary Picture 2), they were simply 
falling pages: 
Kay campesinotaqmin thampiyukuspa Jolletokunata urmachisqa 
And this campesino's stumbled so he drops his papers 
In other cases, a concentration on barely significant stylistic niceties would 
dictate the theme of the whole response: 
Despues veo una nina se encuentra sin narizito por motivos de su sincera nacimiento 
Next I see a girl who was born with no nose 
- this particular pictorial girl being not unlike many of the figures in Appendix 
A's pictures in that her nose is not explicitly rendered. 
More surprising, however, were the responses elicited by pictures which 
incorporated no such specialized devices; only devices which might not be 
thought to be specifically pictorial. One newspaper cartoon, for example, shows 
a woman putting a small girl to bed. The girl's left foot is obscured by the bed's 
headboard. For more than one viewer the occlusion is not registered as such: 
Kaypitaqmin wawanta maman hap'ishaspa sayachishan. Manan payqa puriyta 
atinchu. Mana chakin kanchu. Pero quien puede curar, no? 
Here a mother is holding her child upright. She can't walk. She has no feet. 
But who can cure her? 
I was impressed further by the numbers of strangely static interpretations given 
in response to obviously dynamic pictures; and by the frequency with which 
characters "just watched" each other, when a more active interconnection seemed 
more appropriate. Indeed, in some responses, such as this one (to the Hojas 
Escritas poster of which Picture 19 (reproduced in Appendix A) is a rendering), 
different elements were not interconnected at all: 
Pescado. no cierto? Kay pescado. Kaytaq alambre. Kaytaq wallpa chakin, no cierto? 
It's a fish isn't it? This is a fish. And this is wire. And this is a hen's foot, isn't it? 
This curiously enumerative approach, moreover, was not confmed to fairly 
diagrammatic pictures, but emerged in response to more obviously narrative 
pictures too. In response to Picture 13 (reproduced in Appendix A), for 
instance: 
Alqokuna. Michi. Gato. Runa. Humano. Perro. Animal. Gato. Rata. Michi. 
Michi. Huk'ucha 
Dogs. Cat. Cat. Man. Human. Dog. Animal. Cat. Rat. Cat. Cat. Mouse 
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In addition, there were many responses in which emotions attributed to 
characters seemed to bear little relation to the facial expressions and body 
postures of the figures concerned. 
Picture 11 (reproduced in Appendix A), for example, is taken from a Jehovah's 
Witnesses' pamphlet published by the Watchtower Press. It includes a small 
boy whose eyes are sallow, whose ribs show, and whose hand is raised to his 
mouth as though in a desperate plea for food. He is evidently, and almost 
picturesquel y, starving. 
For one viewer, however, the boy is not obviously even mildly hungry: 
Esto es feliz. Tranquillo. si. mas 0 menos 
This one's quite happy. He's unperturbed, more or less 
This is a small point; he is after all only a small boy, and he fills only a small part 
of the frame. Perhaps this viewer fares better with the rest of the picture. But 
there is a sense in which the intended message of the whole picture might be said 
to depend upon such small interpretations as this; and to be completely 
undermined, moreover, by even slight misinterpretations of its constituents. 
Let us have a closer look at Picture 11. 
5 The build-up of problems 
The Puno Jehovah's Witnesses were, at the time of my stay on Amantani, 
engaged in an awareness programme specifically directed at campesinos in 
isolated rural areas. A visit to the island was to constitute a part of the campaign. 
I asked the supervisor what materials he would use when communicating the 
relevant issues to campesinos. His answer was, like the others, quite definite in 
specifying the provision of pictures in quantity, and preferably in colour. 
Picture 11 was selected as a particularly good example of the type to enlighten an 
average campesino. 
A seven-headed fire-breathing serpent thrashes above a soldier taking aim, a 
World War II style bombing, an earthquake, a planet about which fly futuristic 
planes and missiles, the bony child, two sneering females and the heads of three 
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apprehensive-looking adults; these seem to be the main ingredients of the 
picture. 
Of course it refers to the Bible's Revelation of John: "And another portent 
appeared in heaven; behold, a great red dragon, with seven heads and ten horns, 
and seven diadems upon his heads" (RSV). And in a sense the understanding of 
the picture is quite simple. Here is the Devil in the form of a beast and as the 
cause of famine, war, dissent and fear (so tum to God ... ). But what is required 
in order that this meaning may be drawn from the picture? 
Interpreters must be familiar with the biblical allusion to realize that the beast is 
Satan himself. Once this is established they may then, with knowledge of 
Satan's destructive powers, recognize the anxious faces, the war-tom world, 
etc., to be not mere unrelated states but linked to one another as joint 
consequences of the Devil's dominion. Interpreters should also extrapolate 
metonymic ally from "an explosion or two" to "war", and perhaps too from 
"starving child" to "starvation". Finally, they should not think to themselves 
"nasty picture" and leave it at that; they should understand it to have, at least 
potentially, a real-world counterpart, and to refer not merely to one white 
woman, one black man, and so on, but to the entire human race - themselves 
included. Out of this may then arise the realization of the need for an alternative 
state of affairs, this being the ultimately implied and desired ideological message. 
Before any of this, of course, viewers must at least recognize that the child is 
indeed starving, and that the faces are indeed anxious. 
In all then, and still only cursorily, the "correct" interpretation of the picture (and 
from the Jehovah's Witness' standpoint there almost certainly is an element of 
success or failure) requires a fairly extended accumulation of operations. 
It is this accumulation of operations with which we shall be concerned. 
6 The accumulation of operations 
To illustrate the potentially ordered nature of the functioning of these operations, 
take Picture II's bony boy. We may imagine individual responses: 
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i) "There's a brownish area breaking up the pink" 
ii) "There's a boy with no legs" 
iii) "This boy looks pretty undernourished" 
iv) "There's obviously a famine" 
v) "That's just it, you see. Famine means people go hungry" 
vi) "It's an evil world we live in" 
It might seem from such responses that the hypothetical informants have chosen 
from a number of equally plausible alternatives (figure 2). 
a boy 
Figure 2 
a famine 
famine 
But these do not constitute alternatives in the same manner as would, for 
example, responses: "it's a thin boy" - "it's a fat girl"; "there's a famine" -
"there's a flood"; "he looks sad" - "he looks happy"; "family planning"-
"dietetics"; since the responses "starving boy", "famine", etc., do not exclude 
one another in the way that "thin boy" - "fat girl" or "sad boy" - "happy boy" 
might. 
If not alternatives, how are these responses arrived at? 
The individual who responds: "It's an evil world we live in" may well have a 
purely idiosyncratic mental correlation of the figure with such a message. It 
seems more likely, however - if far from certain - that this pronouncement has 
been prompted by the recognition that the brownish area represents part of a boy; 
by a consideration of the thin and hungry look he has about him; and by a 
reckoning of such boys with the reality and causes of famines and starvation. 
That is, the informant has used thefigure 4 boy as a spring-board for further 
thought. 
In other words, we are dealing with a build-up of signification; a sequence of 
stages: 
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Figure 3 
--7 a boy --7 a famine --7 famine 
each of which presupposes the preceding to some extent, in that the output of 
one operation continues the process as the input for the next. There is still room 
for alternative interpretations, some of which may seem more appropriate or 
justifiable (with reference to expectations) than others. But each alternative too 
will fmd its place as a product of a particular stage of the process: 
Figure 4 
~ a girl ~ a bereavement / love a boy a famine ~ famine ~ a shoe ~ ajoy war 
7 The interpretations 
Broadly speaking, each of chapters V to VIII assumes responsibility for one such 
stage. The framework which ultimately results constitutes a fairly crude means 
of assessing, in tenns of their "visual motivation" and their "complexity", 
verbalized responses to pictures. 
Prior to this, however, we attempt a more extended investigation of some 
potential reasons for the surprising variety evident in the responses above. 
This investigation is based upon the responses made by fifty of the islanders to a 
selection from among the many pictures displayed. These islanders are, for the 
most part, friends and acquaintances of Juan's. Most were approached initially 
prior to the test, and the interviews themselves took place in their homes, in the 
fields, or on the beach. I asked these people merely please to tell me in response 
to each picture what do you see?, what is happening?, and what does it tell you? 
The infonnants' answers to these questions were taped along with my own 
interjections: "Picture 3", "the one in the middle", "the guitar", "left to right", 
etc. Back at Juan's house, he would listen to the tape, repeating slowly what 
had been said, while I wrote it down. I would then listen once more, inserting 
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pauses, picture reference numbers, and so on. It is these transcripts which are 
used as the data for this study. 
Upon what, then, might the differences in their responses depend? 
The assortment of picture tests reviewed in chapter II, as well as bringing to light 
further differences in the ways pictures are interpreted, offers some possible, 
albeit fairly general, answers to this question. 
The task of chapter III is to offer some more specific likely-looking candidates 
for the role of second variable, asking along what seemingly relevant dimensions 
the viewers in my sample differ from one another. With a closer look at the 
physical and social environment in which these individuals live, potentially 
significant differences emerge in terms of the degree to which each of them is 
integrated within Peruvian mainstream society; an integration governed to a great 
extent by (1) their level of education, (2) their ability to speak Spanish, (3) the 
opportunities they have had for travel beyond the island, and (4) their attitudes to 
life beyond the island. After attempting to rank the informants along each of 
these dimensions, we go on in chapter IV to match the resulting profiles with 
their interpretations of pictures to see if any revealing correspondences emerge. 
Few, if any, such correspondences do any such thing. 
In questioning the reasons for their scarcity, however, I corne to realize, first, 
that my failure to adopt a context-sensitive approach to the informants' responses 
precludes revealing correspondences almost entirely; and, secondly, that this 
inadequacy is only enhanced by my failure to adopt a systematic approach to the 
pictures themselves. 
It is the latter deficiency which the second part of this study attempts to remedy. 
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1 Introduction 
CHAPTER II 
Picture Tests 
Chapter I offered some interesting differences in the interpretation of pictures. 
In this chapter we review an assortment of picture tests which bring to light 
further differences in the ways pictures are perceived, and we begin the task 
(taken up in earnest in chapter v) of disentangling to what extent pictorial 
perception is a universal and biologically determined human ability, and to what 
extent it is culturally mediated. 
Underlying the various studies gathered together here as picture tests is one 
basic hypothesis: that, for all that understanding a picture may seem obvious, 
this may, or may not, be a "relative obviousness", which depends upon the 
emotional preoccupations, the age, the culture, and indeed the species of the 
viewer concerned. Under either banner, picture tests have concentrated on 
differing aspects of the process of interpretation; the information perceived to be 
available in non-representational arrays, recognition of pictured objects, 
susceptibility to optical illusions, viewing strategies, projected interaction 
between pictured characters, and so on. 
The main focus of our survey will be cross-cultural picture tests. We ask 
whether differences in perfonnance on perceptual tasks reveal fundamentally 
different perceptual tendencies, and whether any such tendencies may result 
from culturally mediated experiences, or whether they are simply a corollary of 
the conventional and culture-specific nature of the pictorial relation. Steinberg, 
for example, argues that "'technical capacity in the imitation of nature' simply 
does not exist. What does exist is the skill of reproducing handy graphic 
symbols for natural appearances, of rendering familiar facts by set professional 
conventions" (1953: 198). 
There are, then, on the one hand, indications that practically any organism which 
uses visual infonnation should be able to understand information from a picture 
(Herrnstein and Loveland 1964); and, on the other, claims that "the picture, 
particularly one printed on paper, is a highly conventional symbol which the 
child reared in Western culture has learned to interpret" (BiesheuveI1969: 63). 
Somewhere between the two lies the notion that it requires only "practice to see 
the meanings and the spatial relations in two-dimensional representations and 
designs" (Stone and Church 1968: 329). 
Given the validity of either one of the latter, we should anticipate significant 
difficulties in identifying pictured objects on the part of the non-Western child 
and adult, the pictorially naIve Westerner, and also on the part of any non-
human viewer. 
2 Pictures and animals 
There appears to be a popular trend in the lay classification of domestic pets: into 
those which do, and those which do not, watch television. Rhesus monkeys do 
(Miller, Banks and Ogawa 1963); that is to say, they react appropriately to facial 
expressions of other televised monkeys. Chimpanzees have been shown able to 
transfer a taught response from a solid object to its two-dimensional counterpart 
(Hochberg 1964), and to "perceive a photograph of an object atfirst sight" 
(Davenport and Rogers 1971: 320). Pigeons too, once acquainted with the test 
procedure, will respond to human figures in black and white photographs 
(Hermstein and Loveland 1964). Even jumping spiders respond appropriately 
to life-sized pictures of their normal prey (Drees (no date provided), reported in 
Kennedy 1974). And if spiders can recognize objects in pictures, any more 
sophisticated organism which uses visual information should surely have no 
trouble at all. 
In each of the above cases there is, however, the possibility that the image 
provides an instance of the cue, or "releaser", whatever it may be, rather than 
merely a representation of it. Certainly where colour is concerned, as, say, in 
the herring gull chick's pecking at a red "mandibular" spot, on its mother's beak 
and on a crude cardboard cut-out (Hailman 1967), representation and instance 
may indeed be identical. Hayes and Hayes' chimpanzee, Viki, however, 
regularly handled pictures, and was, we gather, in no doubt as to their two-
dimensionality. She would match objects with pictures from which consistent 
"form-cues" had been eliminated, and would lean over a pictured watch, for 
example, in a mime of listening; "she had presumably not mistaken it for a real 
watch, since her normal reaction would then have been to attempt to pick it up 
and hold it to her ear" (Hayes and Hayes 1953: 470). While perhaps not 
conclusive proof in itself that an animal may understand a picture as a picture, 
this does at least suggest that some animals can extract information from a 
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representation without being versed in any convention. Viki's human surrogate 
parents had never attempted to train her in picture perception. In fact the BBC 
Horizon documentary "Chimp Talk" ([Jones] 1993), a survey of research into 
the chimpanzee's linguistic capacity, leaves me in no doubt whatsoever; the 
animals featured, at any rate, seem perfectly capable of understanding pictures as 
pictures. 
3 Cross-cultural object-recognition 
In cross-cultural experiments focussed solely upon object recognition, no 
significant cultural differences have emerged between responses made by 
members of non-European cultures and those of West em adults. 
Hudson (1960), testing black and white, educated and uneducated South 
Africans, found that all subjects could identify pictured animals and humans. 
Much the same conclusion was reached by Mundy-Castle in his tests with 
Ghanaian children (1966), despite the occasional but plausible discrepancy in 
interpretation (a deer labelled a goat, for example) (see chapter IV, §2). 
Deregowski's experiments in Zambia (1968a) and those of Nadel in Nigeria 
(1937) add further support to the notion that recognition of pictured objects is 
not the matter of West em convention Biesheuvel and Steinberg claim it to be. 
In fact, Steinberg is not suggesting, as Kennedy would have it (1974: 30), that 
there is no motivation at all for the relation between the picture and its object, 
but, rather, that some element of conventionality can never be ruled out and that 
there are limitations on pictoriallifelikeness, even where a picture most closely 
resembles its object. Constable's Wivenhoe Park, for example, may look 
wholly lifelike to me, and a Japanese artist's rendition of the same scene 
Japanese. The Japanese observer, on the other hand, may see the one as 
characteristically Briton in style and the other as wholly lifelike (Gombrich 
1977). It is naturalism, then, which is unobtainable outside of a specific 
cultural or stylistic context (Goodman 1976). 
4 Traditional art and contemporary practice 
The traditional art styles of a non-European culture have seemed to some a 
valuable insight into the perceptual habits of its members. In particular, studies 
have focused on the possibility of a relationship between perceptual tendencies 
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and the presence or absence of perspective drawing techniques in the culture's 
art. 
The priority of the "known" over the "seen" is a well-documented feature of the 
art of non-European peoples and that of children (Adam 1949; LOwenfeld 1973; 
Arnheim 1974; Boas 1955; Kennedy 1974; Hudson 1967; Elkind 1969). The 
depiction of the known may be achieved using the "X-ray" technique (Adam 
1949), whereby a subject's internal detail (innards, house contents, etc.) is 
represented, in indigenous art from northern Australia to Alaska; and the "split 
representation" (Deregowski 1968b) technique, whereby an animal may be 
represented by two symmetrical profIles, such as is found in the art of some 
modern North American Indians (figure 1). 
Figure 1 (adapted from Boas 1955: 226) 
Some investigators have considered that just such a disregard of the laws of 
perspective suggests that the artists "see objects in a manner much further from 
the principles of perspective than do the majority of Europeans" (Thouless 1933: 
330). Thouless required Indian students to match elliptical shapes with the 
apparent shape of an inclined circle. Their responses showed a higher degree of 
"phenomenal regression to the real object" (that is, the circle) than was manifest 
in those of British students; results in agreement with those of Beveridge in 
West Africa (1935, 1939). The implication is, Thouless suggests, that "the 
absence of perspective and of shadows in Oriental art is determined by a real 
racial difference in perception and not merely by a tradition of 'symbolic' 
representation" (1933: 337; and see chapter V). Beveridge found that West 
African subjects exhibited the same tendency to phenomenal regression (1935, 
1939). This, he claims, "explains some peculiarities of African drawings which 
the European tends to regard as mistakes" (1935: 61) 
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Segall, Campbell and Herskovits (1966) warn, however, that caution should be 
exercised in assessing a culture's perception on the basis of traditional art or 
contemporary pictorial skills. A lack of perspective in the art may simply reflect 
an age-old, culturally sanctioned way of painting. It is also not unlikely that an 
Indian, accustomed to Indian art styles, might well tend to represent three 
dimensions according to established tradition. Similarly, the stick-like human 
figures drawn by Syrian Bedouins (whose own art is completely non-
representational) surely do not reflect their perceptions of human beings (Dennis 
1960, reported in Segall, Campbell and Herskovits 1966). Performance in 
drawing tasks may also be influenced by fear of the test situation and 
unfamiliarity with the tools provided. Boas reports the case of an Iglulik 
Eskimo asked to draw a walrus hunt on paper with a pencil: "after several 
attempts he took a walrus tusk and carved the whole scene in ivory, a technique 
with which he was familiar" (1955: 65). 
5 Responses to perspective drawings 
Another group of studies has focused upon the possibility of a link between 
responses to perspective drawings and perception. If, as Kennedy suggests, 
"drawings using perspective conform to the laws of light" (1974: 67) (see 
chapter V), it might be anticipated that no cultural differences in response would 
emerge. This is not the case. 
Showing pictures similar to figure 2 to a large and systematically varied subject 
sample, Hudson (1960) posed questions about the proximity of the animals, the 
hunter's target, etc. Like Deregowski (1968b), and Mundy-Castle (1966), he 
found that some subjects did not respond readily to perspective cues in 
drawings. 
Figure 2 (adapted from Hudson 1960: 186) 
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Hudson's results suggest that: 
1) school-going subjects perceive depth more frequently in pictorial material than 
do illiterate subjects and those who no longer attend school and live in isolation; 
2) outline drawings making use of perspective depth cues are less frequently 
seen three-dimensionally than those using overlap or size depth cues; 
3) school-going subjects perceive three dimensions in a photograph more readily 
than in an outline drawing (none of the illiterates saw the photo three-
dimensionally); 
4) intelligence and educational level are factors which independently influence 
three-dimensional pictorial perception, but they appear to do so only with white 
school-going samples (ibid.: 201-2). 
We shall return to Hudson's experiment in chapter v. 
6 Responses to illusions 
Another area of perception in which cultural differences are evident is in the 
realm of optical illusions. 
"The point of an illusion is to design an ambiguous set of sensory inputs in 
order to tease out some characteristics of the perceptual system through an 
analysis of the kinds of errors made. In this way, it is often possible to 
examine in more detail operations of the system that normally are not 
observable" (Lindsay and Norman 1977: 20). The most common optical 
illusions are the MUller-Lyer illusion (figure 3, left), in which line A is usually 
judged to be longer than line B, although the lines are of equal length; the 
horizontal-vertical illusion (figure 3, right), in the vertical line is usually judged 
to be longer than the horizontal one, although the lines are again of equal length; 
and those producing figural aftereffects. More dramatic and perhaps the more 
compelling are illusions in three dimensions (Gregory 1977; Amheim 1974; 
Gombrich 1977, etc.). 
18 
A 
B Figure 3 
)>-------« 
Experiments by Allport and Pettigrew (1957), and (reported in Segall, Campbell 
and Herskovits 1966) Rivers (1901), Heuse (1957), Morgan (1959), and 
Schwitzgebel (1962) all reveal cultural differences in susceptibility to illusions. 
Allport and Pettigrew performed Ames' rotating trapezoidal window illusion to 
an audience of rural Zulus (Allport and Pettigrew 1957). A non-rectangular 
window-frame is rotated in a uniform circular motion. The viewer's tendency is 
to see it as a swaying rectangular window-frame. Under certain viewing 
conditions the rural Zulus reported the illusion significantly less often than did 
white South Africans or urban Zulus. One possible reason for this relates to 
usual visual environment; groups more accustomed to the "visual anchor" of the 
right-angle, who live, that is, in a "carpentered" environment, may be more 
susceptible to line illusions than those, such as the Zulu subjects, whose culture 
is relatively uncarpentered (Segall, Campbell and Herskovits 1966). 
It seems, however, that this is not true of all line illusions. As early as 1901, 
Rivers (reported in Segall, Campbell and Herskovits 1966) found that non-
Western groups were more subject to the horizontal-vertical illusion and less 
subject to the MUller-Lyer illusion than Western groups; that differences exist in 
both directions. This might render suspect, then, any explanation in terms of 
normal environment. But Segall, Campbell and Herskovits claim that the two 
illusions are of different kinds; only the MUller-Lyer illusion exploits a tendency 
to interpret obtuse and acute angles as rectangular surfaces extended in space; 
and only those who live in carpentered environments make habitual use of this 
tendency. Susceptibility to the horizontal-vertical illusion, on the other hand, 
follows from a visual inference habit shaped by broad horizontal vistas (ibid.). 
7 Projective tests 
Further types of picture test employed cross-culturally are subsumed within the 
so-called "projection tests" in vogue during the 1940s and '50s. These include 
19 
Murray's Thematic Apperception Test and the Four Picture Test, but range from 
such table-top techniques as Rorschach's famed inkblots through to play therapy 
and psychodrama. 
What is fundamental to all of them is that, be it a subject's intetpretation of a 
picture, use of doll-play, or characterization of an assigned dramatic role, in each 
case the subject's handling of the task tells us something indirectly about that 
individual's mind (Frank 1939; Bell 1948; Lindzey 1959). This is achieved 
through the essential ambiguity of the task which should allow subjects freedom 
to respond in their own way. In the Thematic Apperception Test, for example, 
subjects are asked to make up a story about each of a series of twenty pictures. 
Since they usually identify with pictured characters, in so doing, subjects reveal 
something of their self-concept, their attitudes to relationships, conflicts, 
fantasies, etc. (Bell 1948). 
7.1 Cross-cultural projective tests 
Hallowell employed the Rorschach technique among the Salteaux Ojibwa 
Indians (Hallowell 1942), and Henry the Thematic Apperception Test among the 
Hopi and Navajo (Henry 1947, reported in Bell 1948), not to diagnose 
psychological problems, but to investigate the effects of acculturation on general 
personality structure. Thus the usefulness of projective tests lies not only in 
their capacity to bring to light signs of emotional disturbance, but also to 
characterize the personality structure of normal individuals (Bock 1980). In 
fact, the two are undoubtedly bound up with one another; see, for example, 
Benedict's characterization of the "Paranoid" Dobuans, and the "Megalomaniac" 
Kwakiutl (Benedict 1932). Bantu responses to the Tomkins-Hom Picture 
Arrangement Test, moreover, scored conventionally, hint at collective neurotic 
or manic-depressive tendencies (Tomkins and Miner 1959, reported in Hudson 
1967). Hudson, however, is at pains to stress that the attribution of psychiatric 
syndromes reveals only a failure on the part of the testers to standardize test 
evaluations cross-culturally (see also Biesheuvel1969; Spindler and Spindler 
1965; Adcock and Ritchie 1958; Henry and Spiro 1953); widespread perceptual 
difficulties (with pictorial depth, for instance) or culture-specific differences in 
intetpretation may underlie seemingly deviant responses to pictures. One of the 
Tomkins-Hom pictures, for example, could be perceived as that of a group of 
people fighting. A standard neurotic response would reject any suggestion of 
aggression, but, likewise, that of any viewer for whom the scene genuinely 
resembles a dance. Frozen postures (see chapter VII, §2.4) "tend to be 
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ambiguous [ ... ] and the viewer's culture can be expected to predispose him 
toward one imaginative story rather than another" (Kennedy 1974: 70). 
Nadel (1937) concentrates more fully on the specifically interpretative aspect of 
picture perception among the Yoruba and the Nupe, two neighbouring tribes of 
Northern Nigeria. He used pictures and stories to investigate the possibility of a 
correlation between diversity of culture and psychological differentiation. We 
shall look at Nadel's study in some detail. 
Subjects viewed a collection of pictures and wrote down what they saw. One 
week later, they were asked to relate what they remembered of the pictures. 
Nadel reports no significant differences in identification of objects by the two 
tribes. Where the responses differed strikingly, however, was in what Nadel 
calls the "psychological organization" of the material. Responses offered by the 
Yoruba were "meaning-oriented", while those of the Nupe subjects were 
"enumerative and appreciative of spatial arrangement" (1937: 211). In his 
(procedurally similar) story experiment, Nadel found that the Yoruba subjects 
"laid stress on logical and relational elements" while the Nupe "showed distinct 
appreciation of situational facts and connexions of time and place" (ibid.: 211). 
For example, Nadel's third picture shows, we are told, a native in Mohammedan 
dress, sitting on a table on which stands a native clay lamp. The lamp, 
incidentally but importantly, resembles the water-pump at the Yoruba's local 
railway station. One Y oruba response, later revealed to be characteristically 
Yoruba, is as follows: "A blind man, wearing a turban and big white gown, 
pumps water from a fountain in order to drink it" (ibid.: 205). Although, when 
recalling the picture one week later, this subject now opts for "lamp" rather than 
"pump", the response still manifests the same degree of organization of the 
material: "A Mohammedan teacher, wearing white turban, sits and lights a lamp 
in front of him, he places it on his right-hand side (obviously in order to read)" 
(ibid.: 205, Nadel's own (rather worrying) brackets). A characteristically Nupe 
response to the same picture is this one: "A man is kneeling, he wears a beautiful 
white turban, his eyes are closed. There is something in front of him which 
looks like the handle of a motor-car" (ibid.: 205). 
What characterized the Y oruba responses, then, was an attempt to give a 
"unitary and consistent meaning to the whole picture" (ibid.: 205). "Meaning", 
for Nadel, is "generally speaking, a recognition of relation, more particularly of 
a relation bearing on purpose and causality" (ibid.: 207). Among the Nupe there 
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is no such tendency. The same respective inclinations were reflected in the 
subjects' recall of the story. Nadel notes, in addition, that imaginary details (see 
chapter VII, §2) played as much a part in Nupe responses as in Yoruba 
responses. Moreover, the "explanatory" response to a picture; for example, 
"The horse is an animal that lives with us people ... " (ibid.: 207), was a feature 
of Yoruba descriptions completely absent from those of Nupe subjects (see 
chapter N, §5; chapter VIII, §8). 
Nadel views the characteristic response types as reflections of certain differing 
aspects of the two cultures. The Yoruba and the Nupe tribes are alike in that 
they live side by side, in the same material environment. They are, moreover, at 
the same stage of civilization, exhibiting similar general social organization and 
employing similar economic systems. Their languages are closely related. 
Where the two groups differ, however, is in the realms of art, drama and 
religion. Yoruba art is highly developed and representational, whereas that of 
the Nupe is non-representational. Only the Yoruba engage in drama and 
pantomime. Y oruba religion involves an elaborate and rationalized hierarchical 
system of deities; N upe religious beliefs centre around a concept of magic of the 
"mana" type. 
The stress on logical cohesion of the Y oruba religion is seen not merely 
incidentally to accompany, but to correspond to, the pronounced meaning-
oriented approach to observational data revealed by their responses to pictures. 
The ornamental, decorative art of the Nupe, on the other hand, along with their 
vague and impersonal religious system, corresponds to a "psychological type" 
which is "more detached and inconsequent in observation and memory, 
enumerative, more sensitive to spatial and temporal arrangement, and stresses 
unity of situation and emotional tone rather than facts of meaning and rational 
consistency" (ibid.: 210). 
8 Summary 
The conclusions which may be drawn from cross-cultural picture tests are 
mixed, pointing perhaps to a continuum of cultural diversity. On the one hand, 
whatever the traditional art style, all subjects seem able to identify most depicted 
objects without difficulty. At the other end, and undoubtedly a cultural 
phenomenon, lie marked differences in interpretation of pictures (once object 
recognition has been achieved), the nature of the differences being potentially 
predictable on the basis of certain features of the cultures in question. In the 
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intennediate area appear differences in susceptibility to optical illusions, which 
may correspond to habitual inferences shaped by usual visual environment; and 
differences in responses to perspective drawings, which seem to relate to level 
of education (see chapter III). 
We have as yet, however, no wholly satisfactory answer to the question of a 
picture's conventionality, particularly with regard to perspective. Implicit in 
many of the experiments mentioned is the suggestion of a progression from an 
unrealistic and convention-laden means of depiction to a thoroughly objective 
Western art (made explicit in Kennedy's phrase above (§5). But any new 
approach provided by formal education, for instance, does not consist in leaving 
cultural considerations behind, but in becoming aware of, and versing oneself 
in, another set of conventions. Thus, although we may have observed the 
influence of cultural considerations on responses to perspective drawings, we 
have neglected to establish the non-conventionality of perspective drawings 
themselves. Any claims such as Thouless's "real racial difference in perception" 
(1933: 337), and even Segall, Campbell and Herskovits' rebuttal (§4 above), 
hinge, therefore, on this supposed objectivity; that is, on the relationship 
between pictorial and non-pictorial perception. 
This relationship is one with which we shall be concerned in chapter V. Only 
once we have a clearer idea of the relationship between pictorial and non-
pictorial perception, shall we be in any position to assess the extent and 
significance of the cross-cultural and cross-species relativity observed above. 
Meanwhile, however, and for the purposes of chapters III and IV, we are 
provided with a handful of potential explanations for the differences in 
interpretations of pictures sampled in chapter I. 
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1 Introduction 
CHAPTERllI 
Dimensions of difference 
Chapter IT's brief survey of picture tests left us with an assortment of 
conclusions about the cross-cultural relativity of picture perception, the safest of 
which seemed to be that it depends. But we were also left with some idea of 
what it may depend upon. For example, it may depend upon the viewer's usual 
visual environment (Segall, Campbell and Herskovits 1966; see chapter II, §6), 
the logical cohesion of the viewer's religious system (Nadel 1937; see chapter IT, 
§7.1), or on the viewers' level of education (Hudson 1960; see chapter II, §5). 
The question discussed in the coming chapter (chapter IV) is whether such 
differences in interpretation as those offered in chapter I may also, and 
revealingly, bear correlation with some second variable, or group of variables. 
It is the task of the present chapter to offer some likely-looking candidates for 
this role. How, in other words, and along what seemingly relevant dimensions, 
might the fifty Peruvian viewers in my sample differ from one another? 
In order to begin to answer this question we need to examine in more detail the 
physical and social environment in which these individuals live (§2). Potentially 
significant differences emerge in tenns of the degree to which each of them is 
integrated within Peruvian mainstream society; an integration governed to a great 
extent by (1) their level of education, (2) their ability to speak Spanish, and (3) 
the opportunities they have had for travel beyond the island (§3). It is these 
three selected aspects of islanders' experience and lifestyle which are adopted as 
"indicators of the degree of integration within Peruvian mainstream society" 
(abbreviated to "integration indicators"). In §5 we attempt to rank the infonnants 
along each dimension, in the hope that the resulting profiles may throw some 
light on their interpretations of pictures. In §7 we introduce two further 
indicators: "pro-traditional orientation" and "pro-'Westem' orientation". These 
are intended as indications not of the degree to which infonnants interact, or are 
able to interact, with Peruvian mainstream society; but, rather, of the degree to 
which they take a positive view of such interaction; that is to say, as an 
attitudinal factor. 
There are, as we shall see, considerable problems with such a quantitative 
approach to difference; not least when we attempt to view the indicators as 
components of acculturation (§4). 
First, then, a closer look at Amantani itself, postponing consideration of themes 
of particular interest until §7 below. 
2 The setting 
The island of Amantani lies in the north-west of Lake Titicaca, five water-borne 
hours from the nearest sizable town, Puno. The terrain is dominated by two 
barren hills, Pachamama and Pachatata, each shelving down into terraced 
chakras, eucalyptus groves and clusters of adobe houses (see Photographs 1 and 
2 in Appendix B). There are no roads and not so much as a bicycle by way of 
transport. Some 5,000 individuals live on the island in five communities: 
Lampayuni, Sancayuni, Occosuyo, Incatiyana and Santa Rosa. Lampayuni is 
the major of these, hosting both the Catholic church and the offices of the 
alcalde. 
As head of the district council, the alcalde is in charge of matters that concern the 
welfare of the island as a whole and in relation to the state. Typically these 
comprise the issuing of licences and the imposing of [meso Equipped with 
office, secretary and antique typewriter, the alcalde delegates other aspects of the 
work to respected and elected members of the island community, called 
collectively autoridades though they may have specific titles, e.g. comisario, 
mayordomo. The teniente gobernador handles the maintenance of law and order 
with the intermittent aid of two non-resident members of the Guardia Civil, 
Peru's national police force. Sharing the task of directing local affairs is the 
community council led by five respected elders each of whom has been elected 
presidente-varayoq by one of the five individual communities. Their main 
concern is with public works projects for the island; for example, the upkeep of 
the school and jetty, and the organization of any community work session, or 
faena. A third, informal but important, network of organization is that 
maintained through compadrazgo, or "co-parenthood": a relationship of mutual 
obligation established at a child's baptism between the child's father and an 
elected godparent. The choice is motivated by the desire to gain a personalized 
tie with someone of higher social standing whose influence and patronage will 
be of benefit to both the godchild and the godchild's parents. 
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Agriculture constitutes the principal daily work for almost every islander. The 
year revolves around the cycle of planting, cultivating and harvesting quinoa, 
beans, barley and, most commonly, potatoes. Terraced plots are broken up with 
hoes and ploughed by hand, crops are planted between August and November, 
and the produce harvested around April. Meanwhile there are sheep to be 
pastured, chickens and perhaps a pig to tend to. 
A modest house is a single-storeyed thatched adobe construction with a separate 
lean-to kitchen and a tiny patch of rough ground outside. Within this small area 
islanders must cook, eat, sleep, wash, weave, dry fish, store crops, receive 
visitors and take care of animals. A wealthier house is one of two storeys roofed 
in tin and built around a small courtyard. Aided by neither electricity nor 
chimney cooking takes place in a smoke-blackened kitchen lit by a kerosene 
lamp, a candle, or just the glow from a clay stove, to the squeaking of guinea-
pigs confined only by a raised doorstep. The typical diet is characterized by 
ample carbohydrate, insufficient protein and little vitamin C. Supper, for 
example, is commonly a stew of potato in various guises, pasta and barley, with 
the less common and welcome addition of tinned tuna, tiny home-caught fish, 
guinea-pig, mutton, seaweed or an egg. By no means everyone eats this well, 
nor is the diet so limited. A few families grow onions, chillis and cabbages in a 
small vegetable garden, but there is no fruit other than the occasional orange 
brought over from Puno. 
Although crop-rotation is well-established, and some use made of animal and 
chemical fertilizers, much of the land is very poor. Terracing cannot prevent soil 
erosion altogether, and irrigation is a problem for all but the two islanders 
wealthy enough to possess a pump, and those fortunate enough to own plots 
near the shore - but not so near as to have been swept into the lake by the 
flooding of 1986. There is also the constant threat of frost, hail, and fungal crop 
disease. Added to these worries is the size of the plots themselves. Land is 
nonnally acquired through inheritance. With successive allocations to many as 
ten children a time, the divided plots eventually become so small that they cannot 
sustain a family for more than a few months. While this undoubtedly occasions 
extreme anxiety it also affords a certain amount of spare time during which to 
search for alternative means of raising cash: fishing, shopkeeping, weaving, and 
tourism. 
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2.1 Non-agricultural activities 
Despite the apparent suitability of the location, fishing has been an occupation to 
which only those with insufficient land resorted. As the fertility of the land 
diminishes, however, more turn to the lake to supplement their diet and/or their 
income. When not destined for home consumption, the catch may be bartered 
on the island, snapped up by buyers from Juliaca, or, more rarely, ferried to 
Puno market. Fishing is not seen as an ideal activity; it is usually nocturnal and 
often impeded by rough weather. The profit margin, moreover, is very low, the 
maintenance of nets time-consuming, and the biannual boat-replacement 
expensive. 
Shopkeeping, while presenting none of these dangers, is no safer financially. 
Amantani boasts five shops each of which is poorly stocked with the same 
limited range of goods: washing powder, kerosene, cooking oil, candles, coca, 
matches, cigarettes, sugar, sweets, tinned tuna, soft drinks and some sewing 
items. There is no market. 
There are no tradespeople either, in the sense of full-time blacksmiths, masons, 
shoemakers, bakers and the like. This is not to say that many islanders cannot 
turn their hand to carpentry, masonry, etc.; but that those with a particular skill 
upon which they might wholly depend will soon leave an island where demand 
could never support such a business. Consequently islanders must either fall 
back on their own and their relatives' abilities, or they must head for Puno. 
Everyone, on the other hand, engages in handicraft of some sort, and most 
especially in spinning and weaving. Most articles are destined for the island's 
salon anesanai, a tourist-oriented weaving and knitwear co-operative. 
Ironically, the best customers are from the neighbouring island of Taquile where 
the artisans cannot keep up with the tourist demand and where goods from 
Amantani will fetch double the price. 
2.2 Tourists and other visitors 
The travellers' Handbook to South America (1987) indulges in a brief but 
enthusiastic bit of plugging on behalf of Amantani. Even so, very few tourists 
come to Amantani. Those who do are charmed by the beauty of the island, 
especially if their arrival coincides with that of the potato blossoms. They are 
also charmed by the scarcity of other tourists - a charm felt by the islanders to be 
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an acute shortage. Since there are no established hostels, a family's provision of 
a meal and a bed for the night may generate desperately needed funds. But 
lancheros, who run the passenger-boats, inevitably stake a claim on the visitors 
before they have reached land. Jealousy and conflict result, while there remains 
the simple fact that there are just not enough tourists to go around. Yet 
thousands get as far as Puno and many hundreds journey to Taquile. Faced 
with this situation, the response on Amantani, naturally enough, is to attempt to 
make a visit there more attractive; by lowering prices, sprucing up the jetty area, 
learning to cook chips, and even engaging in sporadic searches for a fabled 
underground passage from Pachatata to Cuzco. What the islanders appear 
consistently not to do is to invest time and energy (and money) getting the 
message across to the tourists themselves. 
The island is not wholly neglected by other outsiders, who contribute various 
forms of aid, with and without strings attached. The Fundaci6n Interamericana, 
for example, provided motors for the passenger boats; a team of engineers 
sponsored by PISA-Puno drew up plans for a cheap means of irrigating the 
whole island; and the government organization, ONAA, prompted the time-
consuming and expensive construction of stone arches promising flour in return. 
Islanders' views on such help are by no means wholly positive. Experience has 
shown that carrots dangled often tum out to be very small indeed; ONAA's flour 
quotas, for example, a pitiful 2 kilos per family, were greeted with rage and 
weeping. But lack of enthusiasm also stems from a realization that aid projects 
tend to benefit only those most closely involved - whatever the intentions of the 
donor. The boat motors benefit only the boat owning partnerships. And, 
tragically, in the absence of any prospective monopoly, the aid seems doomed to 
benefit no-one at all. The irrigation blueprints, proudly shown to me by the 
island "intermediary", were fished out from under his bed where they had 
remained for three years in anticipation of inevitably insufficient gratitude on the 
part of his neighbours. 
Spiritual aid, if in principle less vulnerable to abuses of this kind, fares little 
better than material aid in practice and is often seemingly reduced to it. Most of 
the islanders are Catholic, though there are a few Mormons and many Seventh 
Day Adventists. Catholic services, held weekly in Amantant"s only church, are 
conducted by a priest from the mainland perhaps one Sunday in fifteen. To this 
extent, their faith is more closely monitored from without than that of the other 
two congregations, though each group receives its share of pastoral visits. 
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Adventists and Catholics are not altogether well-disposed towards one another. 
Of the numerous overt expressions of ill-feeling I heard, only one comment 
concerned doctrine, while accusations of selfishness, overpiety, and no piety at 
all flew in both directions. More specifically, the Catholic Church donates rice, 
milk powder, and second-hand clothes; aid which, say the Adventists, is 
intended for the whole island but which goes straight and solely to the Catholics. 
Indeed this aid is cited by adherents of both as a reason for opting for the 
Catholic faith. 
In all, if not to visitors certainly to the islanders themselves, the picture is rather 
bleak, in terms of both material subsistence and morale. Expressions of great 
anxiety invariably find their way into conversations on almost any topic, the 
words "kaypi mana vida kanchu" (there's no living to be made here) and 
"karselpi hina kayku" (it's as though we're in a prison) recurring as bitter catch-
phrases. It is precisely this, moreover, which inspires intermittent bursts of 
private enterprise, and which draws islanders to the stability of an urban income 
elsewhere. 
3 Avenues of change 
With luck, a move in that direction may indeed bring in more money. But this is 
not the only change the move will involve. It may involve only a new set of 
clothes, a taste for Chilean lager, and a penchant for disaster movies; or it may 
involve learning to read (§3.3), to speak Spanish fluently (§3.2), and perhaps 
too a rejection of traditional island values (§7). 
3.1 Travel 
It is clear that the islanders do not live in total isolation. Those who never leave 
Amantanf may get an indirect taste of life outside through contact with 
missionaries, tourists, police, aid workers, returning migrants, etc., and by 
listening to the radio. Most people's experience, however, is not confined to 
playing host to sundry in comers. Few islanders have never been to Puno, 
whether to buy foodstuffs, clothes, exercise books and wool; to sell potatoes, 
fish and handicraft; or, though uncommonly, to engage in legal proceedings, to 
undergo medical treatment, or to attend Campesino Federation meetings and the 
like. 
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But to make economic headway - or even merely to subsist -lengthier 
excursions are required of islanders, who work in factories, bakeries, and on 
building sites; as soldiers, maids, miners, street vendors, and weavers; 
venturing only as far as Puno or Juliaca, or braving the journey to Lima. Money 
is of course not the sole reason for leaving Amantani; travel offers the 
opportunity for education, adventure, and self-improvement. 
With very obvious material and social advantages to be gained, it is a wonder, 
then, that more people do not leave the island. The reason of course is that there 
are limits to the numbers who may, who want to, who dare, and who can. A 
youngest son, for example, required traditionally to look after his parents, 
generally may not leave. As to wanting and daring, the prospect of adventure 
and comparative wealth must be weighed against the understandable fear of the 
unfamiliar; a fear fuelled by tales of isolation, unemployment, crime, ridicule, 
traffic hazard, and unpalatable food. 
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And as to who can, mobility, whether physical or social, is practically 
impossible in Peru without some knowledge of Spanish. Spanish is the 
language of government, business, law, education (for the most part), and of the 
printed word; while Quechua is the language of the highlands and the slums, 
spoken by the indigent and the illiterate. 
Quechua is also the mother tongue of all islanders native to Amantani. Other 
than when communicating with tourists, moreover, Quechua is used in almost all 
social situations, including church services and public meetings. In school, 
however, it is Spanish which predominates - not surprisingly, since the teachers 
have rarely been Quechua speakers. Although children now learn to read and 
write in their own language this is a recent innovation which has not affected any 
of the informants in the sample. 
For a trip to Puno too, Quechua - plus the odd Spanish numeral, perhaps - will 
serve very well- so long as the purpose of the trip is a purchase or a sale; so 
long business is confined to the market, the lakeside, and the bottom end of 
town; so long as one does not wish to apply for a job, seek professional help, 
understand a film at the cinema, or just chat to someone on the bus. In short, so 
long as one is content not to be able to interact with the vast majority of other 
Peruvians, Quechua will serve. 
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3.3 F annal education 
A second and closely related factor regulating interaction with mainstream 
Peruvian society, is level of formal education. 
The ftrst school on Amantani was built in 1940, offering initially only the ftrst 
two years of primary education, and currently, the full primary curriculum. 
There is still no functioning secondary school, though one is presently under 
construction in Lampayuni, its progress frequently halted by a shortage of 
bricks. To receive a secondary education children must leave Amantani. 
Schooling is free but parents are expected to equip their children with exercise 
books and uniforms. Although this severe drain on funds is felt as keenly today 
as at any time in the last ftfty years, formerly it served to inhibit enrolment 
considerably, and enrolment of daughters almost entirely. Attendance was also 
very low. Children's energies were needed elsewhere: in the ftelds, with the 
sheep, or with smaller siblings. There prevailed, moreover, such a mistrust of 
the school that many parents would not allow their children even to approach the 
building, let alone enrol. Nowadays islanders are very aware of the beneftts of 
education and readily submit to further hardship on their children's behalf. 
Truancy meanwhile remains high - teacher truancy included. Working on an 
isolated island with little excitement and few creature comforts is not an 
appealing post, and teachers often make unscheduled departures. Continuity is 
further disrupted by the speed with which teachers seize upon more amenable 
appointments elsewhere. 
3.4 Summary and introduction of indicators 
It seems likely that any two islanders, more as victims of opportunity and 
necessity than of caprice or interest, will differ in the degree to which they 
interact are integrated within with Peruvian mainstream society. It is possible, 
moreover, that this interaction, whether visual or verbal, participatory or from 
afar, may inform their approach to the pictures they see. 
Since the three aspects outlined within §3 above seem particularly crucial in 
facilitating, or in constituting, that interaction, we shall adopt them as "indicators 
of integration within Peruvian mainstream society" (abbreviated as "integration 
indicators"); that is: 
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(1) level offonnal education; 
(2) proficiency in Spanish; 
(3) frequency and duration of journeys off the island. 
with respect to each of which infonnants will be assigned a rank (§6 below). 
We shall add to the three above two further indicators: 
(4) pro-"Western" orientation; 
(5) pro-traditional orientation, 
each of which has five components (§7 below). These indicators are of a 
different kind in that they are not measures of actual behaviour but of attitudes 
towards the traditions of life on the island and to the world outside. Their 
inclusion has a basis in the possibility (hinted at in chapter II, and taken up again 
in chapter V) that there may be such things as distinct mental approaches to 
pictorial representation which may depend upon neither education nor travel nor 
any other kind of substantial achievement; merely upon attitude. Indeed, in 
acknowledgement of Nadel's findings discussed in chapter II, it becomes 
something of a matter of principle to incorporate an attitudinal angle. That said, 
the ten components are not wholly attitudinal matters. Where mode of dress is 
concerned, I have scored infonnants' clothing (that is, what they wear), rather 
than their preferred taste in clothing. But for the most part the components are 
questions of preference which need not be enacted in actual behaviour. 
4 Models of change 
It may appear that the changes we are describing fall readily under the umbrella 
of urbanization, or upward class mobility!. A not wholly alternative view, 
however, is that it goes deeper than this; and that the process of which 
education, peregrination, and (linguistic) hispanization are but contributory 
episodes is the process of acculturation. 
1 The relationship between class and ethnicity in Peru is far from straightforward (see van den 
Berghe and Primov 1977; Doughty 1968; Hawkins 1984), and the change we describe below as 
a passing from one ethnic group to another has been described as a change from marginalized 
ethnic group to urban middle class. 
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The acculturative framework is one we shall eventually reject. Nevertheless, 
since this study was, in the course of its development, envisaged in precisely 
these terms, it is important that we take a closer look. 
4.1 Acculturation 
"Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of 
individuals having different cultures come into continuous ftrst-hand contact, 
with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both 
groups" (Redfteld, Linton and Herskovits 1936: 149). 
This deftnition was conceived in response to a growing interest in the dynamics 
of culture change as a result of culture contact. Clearly applicable to, say, the 
adoption of Pueblo Indian weaving techniques by neighbouring Navajo (Kent 
1976), initial usage of the term tended to describe only the impact of European 
upon non-European cultures. As it stands, however, the scope of the deftnition 
is itself uncertain, given the semantic elasticity of "groups of individuals", 
"continuous", and "first-hand" (Herskovits 1964). Subsequent versions, for 
example: 
"By acculturation we mean the process which takes place within a culture, a 
population, or a social system, in response to the impact of stimuli from other 
cultures or populations" (Spindler and Goldschmidt 1970: 210 (see also SSRC 
1954: 974; Bee 1974: 96)), 
adopt a more flexible approach to the nature of the groups involved, while 
shifting the emphasis from the type of situation in which change takes place to 
the process of change itself. Despite its being considered a process, however, it 
is quite usual to speak of acculturation in terms of three relatively distinct steps: 
diffusion (the transmission of techniques, ideas, art forms, etc.), evaluation (the 
acceptance or rejection of incoming traits by the recipient group), and integration 
(Bee 1974, after Spicer 1961). 
4.1.1 Integration of traits 
Whatever the reason for a trait's acceptance, it must be integrated into the 
recipients' cultural system. Integration may be achieved in many ways, those 
most commonly offered being: 
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i) incorporation: new elements are simply added to the recipients' cultural 
inventory, usually with some modification, but essentially causing little 
disruption to the system as a whole. The guitar, for instance, unknown in 
South America before the arrival of the Europeans, was scaled down and backed 
with armadillo shell to become the charango; 
ii) replacement: new elements are substituted for pre-existing ones. European 
paper and parchment replaced the Mexican amate, or bark paper, at the time of 
the Conquest (Stromberg 1976). Replacement is often associated with coercion; 
as in the case of the Ainu of Hokkaido, whose traditional hunting and fishing 
practices were made illegal by the Japanese in an effort to promote agriculture 
(Low 1976); 
iii) fusion: traits from the two cultures in contact are combined to produce a 
third, hybrid, pattern. Latin American folk: Catholicism is the classic example, a 
syncretism of Catholic and pre-Columbian ritual (Gonzalez Martinez 1987); 
iv) companmentalization: this is perhaps more properly a form of resistance to 
integration (Bee 1974). Traits of the donor culture, seemingly incorporated or 
substituted for existing traits, are isolated, or held apart, from the recipients' 
own system. For example, seventeenth century Jesuits among the Huron in 
Canada rejoiced to see all the outward signs of successful conversion to 
Christianity: church attendance, hymn singing, prayer, etc. What they little 
realized initially was that their Huron converts were merely going through the 
motions, whether for fear of reprisals, or in anticipation of some immediate and 
all too earthly reward; and that in the missionaries' absence indigenous religious 
practices continued much as usual (Bitterli 1989). 
The presentation of integration as a choice between four options is not wholly 
satisfactory, and the line between the alternative strategies far from 
straightforward in practice. 
Some uncertainty - though by no means all- may be resolved by a clear idea of 
scope, analytic or chronological, in reviewing a particular phenomenon. The 
Egungun "Englishman Pursuing Prostitute" masked burlesque, for example, 
performed in Badagri in Nigeria around 1940s (Bascom 1976), may be viewed 
as an incorporation (the European character), a replacement (a reprieve for the 
former lampoon victim), a fusion (of form and subject-matter in the burlesque 
itself), and (at some further removal) an embryonically revivalist piece of satire. 
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What is more, an incorporation which seems initially to have little effect on the 
coherence of the system may have far-reaching consequences. The horse, for 
instance, was probably adopted by Plains Indians only for its superiority over 
the dog as a pack animal (Wissler 1914). Yet any broader historical perspective 
will show horse-culture to have displaced maize planting, intensified nomadism 
and significantly increased intertribal contact, to become the sine qua non of 
nineteenth century Plains Indian culture (ibid.). In events beyond Wissler's 
chronological scope, however, the horse was also to playa substantial part in the 
ultimate downfall of that culture through its role in the extermination of the 
buffalo (Bitterli 1989). 
Such reappraisals notwithstanding, there remain instances of acculturative 
"double bluff', and reactions to reactions, which are not readily explained in 
terms of the above (see, for example, Graburn 1976). 
4.12 Aspects of individual acculturation 
Traits of course do not migrate of their own accord. Since it is, rather, their 
human carriers who come into contact with bearers of other cultures, the traits to 
which either cultural system is exposed will depend on precisely who meets 
whom and why; that is, on the "conjunctive relations" (SSRC 1954: 980). If 
young males meet regularly to negotiate hunting rights, for example, their 
encounters are unlikely to result immediately in the transmission of midwifery 
techniques. 
Any particular contact event will inevitably involve only a certain number of 
individuals and a certain number of topics. Consequently, members of any 
group will differ from one another in terms of both the amount and the type of 
exposure to a second group they have experienced. What is more, they will 
react to that exposure at different rates and in different ways (McFee 1968). No 
less inevitably, then, individuals within a single group will come to be 
differentially "acculturated". 
Beals, however, notes that "the frequent reference to acculturated individuals 
(rather than groups) seems particularly ambiguous in terms of most of the formal 
defmitions" (1953: 628)1. Nevertheless an emphasis on individual acculturation 
1 Beals should perhaps have taken issue with how individuals, whether singly or in groups, 
may be said to be acculturated at all; since, "while it is individuals who change their habits of 
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is the approach many researchers have adopted (Spindler and Goldschmidt 
1970; McFee 1968; Chance 1965; Christopherson and Dingle 1982; Adcock and 
Ritchie 1958, etc.). 
What these investigators have done is to rank individuals according to certain 
selected aspects of their lifestyle which are considered relevant to the degree of 
acculturation in that they constitute points of contact with an alien culture, 
experience of which may vary from individual to individual. 
Their respective lists of indicators vary considerably (see, for example, Spindler 
and Goldschmidt 1970; Spindler and Spindler 1965; McFee 1968; Chance 1965; 
Christopherson and Dingle 1982), not because these investigators are operating 
with signficantly different general interpretations of "acculturation"; but because 
they are working with different sets of individuals; and different groups may not 
be vulnerable to exactly the same kind of acculturation. On purely practical 
grounds, for instance, there would be little point in employing either Chance's 
indicator (4): hospitalization, where no subject had ever been to hospital; or 
indicator (2): knowledge of the dominant language, where the groups in contact 
use (solely) one and the same language. 
The kind of acculturation to which the people of Amantani are vulnerable is - if 
we take the line proposed by van den Berghe and Primov - almost inevitably a 
question of crossing ethnic boundaries, of "mestizoization"; since those aspects 
of their lifestyle Indians must change if their lot is appreciably to improve are 
precisely the things which make them less Indian, and correspondingly more 
mestizo (van den Berghe and Primov 1977). 
42 "Mestizoization" 
What features, then, distinguish the Indian and the mestizo in highland Peru? 
On the basis of a questionnaire, distributed in San Jeronimo (a small town some 
200 miles north-west of Amantanf), which called for definitions of "mestizo", 
"campesino" ("peasant"), and "indfgena" ("Indian"), van den Berghe and 
Primov (1977) arrived at the following picture: 
doing and believing under the influence of alien forms, it is the body of custom of the society 
to which they belong that is said to be acculturated" (SSRC 1954: 975). 
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1) Indians are monolingual Quechua speakers; 
2) they live in rural areas as full time peasants; 
3) they wear traditional woven clothing; 
4) they chew coca leaves; 
5) they maintain traditional beliefs in apus (mountain divinities), etc.; 
6) they are badly educated (ibid.: 18-21). 
A mestizo, by comparison, was found to be "a Spanish-speaking person 
possessing more education, more wealth, more power, more social status" 
(ibid.: 134). These findings are echoed more or less exactly by Doughty (1968) 
in his survey of the population of Huaylas, another five hundred miles or so to 
the north-west. 
4.3 Model problems 
Now, our indicators (1) to (3) above seem to sit quite comfortably within this 
context. For example, in responses to van den Berghe and Primov's 
questionnaire, education was by far the most frequently mentioned means by 
which an Indian might become a mestizo (1977: 137). Fluency in Spanish, 
moreover, "is clearly the main test of mestizo identity" (ibid.: 117). 
The importance of travel, however, is emphasized neither as explicitly nor to the 
same extent as that of Spanish proficiency and education; though Doughty, for 
example, tells us that "the need to migrate is considered inevitable if one has any 
social or economic ambitions" (1968: 33); and van den Berghe and Primov agree 
that "upwardly mobile Indians [, finding] little scope for their skills and 
enterprise [ ... ] have, thus, little option but to move out of the area" (1977: 124). 
Yet both statements seem to imply that as an index of acculturation travel is 
somehow more "symptomatic" than "instrumental". 
Nevertheless, time spent away from Amantani intensifies overwhelmingly an 
islander's contact with Peruvian mainstream society. What is more, though it is 
by no means as specifically "visually-oriented" an indicator as we might wish, a 
journey of any duration offers a huge increase in variety of visual stimuli, and, 
more specifically, a huge increase in pictorial stimuli, whether on the walls of 
bus stations and workplaces, or at the cinema and through shop windows. 
Indeed, if there is such a thing as "pictorial acculturation", indicator (3) is surely 
more instrumental than symptomatic. 
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But, there emerge, with regard to acculturation itself, problems of such 
magnitude that they far outweigh any conceivable advantages to be gained from 
anchoring our indicators within any such framework. 
The basic problem hinges on the concept of a continuwn of change; a 
fundamental concept within both acculturation and mestizoization. According to 
this model, the allocation of points for the presence or absence of cultural traits 
deemed characteristic of either Indian or mestizo would assign to any individual 
a position on a straight line stretching from the unambiguously Indian at one 
end, to the unambiguously mestizo at the other. 
Yet there exist in Peru probably tens of thousands of people who lie somewhere 
in between; perhaps speaking both Quechua and Spanish; perhaps fulfilling all 
the criteria for Indianhood bar one (Matos Mar's urban "Indians", for instance 
(1986», or perhaps fulfilling no single criterion without qualification (De la 
Cadena 1991). Indeed, through their espousal of such caricatures, van den 
Berghe and Primov are persuaded to locate the whole town of San Jeronimo in 
the middle of the continuum (1977: 134) - abandoned, presumably, to a state of 
"ethnic limbo" (Crespi 1975: 149). 
Where the continuum model is flawed is in its inevitable assumption that all 
changes undergone in the process of individual acculturation are cultural 
replacements; as though, with the adoption of a (characteristically Anglo-
American) attitude to material acquisition, for example, one must necessarily 
renounce, say, any (characteristically Blackfeet) displays of generosity (McFee 
1968); or as though a Monday night spent in the bowling-alley somehow 
precludes admission to Tuesday night's potlatch. It is far from uncommon (see, 
for example, Sallnow 1989; Banton 1981), however, for individuals to wield 
two (or more) sets of cultural norms simultaneously - if perhaps in different 
social contexts (see chapter IV); and it is this which gives us such an astonishing 
degree of multiculturalism in Trinidad that: 
"a Trinidadian feels no inconsistency in being a British citizen, a Negro in 
appearance, a Spaniard in name, a Roman Catholic at church, an obeah (magic) 
practitioner in private, a Hindu at lunch, a Chinese at dinner, a Portuguese at 
work, and a Colored at the polls" (Crowley 1957: 823). 
Next to this, McFee's "150% Man" (75% Blackfeet and 75% Anglo-American) 
(1968), seems positively narrow-minded. Yet even these individuals can only 
be misrepresented on anyone-dimensional acculturation continuum. Being no 
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more Blackfeet than Anglo-American in orientation, the rules of the analysis (one 
point per characteristic) will allocate to such people a position in the middle of 
the continuum - a position also occupied by any ("100%") Person whose 
acculturation genuinely consists only of strategies of replacement (in a classic, if 
scarcely feasible, case of individual assimilation). McFee argues that only the 
adoption of a multi-dimensional approach, which does not rest upon an 
assumption of cultural replacement, and which allows the (in his case) two 
orientations (Blackfeet and Anglo-American) to be considered separately, can 
yield a distribution which fits his subjects' observed social interaction. What 
this means, however, is an outright rejection of the acculturation model (ibid.). 
"New ways can be acquired without abandoning the old" (ibid.: 1096). It is in 
acknowledgement of this, and of the fact that such a phenomenon is in no way 
exceptional, that I have laid aside all thoughts of locating within an acculturative 
framework the analysis which follows. 
5 Preliminary grouping of informants 
There are, as I said, fifty informants in the sample. With the exception of 
Informant 42, all stated that they had been born and brought up on Amantani. 
The grouping of informants according to age and sex needs little explanation. 
Although I had initially envisaged a treatment irrespective or gender, it became 
very obvious very quickly that such a division is fundamental to an 
understanding of differences in opportunity and experience. Likewise, age. 
Informants' ages range from thirteen to over seventy. Few of the oldest 
informants have any idea of their exact age. Informant 19, for example, told me 
that she was seventy years old, while her daughter (Inf. 18) assured me that her 
mother was only sixty. The age category cut-off points are arbitrary. 
Clearly this sample is not only small; it is also badly balanced as regards age and 
sex. The particularly glaring discrepancy in the 35-44 category (see figures 1 
and 2) is largely due to the relative accessibility of men and women in that age 
group. A further imbalance, and one obscured by the table and graph, is that 
there are no informants between the ages of fourteen and nineteen (see summary 
table, figure 22). 
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Figure 1: Age and sex categories 
age group male female totals 
13-24 6 5 11 
25-34 6 3 9 
35-44 11 3 14 
45-54 5 3 8 
55-64 4 1 5 
65+ 1 2 3 
totals 33 17 50 
Figure 2: Age and sex categories 
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6 Ranking of indicators 
II Female 
[J Male 
Infonnants are ranked A, B, C, D, or E with respect to each of indicators (1) to 
(3). The ranks are arranged from, for example, least well-(fonnally-)educated 
(E) to most highly educated (A). They are not intended as absolutes. Within 
indicator (2) (proficiency in Spanish), for example, rank A does not necessarily 
point to complete fluency, nor E to Quechua monolingualism. The ranks are 
intended merely to reflect as much variation as seems relevant in each case. 
As a result each informant is assigned not a score but a profile; beginning in 
Infonnant 2's case, for example: CDR; that is, ranking C on indicator (1), D on 
indicator (2), and R on indicator (3). I have, however, also equated each rank 
with a numerical score: 
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A = 10 
B = 7.5 
C = 5 
D = 2.5 
E = 0 
in order to obtain a single numerical total for each informant; in Informant 2's 
case again: 15. 
Although this cumulative strategy is not uncommon in similarly oriented studies 
(see for example Chance 1965; Christopherson and Dingle 1982; McFee 1968), 
there is, as we have seen (§4.3) much to discourage it. One, to some extent 
independent, disadvantage, however, is that a cumulative strategy assumes that 
the separate indicators (and their rankings) are commensurable. It may be, of 
course, that commensurability of a sort can be engineered through the use of a 
weighting factor. Yet even supposing we could be sure that, say, a two-year 
spell at primary school is "equivalent" to three months down a mine in lea, the 
qualitative difference is so immense that little would be gained, and much 
obscured. Nevertheless, when we come to compare informants' integration 
profiles with their picture interpretations, we shall make use of such numerical 
totals to facilitate the initial presentation of the results. Where a more 
illuminating pattern emerges with a break-down of those totals into their 
component rankings, this will also be presented; where none is evident, I shall 
simply state that none is evident. In fact, this cumulative strategy acquires a 
certain justification, albeit double-edged, with the realization that the three 
indicators we have chosen are so heavily interdependent that in ostensibly 
isolating, say, the influence of schooling from that of Spanish (by considering 
only indicator (1)), we have in reality achieved nothing ofthe sort. 
6.1 Formal education rankings 
Formal education rankings are allocated as follows: 
A completion of secondary education 
B some secondary education 
C more than two years primary education 
D up to two years primary education 
E no formal education 
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Figure 3: Level offormal education 
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The availability of schooling and the changing attitudes to education are clearly 
reflected in the matrix above. Level of schooling decreases with age. The only 
female in the 25-34 age group who has attended school is Informant 30 who is 
thirty years old. Male informants are consistently better educated than women of 
the approximately same age. The rather diffuse patterning in the 13-24 age 
group explains itself when the ages are themselves spelt out: 
Figure 4: Level offormal education; ages 13-24 
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That is to say, for these few women, level of schooling still seems to take a 
downward turn with an increase in age. Finance allowing, however, I suspect 
that the two youngest women (lnfs. 23 and 48) will not follow this pattern since 
both sets of parents are wholly committed to the education of their daughters. It 
should also be mentioned that the two nineteen year olds are only exceptional in 
so far as they are still resident on Amantani - but not for long; having recently 
completed their schooling, they are both seeking the means to continue their 
studies elsewhere. Informant 7 has become quite notorious on the island 
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through rumours of his prodigious grasp of physics, while Informant 8 hopes to 
become a priest. The only other informant ranking A is Informant 42 (aged 29) 
who is a teacher. 
62 Proficiency in Spanish 
Asking informants under what circumstances they spoke Spanish yielded in 
many cases professions of a complete inability: 
Keshwallata rimani. Mana castellanota atinichu 
I only speak Quechua. I can't speak Spanish (Inf. 11); 
or an almost complete inability: 
Castellanota pocollata atini. Keshwa legitimo. Aymaratapis pocollata atini 
I can only speak a bit of Spanish. Proper Quechua, though. And just a bit of 
Aymara 1 too (Inf. 45); 
while others readily claim to speak both: 
Noqa rimani castellano y quechua. Nada mas. Iskay idioma 
I speak Spanish and Quechua. That's all. Two languages (lnf. 20) 
Clearly, a proficiency ranking based upon such statements is insufficient for our 
purposes. To complicate matters, Quechua (and Puno Quechua in particular, 
apparently) is so larded with Spanish loanwords (see, for example, Hoggarth 
1973) that - whatever the informants themselves may claim - the bona fide 
Quechua monolingual is probably something of a rarity. Informant 41, for 
example, in expressing her complete inability to speak Spanish, does, to some 
extent (in bold type), just that: 
Unos cuantos kinsa tawa palabrata intendini pero mana parlayta 
atinichu 
I can understand a few - three or four words, but I can't speak it. (lnf. 41) 
Because of the unreliability of informants' own assessments of their proficiency, 
some independent alternative is needed. In other words, we need to measure the 
degree a/their bilingualism. 
1 Several informants to my knowledge speak or understand some Aymara. It is regrettable 
that the extent to which this is true of the entire sample is not known. 
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6.2.1 Degrees of bilingualism 
That measuring bilingualism should be feasible even in principle has only arisen 
since Bloomfield's "native-like control oftwo languages" (1935: 56) was largely 
upstaged by the idea of a continuum (Diebold 1964; Mackey 1968), with the 
"coordinate" bilingual at one end and the "incipient" bilingual at the other (see 
below). 
With the acknowledgement that bilingualism is a matter of degree, came an 
awareness of the many guises in which it may manifest itself. An individual 
may be able to understand L2 without being able to speak it; to speak L2 without 
being able to translate it into Ll; to read L2 without being able to speak it, etc. 
(Mackey 1968). Correspondingly, bilingualism has been assessed on the basis 
of various criteria: knowledge of L2 vocabulary (Diebold 1961, reported in 
Rubin 1972, for example); range of sociological contexts in which L2 is 
preferred (Myers 1973); aural comprehension (Ervin-Tripp 1978); "fluency" (in 
the sense of the "ability to carry on a continuous conversation without hesitating 
because of morphological or syntactic doubts" (Rubin 1972: 353», with or 
without regard for accuracy (see Shapira 1978); number of errors in the 
production of specific L2 inflectional categories (Kessler 1971); or deviance of 
intuitions concerning well-formedness (Coppieters 1987), to name but a few. 
Where proficiency varies considerably within a group of informants, it may be 
sufficient to classify them impressionistically (Diebold 1964, and Rubin 1972, 
for example). Rubin, for instance, rates her Paraguayan informants' ability to 
speak and understand Spanish and Guarani as "good", "so/so" or "none" (ibid.: 
352), prior to matching them with the then fairly standard categories: 
1) "coordinate bilingual"; that is, "any speaker learning more than one 
language, either during childhood acquisition of two or more native 
languages or later 'perfect' mastery of a language other than the native 
one" (Diebold 1964: 496, after l Weinreich 1953); in Rubin's terms: 
speaking and understanding both deemed "good" (1972: 353); 
1 In fact this is not Weinreich's emphasis at all. Weinreich proposed a distinction between 
"caordinative" and "compound" bilingualism on the basis of whether a speaker functions with 
two sets of signifiers and two sets of signifieds (as though monolingual in two languages); or 
with two sets of signifiers and only one set of signifieds (the two languages merging at the 
conceptual level) (Weinreich 1953). Both were to be contrasted with "subordinative" 
bilingualism, in which "the referents of the signs in the language being learned [are] not actual 
'things', but 'equiValent' signs of the language already known" (ibid.: 10). All three notions 
have since undergone considerable modification, ultimately to result in the abandonment of the 
caordinative/compound distinction, and in the simple (and none-tao-specific) list of options 
presented here (see Grosjean 1982). 
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2) "subordinate bilingual", the minimal qualification for which being "the 
ability of the speaker to produce completely meaningful utterances in 
the other language" (Haugen 1953, cited in Diebold 1964: 496); for 
Rubin: "so/so", and "good or so/so", respectively (1972: 353); 
3) "incipient bilingual" (Diebold 1964); that is, possessing a knowledge 
of L2 which is receptive, or passive, rather than productive (for 
Rubin: "none", and "so/so or good" (1972: 353»; or 
4) monolingual ("none" and "none", presumably; though genuine 
monolinguals are rare indeed (see Grosjean 1982». 
For our purposes, this is not sufficient. The islanders exhibit a wide range of 
proficiency, but it is not so wide as to render these categories useful. It is safe to 
say, for instance, that the sample includes no "coordinate" bilinguals; the only 
infonnant whose Spanish is fluent (in the "plus-accuracy" version of "fluency") 
is Infonnant 42, whoseJirst language is Spanish, and whose productive 
knowledge of Quechua extends only to greetings and a few simple vocabulary 
items. 
6.2.2 Scoring proficiency in Spanish 
The strategy I have adopted, though appearing alarmingly involved in principle, 
is relatively simple in practice. The proficiency score assigned to each informant 
is an indication of the syntactically most complex Spanish string uttered by that 
informant. 
This is not a novel approach; variations upon it have been used in the diagnosis 
of language (that is, LI) disability (Crystal et al. 1976); as well as in studies on 
second language learning by both children (Dulay and Burt 1978; Kessler 1971; 
Ervin-Tripp 1978) and adults (Bailey, Madden and Krashen 1978). But these 
studies are not only methodologically alike; results (a term inapplicable in 
Crystal's case) point to an order of acquisition of certain syntactic structures 
which is, by and large, the same order for all the groups studied. That is to say, 
adult L2 learners appear to progress through the sarne stages in much the same 
order as child L2learners (Dulay and Burt 1978; Bailey, Madden and Krashen 
1978; see also Grosjean 1982); and that child L2learners appear to progress 
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through the same stages in much the same order as child Llleamers1 (Ervin-
Tripp 1978). It is, moreover, much the same order Crystal finds to be clinically 
useful in the assessment of the syntax development of language-disabled 
individuals (Crystal et al. 1976). 
These comparisons, of course, are wholly without point if the notions of 
syntactic complexity espoused are not themselves comparable. Most of the 
studies above are concerned to establish, or to acknowledge, some independent 
measure of syntactic complexity, and most are working within the framework of 
generative grammar - its developmental dimension counting for much (Crystal et 
al. 1976). Menyuk (1969, reported in Kessler 1971), for example, bases her 
analysis on Chomsky's 1957 model, while Kessler herself opts for Fillmore's 
case grammar (Fillmore 1971, reported in Kessler 1971). A typical assumption 
underlying such an approach might be, "for example, that the complexity of a 
sentence is in direct proportion to the number of transformations used to generate 
it " (Crystal et al. 1976: 26); an assumption Crystal himself judges to be of little 
use in the long run (ibid.: 34-7). But there are two more fundamental 
assumptions upon which all the empirical studies above hinge: that the more 
complex a syntactic structure, (a) the later its acquisition (and vice versa)2; and 
(b) the more numerous the errors made in production of it (and vice versa)3 . 
It is the first of these which we shall exploit here; our assumption being that the 
more syntactically complex the most syntactically complex Spanish string 
uttered, the higher the degree o/proficiency. 
Whether focussing upon proportion of errors at a particular degree of 
complexity, or on maximum complexity achieved, the studies above operate by 
volume; that is, with/requencies of possessive markers, or contractible 
auxiliaries, or whatever. Here, however, we shall merely locate the (single) 
most complex utterance and assign a score on that basis. An informant who 
1 This is perhaps too strongly stated. Miesel et al. (1981), for example, offer a theory of L2 
acquisition as a multi-dimensional, rather than a linear and uniform, process. While they 
acknowledge that the two approaches are not ultimately incompatible. their own model allows 
for more variation within each stage, and takes account of L 1 and L2 learners' relative 
susceptibility to socio-psychological factors (such as motivation). See also Grosjean (1982), 
who reviews the successively more convergent views on two processes which were once 
considered irreconcilably different. 
2 See Crystal et al. (1976: 29-30), who are reluctant to endorse the necessity of this 
connection. 
3 See Miesel et al. (1981: 113-114), who express a similar reluctance with regard to this 
connection. 
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offers twenty Spanish strings of a certain degree of complexity, then, will be 
allocated the same rank as an informant who offers only one such string. This 
method has its disadvantages of course. Someone who recites (albeit 
appropriately), say, the first line of a Spanish song may receive an undeservedly 
high ranking. 
The type of complexity we shall exploit is not, in fact, very complex. Moreover, 
the fairly simple discriminations utilized here fmd support in all the studies 
above; whether working with monolinguals or bilinguals, adults or children, 
Chinese or Spanish speakers, the relative clause is considered one of the most 
complex constructions, and one of the last to be acquired by the learner (Kessler 
1971; Ervin-Tripp 1978; Grosjean 1982, etc.). It also seems clear that a 
sentence with one instance of recursion is in this respect more complex than the 
string with none; and less complex than the string with two such instances. 
With one slight modification (below), the distinction between rank C and ranks 
B and A is drawn on the basis of the distinction between "simple" and 
"complex" sentences (Lyons 1968: 178); that is, between sentences consisting 
of a single/inite clause}, and sentences consisting of more than one finite clause 
(Whitely 1986; Quirk and Greenbaum 1973; Crystal et al. 1976). The 
distinction between rank C and ranks D and E is drawn on the basis of the 
distinction between the simple sentence and the non-sentence. 
It should be noted that the categories outlined are tailored to the variety evident in 
the data. The notions of syntactic complexity employed, moreover, require 
reference only to the most traditional of traditional grammars (Lyons 1968, in 
reference to Thrax, for example), to Quirk and Greenbaum, A University 
Grammar of English (1973), and Whitley, Spanish/English Contrasts: A Course 
in Spanish Linguistics (1986) (a Spanish near-equivalent to the foregoing, with 
more pronounced transformational generative sympathies). 
Spanish proficiency rankings are allocated on the basis of whether the most 
syntactically complex Spanish string: 
A contains at least three constituent simple sentences, at least one 
of which should be grammmatically dependent upon another 
B contains at leasttwo constituent simple sentences, one of which 
is grammmatically dependent upon the other 
1 Simple sentences are usually termed "clauses" when incorporated as constituents of larger 
sentences (Lyons 1968: 178). 
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C is a simple sentence 
D is either: 
(i) a string containing at least two Spanish elements one of 
which is a non-finite verb form; or 
(ii) a string of three or more Spanish elements, none of which is 
described below 
E is confined to Spanish elements described below. 
For example, the following are simple sentences ranking, in themselves, C: 
Campesinos estan trabajando 
Campesinos are working (Inf. 13) 
Trabajo en la ciudad 
I work in the town (Inf. 25) 
En el aflo mil novecientos cuarenta se vino la escuela aqui 
The school arrived here in 1940 (Inf. 16) 
Esta corriendo con su riago 
He's running wilh his lassoo (Inf. 27; PicA) 
in that there is one and only one verbal element which is inflected for tense, 
person, number, etc. (Lyons 1968; Whitley 1986; Quirk and Greenbaum 1973). 
The following also ranks in itself a C: 
Esto es ya una canasta pero tiene sus manos.l.no? 
This is a padlock, but it's got hands, no? (Inf. 26) 
in that, though complex, the consituent sentences are linked only coordinatively. 
Ranking B, however are the following: 
Cuando Cristo viene tenemos la verdad 
When Christ comes we'll have the truth (lnf. 43) 
Si. principalmente este es un arMI que significa un recto camino 
Yes, basically il'S a tree which means a straight path (Inf. 44) 
Me parece que esta llorando. no? 
She seems to me to be crying (Inf. 26) 
The following type of sentence will also rank B: 
Esos al Espiritu Santo quieren matarlo 
Those ones want to kill the Holy Spirit (Inf. 44; Pic 12) 
following Whitley's account of the "reduced" complex sentence (1986: 276-
305). 
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Ranking A: 
Bueno esto es una tomba donde representa que ha muerto una nina 
Right, this is a tomb where it's showing that a girl has died (Inf. 42; Pic. 23c) 
Hay varios hombres primitivos que 10 han hecho con piedra que han sacado 
There are various primitive men who have made it with stone which they've 
quarried (Inf. 8) 
Ranking D, meanwhile, is the following: 
Aqui el senor disparando con metrallita (= ametralladora), ina? 
Here the man shooting with a machine-gun, no? (Inf. 25; Pic. 11) 
since the single verbal element, disparando, lacks any such inflexion. It is non-
finite (Quirk and Greenbaum 1973; Whitley 1986). Spanish non-finite verb 
forms are the infinitive (disparar, for instance), the gerund (disparando), and the 
past participle (disparado); to which list some would add a present participle 
(disparante) (Whitley 1986: 83). 
Ranking E are those informants whose most complex Spanish string consists 
only of nouns (often arguably loanwords (see Hoggarth 1983», or numerals, or 
anyone of many idiomatic borrowings such as: "no cierto? (isn't that so?), pues 
(well); bueno (well); muy bien (very good); 0 sea (that is to say); mas 0 menos 
(more or less); a veces (sometimes); poco a poco (bit by bit); no se (I don't 
know); asi es (that's how it is), etc. 
Figure 5: Proficiency in Spanish 
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It is easy to see that the female informants, as a whole, do not have high 
proficiency in Spanish. It is not so easy to see whether age is significant, since 
the scores are so uniformly low. 
49 
63 Travel scores 
The "travel" rankings are ultimately rather impressionistic. Allotting a point for 
every year or every month lived away, for example, is of limited use to us; there 
are just too many combinations, relating not only to frequency and duration, but 
also - and significantly, I feel- to recency. 
For example, three informants who have lived away from Amantani' for 
approximately the same period of time, two to three years, are Informants 47, 49 
and 25. Informant 47 returned from Juliaca more than twenty years ago and has 
not left the island for over ten years. Informant 49, on the other hand, returned 
from Arequipa only six years ago, though she too has rarely travelled even as far 
as Puno since. Informant 25, meanwhile, returned from Lima over five years 
ago, but, as part-owner of a lancha, still ferries passengers to Puno every 
Friday. How should any of these compare with Informant 13 who has never 
lived away for any period of time, but whose shop requires him to make a 
weekly re-stocking trip to Puno? 
In allocating ranks I have attempted to take into account first the maximwn 
duration of any journey or residence elsewhere: 
A maximum exceeding three years; 
B maximum exceeding one year (up to three years); 
C maximum exceeding three months (up to one year); 
D maximum exceeding one or two days (up to three months); 
E one or two days only; 
but to allow successive journeys or periods of residence to accumulate towards a 
higher rank as follows: 
Figure 6 
frequency 
maximwn duration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 exceeding three years A A A - - - - - - - - -
2 exceeding one year B A A A A A A A A - - -
3 exceeding three months C C B B A A A A A A A A 
4 exceeding two days D D D C C C B B B A A A 
5 single night E E E E E E E E E E E D 
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and for category 5 to continue: 
(E less than once a month) 
D once or twice a month 
C every fortnight 
B two or three times a month 
A every week 
In principle, this is still not sufficiently explicit since it takes no account of when 
(or indeedfor what purpose!) a journey took place. As things stand, an 
excursion undertaken over thirty years ago merits the same rank as one which 
took place only a year prior to questioning. It may well be of course that a fIrst 
(or sole) visit to Lima tends to stick in the memory despite the passage of time. 
Nevertheless I am persuaded to limit the timespan within which scoring of each 
category will apply; limiting categories 1,2 and 3 in the table above to ten years; 
category 4 to three years; and category 5 to one year. Provision is made only for 
long excursions which took place over ten years ago 
Figure 7: 11-20 years 
frequency 
maximwn duration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 exceeding three years B B B - - - - - - - -
2 exceeding one year C C B B B B B B B - -
3 exceeding three months D D D D D C C C C B B 
that is, ignoring categories 4 and 5, and according to which, for example, in 
category 3, a B is allocated for seasonal work every year. Clearly by no means 
all possibilities are accounted for; few people are so uniform in terms of the 
duration of their excursions. In practice, however, this is already too involved; 
informants were not asked to list dates and times in their responses. Thus, 
within these general parameters, I have used common sense and tried very hard 
to be fair. 
For example: 
Informant 47 (described above) ranks E; 
Informant 49 (described above) ranksB; 
Informant 25 (described above) ranks A; 
1 I suspect that such information may well be crucial (see, for example, Hallpike 1979). 
Regrettably, I do not possess the data necessary to explore this angle. 
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Informant 13 (described above) ranks A; 
Informant 1, who recently spent five months in Lima with her brothers, ranks C; 
Informant 4, who visits Puno perhaps three or four times a year, ranks E; 
Informant 16, who worked down the mines in Ica and Nazca for around seven 
years (mostly during the last ten years), ranks A; 
Informant 22 (Inf. 16's wife), who travels rarely now but who spent nearly a 
year with her husband in Ica when he first mined, ranks D. 
Figure 8: Travel 
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A summary of infonnants' rankings with respect to each of the three indicators 
above is incorporated into figure 22 below. 
7 Attitudinal indicators 
We now turn to our two final indicators: (4) Pro-"Western" orientation, and (5) 
Pro-traditional orientation, each of which has five components: 
4) Pro-"Western" orientation: 
i) a commitment to Western dress (observed); 
ii) a preference for Spanish over Quechua (expressed); 
iii) a positive view of tourists' visits to Amantanf (expressed); 
iv) a positive view of journeys to Puno (expressed); 
v) preference for "current affairs" radio programmes (expressed); 
5) Pro-traditional orientation: 
vi) a commitment to traditional dress (observed); 
vii) a preference for Quechua over Spanish (expressed); 
viii) a commitment to traditional healing methods (expressed); 
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ix) a commitment to participation in traditional recreations (expressed); 
x) the practice of coca chewing (admitted). 
Given that the passage from wholly traditionally oriented to wholly Western-Iy 
oriented need not be a straightforward one (see §4.3 above), pro-'Western" and 
pro-traditional orientations are scored separately. It is for this reason, moreover, 
that we are able (with regard to language preference (§7.2) and mode of dress 
(below» to allocate "double points" where this seems appropriate. 
7.1 Mode of dress 
Traditional dress for the women of Amantani comprises broad woollen skirts (as 
many as four or five at a time), a woven blouse, sash and shawl, and perhaps 
also a woollen jacket (see Photograph 3 in Appendix B). Traditional dress for 
men includes woollen trousers, shirt and waistcoat, and a shawl similar to that 
worn by women. 
Few people conform perfectly to either model. Because they are made of wool 
and must be laboriously woven, traditional items of clothing are expensive and it 
is much more profitable to sell a woollen shirt in the salon artesanal and to buy a 
synthetic sweater than it is to wear the woollen shirt. Almost all men wear 
commercially made, rather than home-woven, trousers; and caps promoting soft 
drinks, along with many other kinds of Western hat rather than the traditional 
woollen bonnet. When journeying to Puno even those men who habitually wear 
entirely traditional clothing exchange it for western dress; or rather, they 
exchange it for a variety of Western dress which remains non-Western in 
appearance only in so far as it does not go the whole hog (a shirt buttoned to the 
neck without a tie, for instance, or a cheap pair of shoes minus socks). 
Women's travel wear, on the other hand, alters in the opposite direction, with 
the addition of an extra skirt or two, and perhaps a bowler hat - the latter a rare 
sight on Amantani, even at fiestas. 
The wholly traditional dresser, then, requires a certain amount of commitment; 
but no less so the wholly Western dresser who succeeds in shedding all the 
outward signs of "Indian hood" . And it is such significant deviations from the 
path of least resistance as these which we shall heed, rather than the fact that 
most islanders' dress is mixed. 
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Points are allocated as follows: 
WI observed commitment to Western dress 
o mixed dress, or "non-committal" 
TI observed commitment to traditional dress 
Although there is no reason why an informant may not score WI and TI, I have 
only accorded "double points" in one instance. 
Figure 9: Dress 
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For both men and women, traditional orientation in this respect appears to 
increase with age. The three women scoring in the WI category are Informants 
1,23 and 41, all of whom are usually to be seen wearing narrow skirts. In the 
face of an evidently traditionally oriented women's fashion, it would seem to 
require a strong, even courageous, "Western"-orientation to diverge from the 
norm in this way. 
The four men in the same category are Informants 7, 8, 42 and 43, each of 
whom dresses with an undeniable eye for Western fashion, from jeans and 
training-shoes to the latest style in zip-pocketed shiny jackets and (in Infonnant 
Ts case) a tie. Informant 42 appears in categories WI and TI (linked by the 
dotted line in the matrix above), since, as a non-islander, and an occasionally 
shiny-jacketed non-islander at that, his adoption of a woven waistcoat and an 
ever-present woollen bonnet seems a highly significant token of solidarity with 
the islanders. 
7.2 Language preference 
If a group is highly regarded, the chances are that the language they habitually 
use will be considered more beautiful, more efficient, etc. than the language of a 
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group which is not highly regarded. Because native speakers of Quechua are, 
on the whole, not highly regarded, it is only to be expected that Quechua will be 
viewed as uglier, less expressive, less logical, etc. than Spanish - not only by 
native speakers of Spanish, but also by the speakers of Quechua themselves 
(Grosjean 1982). 
Infonnants were asked which language they preferred, Quechua or Spanish. 
Infonnants who prefer Spanish to Quechua are ranked here S l/QO; acquiring, 
that is, one point towards their pro-western ranking. Infonnants who prefer 
Quechua to Spanish are ranked here SO/Ql, thus acquiring one point towards 
their pro-traditional ranking. No preference is accorded a pointing of SI/Ql; that 
is, a point towards each orientation ranking. 
S l/QO preference for Spanish 
Sl/Ql no preference 
SO/Ql preference for Quechua 
Figure 10: Language attitudes 
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The few who positively prefer Spanish gave various reasons: 
Porque es mas principal parlanapaq. Mas atil contestakunaypaq con los jefes. 
Because it's more important. It's more useful to me for answering to the people 
in charge (Inf. 20); 
Chaqay llaqta Puna rinaypaq mistisakunawan parlanaypaq munani 
I'd like to be able to talk to mestizos when I go to Puno (Inf. 18); 
because Spanish is more beautiful (nuis !indo) (Inf. 41); because Spanish has 
nice words (munay paZabra chayrayku) (Inf.5), etc. 
The three infonnants who score Ql/S0 are Infonnant 3: 
Mana Castellanota. K eshwatapuni fIoqaqa munani porque keshwala parlaytaqa 
munani masta. 
Not Spanish. I like Quechua because I prefer speaking Quechua (lnf. 3); 
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Informant 15, who intemlpted me with the vehemence of his preference: 
Mana, mana, mana -keshwatallapuni 
No, no, no. Just Quechua (Inf. 15); 
and Informant 23 for whom Quechua is simply "better" (mejor). 
Most informants, however, do not feel strongly either way: 
Noqamanqa gustawan iskaynin. Quechua y castellano gustawan 
I like them both. I like Quechua and Spanish (Inf. 2) 
Iskayninta munani 
I like them both (Inf. 9) 
Castellanotawan keshwatawan ancha sumaq chayta 
Spanish and Quechua are both very fine (Inf. 7) 
A matching of these scores with proficiency rankings reveals that preference 
bears no obvious relationship to ability. 
7.3 A further six attitudinal components 
The remaining six components of the attitudinal indicators are more 
straightforward. Points are allocated on the basis of answers to the following 
questions: 
4) Pro-"Western" orientation: 
iii) Do you like tourists' coming to Amantani? 
iv) Do you like going to Puno? 
v) What sorts ofradio programmes do you like to listen to? 
5) Pro-traditional orientation: 
viii) Do you ever visit a curandero? 
ix) Do you like taking part in fiestas? 
x) Do you sometimes chew coca? 
And since, moreover, in all cases other than question (v) they are derived from a 
simple yes or no, we shall not dwell on them long. Note, however, that in the 
case of questions (iv) and (ix) an answer pertaining to present infIrmity, for 
example, was followed by "Did you used to?" and scored on that basis. 
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7.3.1 Tourists 
iii) Do you like tourists' coming to Amantani? 
Points were awarded for this component as follows: 
Figure 11 : Tourists 
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The nine informants scoring 0 here are Infs. 4, 11, 16, 19, 30, 33,41,46 and 
47. 
Turistaq hamunanta mana munanichu. (Imarayku?) lmaraykuclui 
I don't like tourists' coming. (Why not?) Who knows? (lnf.4) 
Inf. 30 was less explicit and I have, perhaps rather uncharitably, scored him on 
what seems an obvious subtext: 
Wasiyoqkuna alojamientoyoq chaykunaqa turistaq hamunanta munan 
The people with rooms to let like it when tourists come (lnf.30) 
while the remainder are basically indifferent to tourists: 
Mana yachanichu. Mana kaymanchu mana Occosuyoman hamunchu riki 
I don't know. They don't come here. They don't come to Occosuyo, that's for sure 
(Inf.ll) 
Most informants, however, take a positive view, often with an understandable 
financial edge to it: 
Noqa munani turistaq hamunanta imaraykuchus kay islaykupi mana ancha 
turismo chayamunchu chaymanta. Hamunanta munani artesania rantinanpaq 
I like/want tourists to come because not much tourism reaches this island. 
I like/want themto come and buy handicraft (Inf. 8) 
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7.3 2 Going to Puno 
Infonnants were asked simply whether they like going to Puno. Those who no 
longer travel (through infIrmity, for instance) were also asked whether they used 
to like going to Puno. An answer in the affInnative scores 1; in the negative, O. 
Figure 12: Puno journeys 
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Only one man (lnf. 4 again), and fIve older women (Infs. 11, 19,33,46 and 
47) score 0 here. 
Mana riytaqa munanichu kanpis mana wawakuna apawamunchu ari 
I don't like going and anyway the children don't take me (Inf. 33) 
Mana purinichu. Mana munanichu. Lanchapi purinapaq manchapuni purinapaq 
I don't go. I don't like/want to. The journey in the lancha scares me (Inf. 46) 
Mana purinichu. Kaypi tiyanihinalla. Mas tranquillo 
I don't go. I just stay here. It's more peaceful (Inf. 4) 
7.3.3 Radio 
The radio is the most accessible, if not the most direct, contact islanders have 
with the outside world. Even the four infonnants who do not possess a radio 
(lnfs. 16,22,30 and 33) have the opportunity to listen nonetheless. 
A veces cuando quiero noticias aviso me presto. 
Occasionally. when I want to hear the news, I borrow one (Inf. 16). 
I have allocated a point to each informant whose response demonstrates, at least 
in principle, an interest in affairs concerning the rest of Peru; for example: 
Noticiata uyarini 
I listen to the news (Inf. 24) 
Uyarini parlaqta presidentimanta Alan Garciamanta 
I listen to what the President, Alan Garcia, has to say (Inf. 6) 
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Noticiakunamanta Limamanta maypicM imapicM pasashan terremotos 
imakunacM es traged[a carros volcan yachani chaykunata emisorasmanta no? 
By listening to the news from Lima, wherever it is and whatever it is that's 
happening - earthquakes, whatever; if there's a disaster, say, cars - volcanos; I 
learn about all these things from the radio broadcasts (Inf. 35) 
Points have not been awarded for responses such as the following: 
Waynukunallata 
Just wayiius (Quechua highland dances) (Inf. 31) 
Algon alegrakunaypaq waynukunatapis imatapis uyarini 
I listen to anything to cheer me up, wayiius and so on (Inf. 21) 
Figure 13: Radio programmes 
\1\ 
-
c:: 
·0 
0.. 
o 
[] 
[] [] [] 
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] 
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] C C C C C C C C C 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •• c • • [] [] [] [] 
13 -24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 + 
Age group 
• Female 
c Male 
As we can see, the female infonnants show considerably less interest in the 
world at large than do the male infonnants. While it might be supposed that the 
women's generally poor proficiency in Spanish could be a contributory factor, 
this is not necessarily the case; Quechua radio stations exist, featuring news 
programmes and talk shows as well as highland music; many predominantly 
Spanish stations, moreover, broadcast programmes in Quechua. 
7.3.4 Visits to a curandero 
Just as Spanish competes with Quechua, and wayiius with President Garcia, so 
too local healing practices compete with bioscientific medicine; that is, with what 
is generally tenned "Western medicine" 
There is no doctor on Amantani. There is, however, a sanitario (health worker), 
trained in the rudiments of bioscientific medicine and installed in a small shed 
near the cemetery. Few islanders make use of him. His services are free but 
prescriptions are not. He is also rarely in residence, bad-tempered at the best of 
times, and is generally regarded as incompetent. In Amantanfs case, then, the 
competition is not unduly fierce; islanders are more likely to take their problems 
to one of several curanderos (healers). Curanderos tend to be associated with 
59 
herbal remedies, guinea pig diagnosis, and with the cure of susto (fright) and 
other "folk" illnesses (Chiappe et al. 1985). The range of expertise of at least 
one island curandero, however, is not limited to the above; his skills also include 
setting broken bones, appeasing malevolent ancestral spirits, and exorcising the 
possessed. 
Informants were asked simply whether they ever visited a local curandero, an 
answer in the affmnative scoring 1; in the negative, O. 
Figure 14: Visits to a curandero 
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The informants who, for whatever reason, do not visit a curandero are relatively 
few and relatively young (Infs. 20, 23, 27, 34, 36 and 42). 
Hampiq runaq chayta mana rinichu porque mana onqonichu chayrayku 
I don't go to the curandero because I don't get ill (lnf. 20) 
Most informants, however, do occasionally seek the help of a healer. 
Claro, siempre voy 
Of course, I go all the time (lnf 10) 
Si algon accidente pasan hinaqa purini pero mana cocata yachanichu 
If there's been an accident then I go, but I don't take coca (Inf. 3, who had not 
been asked about coca) 
7.3 5 Chewing coca 
Here is another response to the curandero (n.b.) question: 
Noqa mana akullinichu. Prohibido es. Alumnos no 
I don't take it. It's not allowed. Not for schoolchildren 
What it is that this woman 1 doesn't take, which schoolchildren are not allowed, 
and regarding which there is evidently some sensitivity, is coca. Coca is closely 
1 This response was given by a sixteen-year-old woman who is not one of the fIfty informants 
in the sample. 
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associated with the curandero because of its use in healing, diagnosis and 
divination, for example. The focus of her defensiveness, however, is the 
chewing of it; a practice which invariably accompanies the healing, etc., and 
which, for some individuals, invariably accompanies every other activity too. 
Coca is an essential part of any ritual or social occasion (see Bastien 1978); but it 
is also not unlike smoking - a habit. And just as there are chain-smokers, there 
are "chain-chewers", of whom Amantani has its share. Indeed, so universal a 
practice is it believed to be among "Indians" that chewing coca has found its way 
into the non-Indian's list of essentially Indian characteristics (van den Berghe 
and Primov 1977 (§4.2 above)), along with strongly negative overtones 
resulting from a conviction that it is a dirty and addictive habit, and that most 
Indians go about their business in a state of narcosis. Consequently perhaps, 
coca chewing has been harshly criticized by government and missionary bodies 
alike, as "a sign of Andean backwardness" (Starn 1991: 79). 
Informants were asked whether they ever chewed coca, an answer in the 
affirmative scoring 1; in the negative, O. 
Figure 15: Chewing coca 
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As the young woman cited above predicts, schoolchildren seem not to chew 
coca; those informants scoring 1 in the 13-24 age category are all beyond school 
age (Infs. 5, 9 and 49). Informant 48's predictions, meanwhile, are only partly 
accurate: 
Mana akullinichu. Abuelitokunalla 
I don't chew coca. Only old people do (lnf. 48) 
But there is a second group of people to whom coca is prohibited: the Seventh 
Day Adventists. 
Noqa kani adventista. Kunaqa mana akulliniehu eoeaJa. Ninku eoeaqa malogran 
nispa pero unay tempoqa abueloylcukunaqa siempre kallpalaqa ruwaq kashanku 
eoeata akullikuspa 
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I'm an Adventist I don't chew coca now. They say that coca harms the body, but 
in the past our ancestors used always to chew coca to give them strength (Inf. 3) 
Mana munanichu. Mana cocata munaniehu. Kani iioqa religion adventista ari 
I don't like it. I don't like coca. I'm an Adventist (Inf. 28) 
Mana noqa akullinichu cocata. Millay. Millay ellay. Mana noqa gustawanehu. 
(Qan adventista kankichu?) Adventista ari 
I don't chew coca. It's horrible. Horrible! I don't like it (Are you an Adventist?) 
Yes I am (lnf. 22) 
In fact, with one exception (Inf. 24), Adventist abstinence accounts for every 
single infonnant over the age of thirty-four who does not chew coca (Infs. 3, 
10, 15, 16,20,22,28 and 41). Interestingly, the apparent need to justify their 
behaviour to themselves or to me (asserting that (anyway) they hated coca; it 
made their teeth all green, etc.) is not an exclusively Adventist trait: 
Punuypaq allin 
It's good for sleep (lnf. 45) 
Allin cllay coca nanaypaq estomananaypaq 
Coca's good for my stomach-ache (lnf. 47) 
Akullini porque pescaman purini. Menos alcohol 
I take coca because I go fishing. (It means) less alcohol (Inf. 17) 
7.3.6 Fiestas 
Dotted throughout the year are Amantanfs principal large-scale recreations: 
fiestas. Some, such as Independence Day, are secular; most are religious. The 
majority feature costumed dancing and an abundance of alcohol, but each has its 
own specific schedule in tenns of entertainment, participation and sponsorship. 
Amanatanfs own Pachatata fiesta appears to be a clear favourite, with its 
colourful and breathless procession to the hilltop and back, dancing all the way. 
Music is provided by rudimentary brass bands, and reed flute ensembles, often 
several groups playing simultaneously in a cacophonic traditional and mestizo 
mix. Fiestas also present opportunities for private enterprise; buying soft drinks 
by the crate and seIling them in the square, for example; or baking bread babies 
for the Feast of All Saints. 
Infonnants were asked whether they liked to take part in fiestas. An answer in 
the affinnative scores 1; in the negative, O. 
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Figure 16: Fiestas 
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Only three informants dissent to any extent. They are informants 16, 18 and 41. 
Mana munanichu. lma puesJiestakuna a veces gustawan iioqata pero mana 
machanichu pero gustawan qhawarikuynin nawiwan 
I don't like them. Well, sometimes I like fiestas, but I don't get drunk, but I like 
watching (Inf. 16) 
Mana tiempoy kanchu mana qo/qey kanchufiestakunapaq 
I don't have the time or the money for fiestas (Inf. 18) 
Unay Jiestakunata munarqani. Kunan sayk'urqopuni 
I used to like fiestas. Now I find them very tiring (Inf. 41) 
7.4 Summary of attitudinal indicators 
Points awarded for individual pro-"Western" components are added, and the 
total is assigned a letter A to E as above. The totalled pro-traditional component 
points, meanwhile, are assigned a numerical rank, 1 to 5, ranging from most 
traditionally oriented (5) to least traditionally oriented (1). This difference is 
purely a matter of presentation and is intended to help prevent confusion of the 
two. For example, the component pro-"Western" points scored by Informant 6 
(Alberto) and Informant 41 (Francisca) are shown in figure 17 below. These 
points are totalled to yield the rankings Band C respectively. 
Figure 17 
Pro-"Western" orientation Albeno Francisca 
i) commitment to Western dress 0 1 
ii) positive view of Spanish 1 1 
iii) positive view of tourists 1 0 
iv) positive view of journeys to Puno 1 1 
v) preference for "current affairs" radio 1 0 
Total 4 (=B) 3 (=C) 
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The component pro-traditional points scored by the same two informants are 
shown in figure 18, totalled to yield the rankings 5 and 1 respectively. 
Figure 18 
Pro-traditional orientation Albeno Francisca 
vi) commitment to traditional dress 1 0 
vii) positive view of Quechua 1 0 
viii) commitment to traditional healing 1 1 
methods 
ix) commitment to traditional recreations 1 0 
x) coca chewing 1 0 
Total 5 1 
Alberto's attitudinal rankings are summarized, therefore, as B5; those of 
Francisca as C 1. 
Informants' rankings with respect to the two attitudinal indicators may be 
summarized as follows: 
Figure 19: Pro-"Western" orientation 
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From the clustering within categories Band C, we may observe that most 
informants seem to have a reasonably positive attitude to (limited aspects of) life 
outside Amantanf. Those who are, by this account, less well-disposed seem, on 
the whole, to be the sample's older women. The exception is Informant 4 (aged 
20). 
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Figure 20: Pro-traditional orientation 
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Here again there are few extremes, and perhaps the faintest hint of a tendency for 
older informants to have a more positive attitude to (limited aspects of) traditional 
island life than younger informants. The three informants ranking 1 are 
Informants 20 (aged 42), 41 (aged 35), and 27 (aged 13). 
To observe the extent to which a positive "Westem"-orientation is accompanied 
by a negative traditional orientation, and vice versa, informants' two attitudinal 
rankings are correlated in figure 21, a two-dimensional matrix of the sort 
recommended by McFee (1968; see §4.3 above). 
Figure 21: Double attitlldes 
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As we can see, there is no necessary correspondence. The informants whose 
rankings fall along the Al-B2-C3-D4-E5 diagonal might be said to be 
conforming to a pattern of "straight-line attitudinal acculturation" - a gross 
misrepresentation in any case, given the highly limited data and the obvious 
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questions as to the commensurability of the component indicators (see §6 
above). But these informants are a minority. More numerous are those whose 
rankings conform to no such pattern; either expressing positive traditional and 
positive "Western" attitudes (the twelve informants ranking B4, for instance); or 
not expressing many positive attitudes of either sort (for example, Informant 4, 
ranking £3, and Informant 41, ranking CJ). 
The use of colour in figure 21 allows a further (though simplified) correlation 
with the cumulative scores relating to integration indicators (1) to (3). Here 
again it is clear that no high degree of (attitude-independent) integration within 
mainstream Peruvian society is required in order to express positive attitudes 
towards (limited aspects of) that society. The scores of the twelve informants 
ranking B4, for example, range from 2.5 (Informants 17 and 50) to 22.5 
(Informant 44). 
Despite the commitment to a multi-dimensional approach figure 21 attests, we 
shall see in chapter IV that I have still not fully appreciated its implications, and 
that this has further repercussions which have yet to be addressed. 
8 Summary of informant profiles 
We end with a summary of the profiles and scores which in the next chapter will 
be matched with informants' responses to Appendix A's pictures. 
Figure 22 
Inf Edu Spa Trav Total wrr Name S/A Profile 
1 5 5 5 15 B 2 Anselma f 19 CCCIB2 
2 2.5 5 7.5 15 B 4 Gregorio m38 DCBIB4 
3 0 10 7.5 17.5 D 4 Benerijto m47 EAB/D4 
4 5 5 0 10 E 3 Ernesto m20 CCE/E3 
5 2.5 2.5 0 5 C 3 Herminia f20 DDFJC3 
6 0 7.5 2.5 10 B 5 Alberto m73 EBDIB5 
7 10 10 7.5 27.5 A 3 Benigno m 19 AAB/A3 
8 10 10 7.5 27.5 A 3 Wilfredo m 19 AAB/A3 
9 7.5 5 7.5 20 C 4 Rufino m23 BCB/C4 
10 2.5 7.5 7.5 17.5 C 2 Aurelio m49 DBB/C2 
11 0 0 0 0 E 4 Evangelina f 50 EEE/E4 
12 2.5 5 2.5 10 B 4 Augusto m52 DCD!B4 
13 2.5 7.5 10 20 B 4 Arturo m55 DBNB4 
14 0 0 0 0 C 3 Ana f 32 EEFJC3 
15 5 5 5 15 C 3 Ricardo m36 CCC/C3 
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Figure 22 continued 
In[ Edu Spa Trav Total wrr Name S/A Profile 
16 2.5 10 10 22.5 C 2 Alfredo m38 DAA/C2 
17 0 2.5 0 2.5 B 4 Hector m53 EDF/B4 
18 0 0 5 5 C 2 Alvina [ 31 EEC/C2 
19 0 0 0 0 E 5 Vincentina [60+ EEE!E5 
20 5 7.5 5 17.5 B 1 Saturno m42 CBC/Bl 
21 5 5 0 10 C 4 Valentin m34 CCE/C4 
22 0 0 2.5 2.5 C 3 Natividad [35 EED/C3 
23 5 2.5 0 7.5 C 2 Juanita [ 13 CDF/C2 
24 2.5 10 10 22.5 B 2 Sylvestre m35 DAA/B2 
25 2.5 7.5 10 20 B 3 Anaclito m38 DBA!B3 
26 2.5 7.5 7.5 17.5 B 4 Florentino m38 DBB/B4 
27 5 5 0 10 B 1 Roberto m13 CCE/Bl 
28 2.5 5 5 12.5 B 2 Alejandro JuI m44 DCC/B2 
29 2.5 7.5 7.5 17.5 B 4 Francisco M m40 DBB/B4 
30 2.5 5 7.5 15 D 4 Lukas m43 DCBID4 
31 0 0 0 0 C 4 Julia [35 EEF/C4 
32 0 5 2.5 7.5 B 4 Marcelino m55 ECD/B4 
33 0 0 0 0 E 5 Rosa [70 EEE!E5 
34 5 7.5 5 17.5 B 3 Julian Q m34 CBC/B3 
35 2.5 5 7.5 15 B 4 Esteban m45 DCB/B4 
36 5 2.5 0 7.5 B 2 Juan E. m13 CDF/B2 
37 2.5 0 0 2.5 C 4 Eudocia [30 DEF./C4 
38 5 7.5 7.5 20 B 3 Victoriano m32 CBB/B3 
39 5 5 7.5 17.5 B 4 Jorge m32 CCB/B4 
40 0 0 0 0 C 5 Luciana [50 EEF/C5 
41 0 2.5 5 7.5 C 1 Francisca Y [35 EDC/Cl 
42 10 10 10 30 A 4 Chichu m29 AANA4 
43 5 7.5 5 17.5 A 2 Juan m32 CBC/A2 
44 5 7.5 10 22.5 B 4 Sebastien m38 CBA!B4 
45 0 2.5 2.5 5 B 4 Herminio m60 EDD/B4 
46 0 0 0 0 E 5 Maria [ 45 EEE!E5 
47 0 0 0 0 E 5 Josepha [70+ EEE!E5 
48 5 2.5 0 7.5 C 2 Flora [14 CDF/C2 
49 0 0 7.5 7.5 C 4 MeIjilda [24 EEB/C4 
50 0 2.5 0 2.5 B 4 Veciente m55? EDE/B4 
1 Introduction 
CHAPTER IV 
Variety and Context 
In this chapter I attempt to match the types of response offered to the pictures in 
Appendix A against the integration rankings elaborated in the course of the last 
chapter. It is in this manner that I originally hoped to be able to assess any 
influence education, mobility and proficiency in Spanish may have upon picture 
perception. We shall examine the responses below in terms of a number of 
general response types, suggested by some of chapter II's picture tests, and also 
by the variety evident within the responses themselves. Since the aim of this 
study is eventually to offer a theoretical framework for the assessment of such 
responses, and since this framework is not yet available to us, the response 
types are formulated in a deliberately naIve way. It is hoped that by the end of 
this chapter the reader too will see the need for such a theoretical framework, yet 
without judging this preliminary attempt entirely lacking in interest. 
For there are, I believe, many points of interest. Some of them, however, have 
much more to say about the approach taken to the informants' interpretative 
choices, than about those choices themselves. So much so, that conclusions 
drawn from the latter are inappropriate. The results presented here are, then, 
ultimately disappointing. Yet the reasons for that disappointment cannot but be 
important in providing pointers to the range of interpretations an adequate 
theoretical framework should be prepared to deal with. More importantly, they 
strongly advocate the adoption of a context-sensitive approach to the assessment 
those interpretations, without which any patterns emerging have little or no 
value. 
It would be coy to pretend that the response types outlined below are not heavily 
determined by the framework ultimately adopted; and it would be wholly without 
point to describe response types which bear no relation to that framework. It 
should be borne in mind, therefore, that the range of response types loosely 
described below, is, by and large, the range of response types more carefully 
described in later chapters. 
Rather than confuse matters by introducing (and inevitably having frequent 
recourse to) a deliberately naIve set of descriptive terms in this chapter, only to 
introduce a second, more rigorously formulated, set of terms later on, I have 
decided to employ the technical terms here without formal definition. It is hoped 
that what is in any case intended to be a certain intuitively appropriate feel to 
them will remain to the fore, until such time as their sense may be more formally 
elaborated. It is also hoped that this will ease the transition from this chapter to 
the chapter which follows. 
We begin by addressing the question of object recognition (§2), before 
considering a few response types which seem to go beyond the mere recognition 
and labelling of objects (§3). In §4 we examine some of the conventional 
interpretations which, to some extent, provided the initial inspiration for this 
study in its entirety. We go on in §5 to address the "explanatory" response, 
considering briefly its importance to successful visual communication. In §6, 
the (lack of) influence of attitudinal integration on picture interpretation 
confronted. The summary of results undertaken in §7leads us to question the 
relationship of picture interpretation not only to mobility, education, proficiency 
in schooling and attitudinal integration; but also to the viewing context (§8). 
2 Object recognition 
On the whole, there appears to have been little difficulty in recognizing pictured 
objects. This result seems to be in accord with those of Hudson (1960), 
Mundy-Castle (1966), Deregowski (1968a), etc. (chapter II, §3). As with 
Mundy-Castle's informants, however, the informants in this study also 
occasionally misidentified objects. 
2.1 Animals - recognized and specified 
Most of these misidentifications involve animals; and most of these are in 
response to Pictures 4 and 7. 
For example: 
Waka kay kasqa. Kay casa kasqa. Wasi kasqa. Wakachu? Alqochu? Kayri 
ovejakuna Kayri waka. Y kuchichu? Mana yachanichu. 
These are cows (units E and I (and F?». This is a house. It's a house. Is this a cow? 
(unit I) Is it a dog? (unit I) These are sheep (unit L). And this is a cow (unit J). 
And is this a pig? (unit K) I don't know. (lnf. 46; Cat. 0; Pic. 7) 
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in which all the animals mentioned are in fact (intended as) sheep. 
And in response to Picture 4: 
Ya aqul hay distintos clases animalitos. no? Lo yeo en esta carta. Alii esta ... 
hombre. Este debe ser una vicuna. Ya un chivo llevando su cabrito. Tambien esta arando 
hombre y mujer. Y tambiin 10 mismo que estan en chakitaqlla. no? Mas 0 menos. Ya pues 
arando tambien. no? Los dos. Hombre y mujer igualito aqui nosotros aramos. Asi es. 
Tambien una casita con su arbolito. Tambien estan cargando ... Llant'a estan cargando. 
Tambien su llama. Tambien ya .. , ya mas 0 menos estajalando con su .,. Ya. tiene su 
amarra. no? Con ista estajalando. Ya aqui la mujercita.la gallenita ya asl. EI coral debe ser 
esto. no? Alii mas viene estas animalitos los perritos. Debe ser esto. Los perros con su crla. 
En que chua es "una". Entonces. muy bien entonces. Asi es. 
Right, here there are various types of animals, aren't there? I see it in this picture. 
There there's ... a man. This one must be a vicuna. And a gQru raising its baby goat. Also 
there's a man and a woman ploughing. And the same here with a foot-plough, isn't it? More 
or less. Yes, ploughing too, aren't they. Both of them. It's just like that that we plough here, 
with a man and a woman. That's how it is. Also there's a little house with its little tree. 
Also these are carrying .. , They're carrying firewood. Also his llama. Also '" yes, more or 
less, he's heaving at it with his '" Yes, he's got his rope. With this he's heaving. And here 
there's a little woman, little hens like this. This must be the pen, mustn't it? And coming 
along here too are these animals, the little~. It must be that. The ~ with their baby. 
In Quechua it's called "una". Ok, fine, right. That's how it is. (Inf. 26; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 4) 
in which the "dogs" (units a, b and Z) are actually pigs, and the "goats" (units c 
and d) some species of the genus lama (sic). 
It is patently clear that Picture 4 is not a wise choice of stimulus picture; its many 
animals are only slightly differentiated, and it requires close attention to neck and 
ear-length, and especially tails to distinguish them. In fact, the frequent 
misinterpretations of unit c as a dog (Inf. 16); a goat (Inf. 10, and Inf. 26 
above); a calf (Inf. 39), etc. are perhaps less remarkable than that anyone should 
bother to look long enough and closely enough to arrive at the "right" animal. 
But people do seem to bother where animals are concerned. In response to 
Picture 17's unit C, for instance, seventeen informants ask me, if only in 
passing, to tell them what it is (or what it is supposed to be). 
For example: 
Chivochu kayri? (Someone in background: Asno) Asnochu? Mana asnochu 
kanman. Asnotachu kay fusilan kay. 
Is this a goat? (Someone in background: donkey) Is it a donkey? It wouldn't be a 
donkey. This one's shooting the (doubted) donkey. (Inf. 46; Cat. 0; Pic. 17) 
Alqochu? Asnochu? Chivo. Auto. 
Is it a dog? Is it a donkey? A goat. A car. (Inf. 11; Cat. 0; Pic. 17) 
Phuyu. Phuyu kay. Caballochu? Chivo. Chivo manachu? Yachanki qan? (Me: 
No) Noqaqa niyman asno nispa. 
70 
Cloud. This is cloud. Is this a horse? A goat. Is it a goat or isn't it? Do you 
__ ----"k .... n~ow!L? (Me: No) I'd say it was a donkey. (Inf. 17; Cat. 2.5; Pic 17) 
Este ... como se llama? Burro, no? Burro 
This ... what's it called? It's a donkey. isn't it? A donkey (lnf. 2; Cat. 15; Pic. 17) 
ImatataqcM? Wafzuchishan kay caballotachu[ sJ No se. imatacM wafzuchinra 
What on earth's that? He's killing this horse - islt? I don't know. Whatever it is, 
he's killing it (lnf. 16; Cat. 22.5; Pic. 17) 
Given that I too should be hard put to find a name for this element, Informant 
42's suitably vague (and unquestioning) response seems the safest: 
Bueno, hay un hombre sentado con cerveza. Yaqui otro hombre que esta apuntando al 
animal con fusil 
Ok, there's a man sitting down with a beer. And here another man who's aiming at 
the animal with a rifle (Inf. 42; Cat. 30; Pic. 17) 
Yet in response to Picture 21c's dog, he might be thought to be unsuitably 
vague: 
Bueno el mapa del Peru con un animal. 
Ok, the map of Peru with an animal. (Inf. 42; Cat. 30; Pic. 21c) 
This is hardly a misidentification, of course. When a response is unsuitably 
specific, however, a clear line between the two is less readily drawn. 
For example, Informant 10 labels Picture 7's units E and I "ovejas medinos"; 
that is, a particular, large and expensive breed of sheep: 
Kaytaq iIOqanchiqhina runacha purishanku a trabajaspa chakrata. Wasinku. Kaytaq 
ovejas. Kaytaqmin, pues, medinos. Ovejas medinos. 
These men, like us, are going to work the chakra. (These are) their houses. And 
these are sheep. And these are, well, medinos. Medina sheep. (Inf. 10; Cat. 17.5; 
Pic. 7) 
All there is to see, meanwhile, is a sheep-like woolliness and some legs. 
Informant 22, along with many others, labels Picture 7's similarly indeterminate 
tree-like leafiness (units Band C) "eucaliptokuna" (eucalyptus trees): 
Orqokuna. Eucalyptokuna. Ukyakuna. Puiiukushan. Ukya. Uranpata q'epirisqa 
tawnantin purikushan. 
Hills. Eucalyptus trees. Sheep. He's sleeping. Sheep. Down below, the one with 
he bundle is going along with a stick. (lnf. 22; Cat. 2.5; Pic. 7) 
Informant 47 - along with many others again, labels Picture 19's all-purpose 
fish "trucha" (trout). 
Trucha, eh? Trucha kayqa kashan. Hap'ishanku. Chay makiwan truchata 
hap'ishanku. 
IrIDu, eh? This is a.t!:Qill. They're grasping (it). With that hand they're grasping at 
the trout. (Inf. 47; Cat. 0; Pic. 19) 
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Unwarranted specificity and unwarranted vagueness may co-occur in response 
to a single pictorial element. For example: 
Kaytaqmin hoq cerro maypichus hoq comunidad tarikun hoq orqontin plantakunantin 
como eucalyptus, con sus animales ... sus ovejas. 
And this is a hill where a community is to be found together with its hill, its ~ 
like eucalyptus, with its animals ... its sheep. (lnf. 7; Cat. 27.5; Pic. 7); 
that is, employing both "plant" and "eucalyptus" in preference to "tree". The 
extent to which the unjustifiably specific label qualifies as a misidentification is 
examined in chapter VI. 
Further misidentifications emerge in response to pictures of inanimate objects. 
Picture 8's unit D, for instance, is described by Informant 29 first as a star, then 
as a clock (both descriptions also encompassing the other two clocks), before he 
finally plumps for "compass": 
Si esto es ... son las estrellas 0 reloj. Este es la brujula de veinte y tres. Es una 
brujula de ... Es un hombre. 
Yes, this is .. these are the ~ or~. This is number twenty-three1,s compass. 
It's a compass of ... It's a man. (lnf. 29; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 8) 
Informant 3 seems similarly spoilt for choice over the identity Picture II's unit I: 
Luna, no? 0 mundo tambien? (Me: No se) Luna sera. Mas 0 menos la luna. 
Luna, eh? No se. Mondo. [laughs] Huevecito. 
The ID.QQ!!, isn't it? Or the ~ too? (Me: I don't know) It'll be the!!lQQ!l. The 
illQQ!l, eh? I don't know. The world. [laughs] It could be a little egg. (lnf. 3; 
Cat. 17.5; Pic. 11) 
22 Misidentifications and valid alternatives 
The further the "misidentification" angle is pursued, the more inappropriate the 
term becomes. Some of the above (and we shall investigate which in chapter V) 
may not be misidentifications; some not even "plausible discrepancies"; they may 
be valid alternatives. All that obscures their alternative validity, moreover, is 
simply the obviousness (to me) of my own intepretations. 
Once we begin to attempt to transcend this obviousness, and to look for reasons 
underlying "misidentifications", up to a point, they are readily forthcoming. 
1 This picture was formerly numbered, and is still visibly numbered, "23". 
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Infonnant 50, for example, tags men as women and vice versa - a habit which 
might some years ago have earned him the projective psychologist's label 
"schizophrenic" (Bell 1948; see chapter II, §7). Picture 12's units A, B, and C 
(each a man), for example, are called "seiiorakuna" (ladies); and Picture lO's 
unit F (a woman) "caballero" (gent). 
But how do we know Picture 12's unit A is a man? Because he has a beard. 
Along with this seemingly incontrovertible gender signal, however, is a second 
seemingly incontrovertible gender signal- which appears, nonetheless, to 
contradict the first. Unit A is wearing a typical New Testament era manly 
Judaean robe l . In other words, he is wearing a dress. If the dress is accorded 
more "significatory weight" than the beard (and it is certainly bigger), the 
alternative interpretation is unremarkable -likely, even. The same might be said 
of Picture lO's unit F. I may deem waists and busts more interesting than ties 
and suits. But I have yet to provide any reasons why they should be deemed 
more valid in tenns of significatory weight (see chapters VI and VII). 
What we do have is ample evidence that Infonnant 50 is at least slightly 
interested in ties and suits. Clothing, in fact, is the theme of many of his 
responses; for example: 
Munay fiaqchasqa umankuna pollerankunapis zapatokunapis munaylla 
kashan 
Her hair is nicely combed and her skirts and shoes are nice too (pic. 1) 
Kaypi hoq munay ninri ch'ulluyoq 
Here's one with a hat with nice ear-flaps (pic. 3) 
Munay sumaq verde q'omer pantalonniyoq 
He's got lovely green trousers on (pic. 8) 
More noteworthy alternative identifications are two responses to Picture 3's unit 
E (an aeroplane, I should say). For Infonnant 44 (Cat. 22.5) it is a condor; for 
Infonnant 47 (Cat. 0), a fish. Now unit E may indeed look more like a fish than 
a condor; but only "condor" is appropriate to the mountainside context. 
Context may also have a part to play in Infonnant 46's response to Picture 7 
(above). Rudimentary though it is, for example, I do not think that "waka" 
(cow) bears an acceptable correspondence with Picture 7's unit I. These are not 
simple misidentifications, however. Infonnant 46 is happy to offer "ovejakuna" 
1 In fact, it is no such thing; "since most Jewish looms were only three feet wide, [ ... ] the 
seamless [garment] worn by Jesus was something of an exception" (The Lion Handbook to the 
Bible 1973: 90). 
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(sheep) for the tiny sheep (unit L) even though there is little to see but the odd 
squiggle and some impressionistic legs. Unit K (another sheep), meanwhile, is 
"khuchi" (pig). 
Informant 46 is not alone in this seemingly cavalier approach to shape. 
Informant 2 (Cat. 15) also appears to use "cow" and "sheep" interchangeably; 
and Informant 1 0 (Cat. 17.5) labels the sheep at the bottom of the picture 
"ovejas" (sheep), and the bigger sheep on the horizon "ovejas medinos" (a large 
and expensive breed of sheep). Thus there may be reason to suppose that these 
informants are juggling with their labels as a way of dealing with the anomalous 
relative sizes of the animals. That is to say, they may be taking context into 
account to the point of ignoring the physical features of the animals concerned. 
There are 211 instances in the data of labels which I had deemed 
"misidentifications", but which I have subsequently come to view as valid 
alternatives to my own interpretations. 
Figure 1: "Misidentifications "/valid alternatives 
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Integration score 
3 Imagination and relations 
The response portions considered above named, and did no more than name, 
pictured objects. But interpretation does not end with mere labels. Picture 13's 
unit A, for instance, is not just "a man"; he is "a man wearing trousers", "a man 
holding a stick above his head", "an angry man guarding a meat safe", "a man 
hitting a dog", etc .. These - "wearing trousers', "holding a stick above his 
head", "angry", and so on - tell us more about the man; they "characterize" him. 
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The types of response portion addressed in this section are all 
"characterizations". But they may be distinguished from one another according 
to the degree of imaginative input they seem to have required. The question we 
ask, and according to which responses are classified, is how much visual 
evidence, or "visual motivation", there is for any particular characterization. 
"Wearing trousers", for instance, is assumed to be more or less self-evident in 
unit A's case. It is an elementary observation - an "elementary characterization". 
Since he is holding a stick above his head (and since there is a cowering dog 
within his reach), it seems reasonable to suppose that unit A is in none too good 
a mood. "Angry", then, is a reasonable inference - an "inferred 
characterization". Since there is no meat safe in the picture, however, "guarding 
a meat safe" seems neither an elementary observation nor a reasonable 
supposition. In fact, it seems a highly gratuitous assertion - an "asserted 
characterization" . 
We shall also consider responses in terms of how many pictorial elements they 
correspond to - one, or more than one. "Guarding a meat safe", for all its 
gratuitousness, nevertheless characterizes only the man, and in this respect is 
quite a "simple" response. "Hitting", meanwhile, corresponds to both the man 
and the dog in that it posits a relation between them. Responses which deal with 
each element separately are less complicated - or less "complex", than those 
which "relate" elements to one another. 
It is these types of response: the purely descriptive ("elementary"), the 
reasonably supposed ("inferred"), the highly gratuitous ("asserted"), the 
"simple", and the "complex", which we shall examine below. 
3.1 Treatment of results 
To facilitate the comparison of informants' responses, and to keep our sights 
fIrmly fIxed on the relative complexity and imaginative content of informants' 
responses, in this section we shall deal in proportions. 
For example, Informant 31's response to Picture 7: 
Eucalipto. Runa. Wasi. Oveja 
Eucalyptus. Person. House. Sheep (lnf. 31; Pic. 7) 
contains five labels and nothing else. 100% of this response consists of labels. 
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In Informant 27's response to Picture 17: 
Auto. Runafusilakushan asnota. Campana. Q'osni 
A car. A man's shooting the donkey. A bell. Smoke (lnf. 27; Cat. 10; Pic. 17) 
there are also five labels (Auto, run a, asno, campana, and q'osni). But 
Informant 27 offers us additionally "fusilakushan", which is not a label. The 
percentages of labels and non-labels in this response (to the nearest whole 
number) are 83% and 17% respectively. 
Informant 1 's response to Picture 4, then: 
Waka. Llamakunata pusashanku. Wasi chayqa. Rumimanta. Pastota mikhushan. 
Inti lloqsimushan 
A cow. They're leading llamas. That's a house ... out of stone. It's eating grass. 
The sun's coming out (lnf. 1; Cat. 15; Pic. 4) 
may be segmented as follows: 
1 2 3 4 5 
waka llamakunata pusashanku wasi chayqa 
label label non-label label non-label 
6 7 8 9 10 
rumimanta pastota mikhushan inti lloqsimushan 
non-label label non-label non-label non-label 
"Inti" ("the sun") is, perhaps (at this stage) counter-intuitively, deemed not only 
a non-label, but a conventional non-label (§4 below; and see chapter VIII, §3.3). 
As such, it is not considered further here, and its presence is not registered in 
any of the figures or graphs below. "Chayqa" ("that (is a)") is also ignored for 
present purposes, in acknowledgement of the relative obligatoriness in Spanish 
and Quechua, and hence the relative frequency, of such segments as this (see 
chapter VII, §2.1). There remain in Informant l's response four labels and four 
non-labels; that is, 50% each. 
But we may go further; specifying, for example, that of these eight remaining 
"portions", five portions (portions 1, 4, 6, 7 and 10) correspond to single 
elements in the picture (62.5% (scored as 63%», and three portions (2, 3 and 8) 
to more than one element in the picture (37.5% (scored as 38%», Of the non-
labels considered (3, 6, 8 and 10), moreover, three portions (3, 8 and 10) 
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incorporate movement (75%), and one portion (6) incorporates no movement 
(25%). 
It is this simple strategy which is used to compare responses below. 
Notice that these figures are not necessarily an indication of length, in the sense 
of the quantity of paper required in transcription, say. Single response portions 
need not be short. The following, for example, are both single portions with 
much the same import: 
Cuerponmanta hoq iskay kinsa tawa uno dos tres cuatro cinco seis sietilla umayoq 
ch'ullalla cuerpon 
From its body there are one, two, three, four, one, two, three, four, five, six, seven 
heads and only one body (Inf. 49; Pic. 11) 
Tiene siete cabezas 
It's got seven heads (Inf. 10; Pic. 11) 
3.2 Imagination 
Figure 2 shows the proportions of labels, elementary descriptive observations, 
and inferred and asserted characterizations, to give an outline of each integration 
category's relative degrees of imaginative input. 
Figure 2: Imaginative input 
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Note that there is an initially fairly uniform decrease in the proportion of labels at 
the left hand side of the graph; coupled with (in most of those cases) a 
corresponding increase in the proportion of reasoned inferences and gratuitous 
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assertions. There is also perhaps the very vaguest hint of a V -shape to the label 
pattern as a whole. This impression probably hinges upon the low proportion of 
labels provided by integration category 12.5; and upon the particularly high 
proportion in category 30. Remembering, however, that there is only a single 
informant in each of these categories (Infs. 28 and 42, respectively), we should 
probably postpone further comment. 
Elementary, or purely descriptive, characterizations are the least common type of 
characterization within each of the integration categories. They may correspond 
to one, or to more than one, element within a single picture. 
The following underlined portions are elementary characterizations 
corresponding to a single element: 
Pajaro sinchi hatun senqayoq 
A bird with a very big beak (lnf. 23; Cat. 7.5; Pic. 24b) 
Kay qhari huch'uy nawiyoq 
This man has little eyes (Inf. 49; Cat. 7.5; Pic. 3) 
The following underlined portions are elementary characterizations 
corresponding to more than one element: 
Munay wasikuna 
Nice houses (Inf 19; Cat. 0; Pic. 2) 
Runakuna lasuwan 
People with lassoos (Inf. 14; Cat. 0; Pic. 4) 
Unos niiLOs se encuentran por todos lados 
Some children are found on all sides (Inf. 7; Cat. 27.5; Pic. 16) 
Despues kay nifiokunaqa kinsantin munayta tiyashanku sil/api 
Next, these ~ children are sitting nicely on the seat (Inf. 50; Cat. 2.5; 
Pic. 6) 
Of course, there is a certain amount of flexibility about the spatial boundaries of 
any "single" element. This elasticity is illustrated by the following four 
responses, each of which again incorporates an elementary characterization. 
Aqui un senor con lentes 
Here a man with spectacles (Inf. 25; Cat. 20; Pic. 10) 
Kaytaq martillota hap'ishan 
And this one is holding a hammer (Inf. 22; Cat. 2.5; Pic. 15) 
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Un amigo esta con La cerveza 
A chap with a beer (Inf. 28; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 17) 
Kaytaq runa waqahina waqrayoq makiyoq chakiyoq 
And this is a man with a hom. hand. and foot like a cow (Inf. 39; Cat. 17.5; 
Pic. 22b) 
It is this elasticity, moreover, which leads us in chapter VI (§7) to the conclusion 
that spatial boundaries, if only arbitrarily assigned, must be made explicit. 
The proportions of more imaginative responses, or inferred and asserted 
characterizations, in figure 2 above seem to vary considerably. Again, however, 
we should be aware of the degree to which integration categories 12.5 and 30 
appear to contribute to that pattern. 
A break: down of the proportions of characterizations into its component 
categories: elementary, inferred, and asserted, provides us with the following: 
Figure 3 
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The only particularly striking feature here is the sudden decrease in the 
proportions of assertions towards the far right of the graph. Inferred and 
asserted characterizations elicited by the pictures include the following: 
a) inferred: 
Kaytaq hombre cojo 
And this man is a crim>le (Inf. 12; Cat. 10; Pic. 12) 
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Kay warmi purishan 
This woman is going alQng (lnf. 13; Cat. 20; Pic. 1) 
Pikushan papata 
She's ~ potatoes (Inf. 23; Cat. 7.5; Pic. 2) 
Son policia, no? Estan arrestando a La ehiea 
They're policemen. They're arresting the girl (lnf. 29; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 9) 
b) asserted 
Hoq eampesino sinehita trabajarqon hinaspa samarishan 
This campesinQ has been working very hard so he's resting (Inf. 45; 
Cat. 5; Pic. 7) (simple) 
Aquf una ehieita huh/ana podiamos deeir 
Here's a little Q!Jlhgn girl, we might say (Inf. 3; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 10) 
Astronautas, no? 
Astronauts (lnf. 44; Cat. 22.5; Pic. 8) 
WaLeqllaehu ninku como estas nispa how are you si si mas 0 
menos, no? 
They're saying "How are YQu: how are you: yes yes" more or less. 
aren't they? (Inf. 3; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 8) 
Son policia, no? Estan arrestando a La ehiea 
They're policemen. They're arresting the girl (Inf. 29; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 9) 
Many inferences from clothing recur throughout the sample, most especially 
from Picture 9's unit F, in the fonn of" guardia" (policeman) (Inf. 17), "policfa" 
(policeman) (Inf. 37 and Inf. 29 above), "soldado" (soldier) (Inf. 40), and the 
like. Further examples include Infonnant 50's cross-gender inferences 
mentioned above (§2.2). 
Figure 4 gives us an idea of the degree to which infonnants incorporate 
movement into their responses, showing the relative proportions of movement-
responses, and no-movement, or "static", response portions provided. 
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Figure 4: Movement 
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Accompanying an increase in integration score - yet with exceptions - there 
seems to be a slight increase in tendency to incorporate movement. 
An interesting phenomenon is the frequency with which less integrated 
informants offer static characterizations when one might suppose movement to 
be an almost inevitable inference. For example: 
Kaytaq escalerapi pukllayta munashan 
And this one on the ladder wants to play (Inf. 46; Cat. 0; Pic. 6) 
Alqota qhawashan 
He's watching the dog (lnf. 37; Cat. 2.5; Pic 13) 
Picture 6's unit B seems to me to be suspended in mid-air; while Picture 13's 
unit A, whose arm and foot are raised and whose body is inclined forward, has 
- I should say - very much the look of one who is not about to maintain that 
posture for long. 
What is more, it is also the less integrated informants who offer movement 
characterizations when one might suppose a static characterization to be a more 
obvious inference. 
Kaytaq tosushan 
And this one is dancing (lnf 47; Cat. 0; Pic. 22c) 
Paykuna purishanku hoq eskelitowan 
These ones are going along with a skeleton (lnf. 23; Cat. 7.5; Pic. 16) 
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3.3 Relations 
Response portions may deal with each pictorial element separately ("simple" 
portions), or they may "relate" elements to one another ("relational") portions. 
Figure 5 shows the proportions of "simple" and "relational" portions offered by 
each integration category. 
Figure 5: Simple and relational responses 
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The patterning here is a little more marked; that is, the degree to which 
informants relate distinct elements seems to increase with degree of integration; 
the only exception being again category 30; i.e. Informant 42. 
For example, where less integrated informants offer: 
Phuyu. Runafusilashan. Fusilashan. Botellata marq'akushan. Kaytaq carro 
phawakushan. Kaytaq caballo 
Cloud. The man is shooting. He's shooting. He's carrying a bottle. And this is a 
car speeding along. And this is a horse (Inf. 31; Cat. 0; Pic. 17) 
Phuyu. Phuyu kay. Caballochu? Chivo? Chivo manachu? Yachanki qan? (No) 
Noqaqa niyman asno nispa. Punku. Kayqa tiyakushan runa. Kaytaq auto. Kaytaq 
fusilakushan 
Cloud. That's cloud. Is that a horse? A goat? Is it a goat or isn't it? Do you know? 
(No) I'd say it was a donkey. Here's a door. This man's sitting down. And this is a 
car. And this one is shooting (Inf. 17; Cat. 2.5; Pic. 17) 
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(neither of which contains any relations); typical responses by more integrated 
informants to the same picture are: 
AqUl esta el senor. Creo que es e/ comandante en cuartel. no? Y una gente que 
estaba apuntando a/ cabrito. Tiene su autito y tiene su mesita 
Here's the chief. I think it's the commander in the barracks, isn't it? And there's a 
person aiming at the goat. He's got his car and he's got his table (Inf. 25; Cat. 
20; Pic. 17) 
Kaytaq ukyashan vinota imataclui ukyashan. Kaytaqmin auton churarashan kaytaq 
- imatataqcM? Wafwchishan kay cabaliotachu[sJ - no se - imataclui wanuchinra. 
And this one's drinking wine or whatever it is he's drinking. And that's his car 
which he's parked. What on earth's that? He's killing this horse - is it? I don't 
know. Whatever it is, he's killing it (Inf. 16; Cat. 22.5; Pic. 17) 
the first of which contains four relations; the second, three. There are exceptions 
within both groups, however; for example: 
Auto. Runafusilakushan asnota. Campana. Q'osni 
A car. A man's shooting the donkey. A bell. Smoke (Inf. 27; Cat. 10; Pic. 17) 
Por ejemplo es caballo. AqUl una campana. AqUl esta un pensamiento. Aqul es un 
tirador. AqUl es un carro. AqUl es un senor 
For example this is a horse. Here's a bell. Here's a thought. Here's a marksman. 
Here's a car. Here's a man (Inf. 44; Cat. 22.5; Pic. 17) 
We might also distinguish, for example, the following: 
Ya aqui tambien otro. Ya tambien un ... Ya un dibujo muy ... muy ... Es se llama 
una trucha. Una trucha ya. Aqul es ya ... Ya pan esto debe ser. no? Casi no 
comprendo eso mas en este partecito. no? 
Ok, here's another. It's also a ... Yes, a picture which is very ... This is called a 
trout. Yes, a trout. Here's a ... Yes, it must be bread, mustn't it? I really don't 
understand any more in this part (Inf. 26; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 19) 
(which does not relate any element to any other element) not only from: 
Kaytaq hoq alanri na alambre trucha hap'ikukusqa. Kay ima khulluchu? Kay 
t'anta. Chayta runa ruwan 
A trout is caught in this wire. What are these round bits? This is bread. People 
make that (lnf. 39; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 19) 
which contains one relation involving two elements; but also from: 
Kaytaqmin hoq maki hoq challwata mallapi hap'ikushan 
And this hand is catching the fish in a net (lnf. 43; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 19) 
which again contains only one relation; but which relates three elements. A 
fairly readily (if again informally) observable tendency indeed is for more 
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integrated infonnants to relate more elements at one throw, than less integrated 
infonnants. 
The relations we have considered here are explicitly stated relations. There is 
much to suggest, however, that implicit relations are just as important in 
assessing a response. As with Infonnant 46's potentially size-related 
identifications of Picture 7's sheep (above, §2.2), these potential contextual 
relations can only be guessed at. 
For example, both: 
and: 
Kayqa invalido runakuna. Purinku paykuna k'aspillawan. Seguramente chakin 
mana allinchu. Kaytaq mana iiawin kanchu. Chay avion hamushan. Doctorkuna 
hamushanku paykunapaq hampinankupaq 
These are disabled people. These ones are walking with sticks. Probably their feet 
are poorly. And this one's got no eyes. That plane's coming. Doctors are coming to 
cure them (Inf. 20; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 3) 
Kaytaq hanaqpachata maiiakushan parata. Kay orqokunamanta unu phawamushan 
She's praying to heaven for rain. From these hills water is flowing. (Inf. 39; Cat. 
17.5; Pic. 1) 
despite the paucity of explicit relations, manifest a degree of overall coherence 
nevertheless. 
The subtlety of such associations alert us to the possibility that seemingly 
gratuitous imaginative detail is, instead, an inference we (or rather, l) had not 
anticipated and had thus overlooked. 
For example, Infonnant 44's gives us "astronauts" in response to Picture 8. 
There is nothing about units A, C and F to hint that they may be astronauts; no 
helmets, no flags, no breathing apparatus, no nothing. What there is, of course, 
is a barren, strangely-lit background which might well look like the moon. 
To take another example; Infonnant 8, in his response to Picture 11, does not 
mention the devil. He does, however, mention God: 
Kay wakinkunaqa tristemente llakikuspa. Kaypi kashanku mondota yuyarispa Diosta 
pensarispa Diosta maiiakuspa. Diostaq mana rikurinchu 
These others are distressed. Here they are remembering the world, thinking of God, 
praying to God. And God doesn't appear (lnf. 8; Cat. 27.5; Pic. 11) 
(see also Infonnant 3's response to Picture 11 below) 
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In addition, when we reconsider, there are also probably hundreds of inferred 
characterizations which have only been classified as inferred (rather than 
asserted) because we too have made the same, wholly context-dependent, 
inference. For example, any informant who tells us that any of Picture 14's 
units A, D, G or K is a builder (Inf. 5), or a carpenter (Inf. 15), or an architect 
(Inf. 32) must, surely, have noted the elements' positions with regard to the 
house(s). And if implicit inferences from unexpressed houses are acceptable as 
inferences nonetheless, why not astronauts from moonscapes too? Once again 
this underlines the part expectations have played in the scoring of responses. 
4 Conventional interpretations 
We noted in chapter I that "successful" interpretation of some of the posters 
distributed around Amantanf seemed to rely upon the viewers' knowledge of 
certain conventional significations. Poster 2 (reproduced in Appendix C), for 
example, seems to require that the viewer recognize "peace" in the dove, and 
certainly "Christ" in the human figure. We also noted, however, that responses 
to the first tentative sets of pictures displayed did not bode well in this respect, 
since they did not appear to tap any anticipated reservoir of symbolic 
associations. 
The pictures in Appendix A also abound with potential for interpretations of this 
type. There are clocks and scales, fishes and doves, crosses and condors; time, 
justice, death, etc. are all available to the viewer who knows the convention and 
who cares to look. Recognizing a conventional interpretation for what it is, of 
course, presupposes our co-acquaintance with that convention. So far as is 
feasible, therefore, we should verse ourselves in the repertoire of likely 
candidates, while resigning ourselves to the possibility that some will slip 
through the net. 
Appendix A's pictures yielded in total 249 conventional interpretations in 
response to single pictorial elements. Of these 249, only "novel" instances will 
concern us further. The reason for this reduction is amply demonstrated, I 
hope, by Informant 16, who responds to Picture 11 with: 
Diablo waqrayoq. EI diablo con su waqra. Kay qanchis wnayoq diablo kashan 
The !kYil with his horns. The devil with his horns. This with seven heads is the 
!kYil (Inf. 16; Cat. 22.5; Pic. 11). 
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Although there are three instances of conventional signification, there is only one 
"novel" instance. The important point, however, is not simply that Informant 16 
has come forth with "diablo" three times. It has, moreover, nothing to do with 
his Quechua-Spanish repetition. The three responses are scored as one because 
(a) they are in response to a single element in the picture; and (b) it is the same 
conventional signification. It is, if you like, a policy of "one-element: one-
convention: one-score". Repetitions of this kind number 23, and are not 
included in any of the tables below. 
There remain 226 instances of novel conventional signification in response to 
single pictorial elements. 
Some informants are quite explicit in their acknowledgement of the convention: 
Kay cruz representaq JesUs 
This cross represents Jesus (lnf. 12; Cat. 10; Picture 15) 
Hay un pajaro que representa la paz 
There is a bird which ({,presents peace (Inf. 42; Cat. 30; Pic. 18) 
La cruz es un slmbolo de la muerte y resurreccion de Cristo vivo 
The cross is a symbol of the death and resurrection of the Living Christ. (Inf. 8; Pic. 
15) 
Kaytaqmin EspIritu Santo significan 
This signifies the Holy Spirit (Inf. 20; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 18) 
Chayqa diablo. Chayqa representan diablo 
That's the Devil. That represents the Devil (Inf. 17; Cat. 2.5; Pic. 11) 
More often, however, they are not so explicit and it is up to us to find the 
convention. 
4.1 Unconventional religions 
The conventional symbolism elicited by the data is predominantly Christian. 
Over two fifths (97) of the total conventional significations are derived from 
Picture 12 alone, as "Christ", "God", "Lord Jesus", etc. Indeed the only 
informants who do not explicitly recognize that the bearded man may signal 
Christ are Informant 48, who concentrates instead on the cripple's bandage and 
the soldier's "skirt"; Informant 45, for whom units A, B, and C are 
"campesinokuna" (campesinos); and Informant 50, for whom they are 
"sefiorakuna" (ladies) (§2.2 above). 
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Of course, the high number of conventional responses Picture 12 gives rise to is 
not surprising when we consider that there are three Christ-like figures to play 
with; and that a reduction to novel instances is inapplicable in the case of the 
following: 
Jesus. Jesuspis. Jesuspis 
~. ~ too. ~ too (lnf 36; Cat. 7.5; Pic. 12) 
each "Jesus" corresponding to a separate figure. 
The Holy Spirit is responsible for eleven of the responses in this section. Three 
of these may have been offered as a means of resolving Christ's apparent 
triplehood in Picture 12; and four are n-ary interpretations of Picture 18's unit D 
(a dove): 
Kaytaqmin Espiritu Santo significan 
This signifies the Holy Spirit (lnf. 20; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 18) 
The biblical allusion needs no explanation; and its graphic counterpart crops up 
in colonial and contemporary art all over Peru. 
The Holy Spirit is also provided as an interpretation of Picture 24b's condor. 
The condor is of course a bird of great significance in Peru. It features in ancient 
art (Bushnell 1965; Sanchez Montafies 1986), in legend (Huarochirf MS. 1991; 
Ansi6n 1987), as a character in contemporary folk-dances (Portugal Catacora 
1981), and in the flesh in ritual battles (Boyer 1976); as a "metaphor of 
Andeans" (Bastien 1978: 63), as a political emblem and symbol ofIndian 
identity (Flores Galindo 1987), and on revivalist murals (see Photograph 8 in 
Appendix B). 
For these informants, however, with one exception, the condor's only 
conventional signification is "Holy Spirit". 
Espiritu Santo 
The Holy Spirit (lnf.33; Cat. 0; Pic. 24b) 
Es un ave. Me hace pensar el Espiritu Santo 
It's a bird. It makes me think of the Holy Spirit (Inf.6; Cat. 10; Pic. 24b) 
Chay pajaro Espiritu Santo 
That bird is the Holy Spirit (lnf. 12; Cat. 10; Pic. 24b) 
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Now this might be explained in tenns of a spontaneous, though minimally 
evocative, metaphor: condor ~ dove l . But it need not be; an iconographic 
tradition originating in the Colonial period (Adorno 1981), and perpetuated in 
folk art today (Takisunchis: 114, for example), links the Holy Spirit with a bird 
possessing long talons, a hooked beak, and an eagle-like flight silhouette; a bird 
bearing a far greater resemblance to a condor than to a dove. 
The remaining conventional response to Picture 24b is Infonnant 40's: 
Angel 
An ~ (lnf 40; Cat. 0; Pic. 24b ) 
Here we might appeal to one of Ansi6n's myths, which associates condors with 
angels (Ansi6n 1987: 130); but again the link may be more direct. An islander 
(not a member of the sample of infonnants) gave the following response to a 
picture of a very basic, duck-like bird: 
Kay Espiritu Santo angelninchiq kay 
This is the Holy Spirit our angel 
In any event it seems likely that the association condor ~ angel is neither 
spontaneous nor idiosyncratic, but an association with a history. Likewise, and 
undoubtedly better documented, the association between reptilian animals and 
Satan. The few infonnants who recognized Picture II's biblical allusion were 
Infonnants 15, 16, 17, 20, 35, 38, and 44). 
For example: 
El diablo es. Siete cabezas 
It's the Devil. Seven heads (lnf 35; Cat. 15; Picture 11) 
Chayqa diablo. Chayqa representan diablo 
That's the Devil. That represents the Devil (Inf. 17; Cat. 2.5; Pic. 11) 
Kayqa manama allinchu. Kayqa dismayashan runakuna porque imaraykupaq Satamis 
kay mondopi runakunata pensachin mana allinta 
This is terrible! These people are afraid because in this world .s.ruan makes people 
think ill (lnf. 20; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 11) 
The remaining "the Devil"'s came not in response to Picture II's red seven-
headed version, but to Picture 22b's green, homed alternative; for example: 
Este es diablo 
This is the Devil (lnf. 21; Cat. 10; Pic. 22b) 
1 That these informants should agree, of course, renders this explanation less plausible. 
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Satantis 
Samn (lnf. 45; Cat. 5; Pic. 22b) 
Bueno aquf al diablo 10 satiriza. Satirizan aquf al diablo 
Ok, here the Devil is satirized. They're satirizing the Devil (Inf. 42; Cat. 30; Pic. 
22b) 
while for others the picture represents merely a dwarf with horns (lnf. 23); a 
sheep (Infs. 10 and 22); a cow (lnf. 4); a man with a hom hand and foot like a 
cow (Inf. 39), and the like. 
4.2 Non-religious conventions 
The conventional interpretations are not all Christian in origin. Among the 
others offered are: 
to Picture 20a's flower: Pensachiwan alegrota 
It makes me think of happiness (Inf. 48; Cat. 7.5; Pic. 20a) 
to Picture 16's skeleton: Wanuyta muerte yuyachiwan 
It makes me think of ds<illh (Inf. 4; Cat. 10; Pic. 16) 
to Picture 20b's flies: Alma 
fuml (lnf. 19; Cat. 0; Pic. 20b); 
(a Peruvian fly commonly, and most specifically on 
the Feast of All Saints, being believed the bearer of 
the souls of the departed (Hocquenghem 1987»; 
to Picture 17's clouds: Aquf esta un pensamiento 
Here is a thought (Inf. 44; Cat. 22.5; Picture 17) 
to Picture 8's clock: Tiempo. Tiempo es oro 
Time. Time is money (Inf. 7; Cat. 27.5; Pic. 8) 
and to Picture 4's face: Inti 1I0qsimushan 
The sun is coming out (Inf. 1; Cat. 15; Pic. 4) 
4.3 Conventions and integration categories 
By members of which integration categories, then, are these responses 
provided? The answer is that they come from all categories. A correlation of the 
number of conventional significations with each informant's cumulative 
integration score gives us a rough idea of their distribution: 
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No more revealing pattern emerges with any breakdown of the cumulative 
integration score into its component indicators. Neither is the scatter 
significantly altered by a removal of the scores for Picture 12 (the abundance of 
which might have tended to swamp those in response to other pictures), other 
than in that it reduces the totals of five informants (lnfs. 9,13,18,23, and 27) 
to 0; it brings thirteen individuals down to 1; and it leaves the maximum number 
of responses standing at 7 rather than 9. 
Likewise, a correlation with Indicators (4) and (5), seems no more enlightening: 
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Figure 8 Convention and pro-traditional attitudes 
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No pattern emerges, moreover, with a correlation of these conventional 
responses with both sets of attitudes simultaneously. For instance, the most 
numerous category is B4 (12 members); and the number of their responses still 
ranges from 1 to 9. On the basis of the above, then, it would seem that the 
degree of integration within Peruvian mainstream society has little predictive 
power with regard to the comparative frequency of conventional interpretations 
of pictures. 
Of course, these pictures, for all that they may provide ample opportunity for 
conventional signification, may not provide the right kind of opportunity; 
perhaps they are not especially Peruvian opportunities; perhaps, moreover, the 
test situation does not favour symbolic digressions. 
5 "Explanatory" responses 
The final type ofresponse we shall look at is Nadel's "explanatory" response 
(chapter II, §7.1); "the horse is an animal that lives with us people" (1937: 207), 
being the example provided. This is a kind of generalization (or "generic"; see 
chapter VIII, §8), in that the viewer, given a singular pictorial animal, sees fit to 
talk about any number of, in some respects, equivalent animals in the real world. 
Offered by only one of the two groups he studied, Nadel sees a potential 
correspondence between the tendency to offer such responses to pictures, and 
the logical cohesion of the viewer's religious system. 
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It is certainly a type of response which ought to be of particular interest to visual 
communicators, since it allows the picture to make general statements. Without 
generalization, a pictorial child with a pictorial disease, say, can have no bearing 
on everyday matters of health care and disease prevention, and remains 
informative only to the extent that any fictional one-off event is informative. If, 
however, the pictorial child could, in some sense, be "children in general"-
perhaps including my child; and the pictorial disease my child's disease, then 
that picture acquires the beginnings of an "extra-pictorial" relevance (see chapter 
VIII). 
Explanatory interpretations in response to single elements number 268 in total. 
These include both the relatively objective: 
Kay Perunacionpiqa kay animalitokunan kawsan. "Perro". mana: "alqo" nisqa 
quechuamanta simimanta 
These little animals live here in Peru. It's/they're called "dog" - no - "alqo" in 
Quechua (Inf. 20; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 21a) (noting that this is in response to Picture 21a); 
and the somewhat less objective: 
El raton cuando se entra a las casas se roba hasta las quesos hasta los. por ejempio, 
hasta lasJrazadas. Todos se come y se malograba todo total hace este animal 
The mouse, when it comes into a house, steals things, even cheese, even, for 
example, even blankets. It eats everything and ruins everything completely, this 
animal does (Inf. 3; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 13) 
Cuando toman alcool 0 es borracho es kay animalkuna sonqonmanqa waykun 
lokuyachin 
When you drink (one drinks) alcohol or when you're drunk, these animals enter your 
heart and make you start talking (Inf. 6; Cat. 10; Pic. 22c) 
Of this total, 43 instances also involve a conventional signification. For 
example: 
Cruz Roja significa. Quiere ayudar en todo Peru. 
It means the Red Cross (conventional). They want to help in all of Peru 
(explanatory) (lnf. 44; Cat, 22.5; Pic. 6); 
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The distribution of explanatory responses is as follows: 
Figure 9 Explanatory responses 
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What is interesting to note here is that the majority of explanatory responses 
provided by informants who feature towards the right of the matrix are offered in 
response to pictures containing only a single element (Picture 21a, for example); 
whereas those of informants on the left derive from single and multiple element 
pictures. 
Their different strategies in this respect are to some extent brought out by 
Pictures 20a to 25c. Many informants provide explanatory responses to the fIrst 
two parts of a picture trio; for instance: 
Kaytaqmin hoq leon, no? Kay leon tarikun en la selva 
This is a lion. The lion is found in the jungle (Inf. 7; Cat. 27.5; Pic. 24a) 
Kaytaqmin floqaq pensaynipi hoq condor, no? Kaykunaqa orqopatapi kawsan 
And this, to my mind, is a condor. They live in the mountains (Inf. 7; Cat. 27.5; 
Pic. 24b) 
reverting, however, to a non-explanatory reading in the third: 
Kaytaqmin kunitan rata leon entre condor se encuentran en una pelea grande. 
cuaz de los dos ganaran? 
And now the lion and condor are joined in a great battle. Which of the two will win? 
(Inf. 7; Cat. 27.5; Pic.24c) 
This suggests that, where particular (rather than general) readings are readily 
available, it is the less integrated members of the sample who tend still to opt for 
the general interpretation; a tendency, moreover, to which their lower proportion 
of relational responses (fIgure 5 above) seems perhaps to correspond. 
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Exceptions include the previously quoted response to Picture 19 offered by 
Infonnant 39 (§3.3), which contains: 
Kay t'anta. Chayta runa ruwan 
This is bread. People make that (lnf. 39; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 19) 
In its entirety (above), however, the response (along with that of Infonnant 26 
preceding it above) gives the strong impression of someone struggling for 
something to say in the face of a rather abstruse picture. 
6 Attitudes and Informant 42 
The range of response types treated above by no means exhausts the types 
offered by infonnants. 
Two items are notable for their absence from the above. The first is attitudinal 
integration, the amount of space devoted to which in chapter III might have 
heralded more than two simple matrices here. The second is Infonnant 42. 
Infonnant 42 does not belong in this sample; he is just too different. He is a 
teacher, a native speaker of Spanish, and he is far better educated than any of the 
other members of the sample. And his picture responses are too different too. 
On the basis of the few and slight trends fonnally and infonnally observed here, 
we might expect that, compared to the responses of any infonnant with an 
integration score of under 10, say, Infonnant 42's responses would contain: 
1) a lower proportion of labels (figure 2); 
2) a lower proportion of asserted characterizations (figure 3); 
3) a higher proportion of responses which incorporate movement (figure 4); 
4) a higher proportion of relations (figure 5); 
5) a higher proportion of explanatory responses (figure 9); 
since these appear to be some of the major ways in which the more integrated 
differ from the less integrated. Yet Infonnant 42 confonns to only one of our 
expectations: (2) he provides a lower proportion of asserted characterizations. 
This ought not to matter, of course; he is after all only one out of fifty. The 
hope, however, had been that his responses would provide some idea of what 
other infonnants' picture interpretations might be working towards. 
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Infonnant 42' s responses are on the whole succinct; 
Bueno es un paisaje costumbrista. Un paisaje 
Ok, it's a traditional local landscape. A landscape (Pic. 7) 
tending additionally to be either pronouncedly descriptive: 
Bueno el mapa del Peru con un animal. Pero este mapa no tiene ningun nombre. 
ningu.n tipo de nombre de los demas repUblicas 
Ok, the map of Peru with an animal. But this map hasn't a single name, not any sort 
of name for the rest of the republics (Pic. 2Ic) 
Bueno aqui se pego una succesion de elementos que desde las guerras hasta los estos 
dfas 
Ok, here someone's glued a series of elements from the time of the War to the present 
day (Pic. 10) 
or to keep to well trodden metaphorical paths: 
Bueno esto parece uno se ensefta el correr del tiempo. Reloj 
Ok, this seems to be one which teaches the passing of time (pic. 8) 
Bueno aqui es, parece indicar que tiene dos personalidades en una persona 
Ok, this one seems to indicate that he has two personalities in one person (pic. 22c) 
Since his experience of Peruvian mainstream society is, in real tenns, very 
different from that of Infonnants 7 and 8 (from whose integration scores (Cat. 
27.5) Infonnant 42's score (Cat. 30) differs by only 2.5), we are of course in no 
position to judge whether Infonnant 42 is simply abnonnal. 
The infonnants' attitudes constitute the second notable omission in this chapter. 
In fact correlations of these indicators, whether with asserted characterizations, 
movement, relations, etc. yield rw single pattern any more revealing than figures 
7 and 8 above. This, of course, could mean one of a number of things. The 
most obvious explanation at this point (see below) is simply that there are too 
few data to be able to tell whether there is a match or not. 
7 Summary: mismatching the data 
It must be admitted that the results of this survey are hardly persuasive. We 
have encountered the very occasional trend-like tendency (figure 5's, for 
example), but little of note. Perhaps, after all, picture perception genuinely has 
nothing to do with level of education, mobility, and degree of proficiency in 
Spanish. This is perfectly possible. My strong impression, however, is that it 
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is not the case. There are many possible reasons for this failure, some of which 
are in themselves highly significant. 
The deficiency for which I shall attempt to make amends in the coming chapters 
concerns the lack of any sound basis for deeming any two responses 
"equivalent" in any respect. The present chapter has been rife with unjustified 
assumptions concerning the status of entities discussed and their relationships to 
one another. 
For example, since we did not come to any conclusions in chapter II as to the 
conventionality or otherwise of the picture, we do not know on what basis 
"conventional interpretations" are distinguished from any other kind of pictorial 
interpretation. Similarly, we have treated the generalizing "explanatory 
response" with some awe, while offering no reasons why it should be 
considered more remarkable than any more particular response. It was left to the 
readers' intuitions, moreover, to decide what constitutes a "pictorial element", 
without any kind of guarantee that the spatial boundaries of their elements would 
coincide with those of my own. Yet the classification of responses as either 
"simple" or "relational" has relied upon the assumption that these boundaries 
would indeed coincide. In short, lacking any kind of systematic approach either 
to the picture responses or to the pictures themselves, we have no idea of the 
status of the entities we are dealing with. 
Other inadequacies relate to the second of the two variables matched; that is, to 
the integration categories and to the categorization of informants. 
Let us assume that there is some interesting relationship between picture 
perception and integration within Peruvian mainstream society. Why was I 
unable to bring this to light? 
Firstly, it may be that there is some more significant variable, or group of 
variables, at work which has not been examined. Two candidates have in fact 
been suggested (though both hidden in footnotes). First, we might have 
assessed degree of bilingualism, rather than proficiency in Spanish; thus taking 
into account any informant's bilingualism in Quechua and Aymara (and also 
Informant 42's lack of proficiency in Quechua). Secondly, we might have 
attempted to rank informants according to the activities pursued on any trip away 
from the island - rather than the fact of the trip itself. Clues as to why this might 
be relevant are provided by HaUpike (1979) in his examination of the 
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relationship between modes of classification and generalization, and the 
cognitive demands of the environment. 
Another reason for the disappointing nature of the results presented here may be 
that the rankings were not assigned with sufficient care. This is quite likely. 
The education rankings, for example, might profitably have incorporated a 
recency factor similar to that used in scoring travel rankings. As things stand, it 
is possible that schooling actually distorts the data; by allowing the young a good 
2.5 point headstart on everyone else - and without their necessarily having 
begun to explore the world outside. The Spanish rankings, moreover, might 
have been based upon the frequency of particular Spanish syntactic 
constructions, rather than on maximum syntactic complexity. My impression, 
however, is that either alternative would merely have shifted the source of the 
misrepresentation. Additionally, I ought perhaps to have matched separately 
responses given in Spanish and those given in Quechua. Studies of language 
choice and bilingual code-switching (Fishman 1972; Harvey 1991, for example) 
would predict differences in what anyone might tend to say in one language as 
opposed to another - quite apart from any question of its comparative 
"sayability" (Whorf 1972; Lenneberg 1972; Cole et al. 1971, etc.). 
The obvious objection that I should not have added together scores for indicators 
(1) to (3) is not responsible for the failure. All types of picture response were 
also (and initially) correlated with each indicator separately (see chapter III, §6). 
No revealing patterns emerged; and it is for this reason that they were not 
presented in this form. 
As regards the influence of attitudes, another strong impression I have is that 
they are relevant - despite the staggeringly unilluminating correlations of 
attitudinal indicators with picture responses. 
I argued strongly against adding pro-"Western" totals to pro-traditional totals. 
Perhaps I should simply not have added any component to any other component 
at all. Certainly, the attitudinal indicators were very easily manipulated - as I 
realized when experimenting with various alternative scoring methods before 
settling on what I term to myself "double positive" (in that all points are for 
liking; none for disliking). Indeed, I might have investigated the influence of 
coca chewing alone, say, on the degree of imaginative input. To have done this 
however, would only have accorded even more weight to responses which 
were, after all, just "yes/no" answers made on the spur of the moment. 
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8 A new focus for responses 
The spur of the moment. This brings us, belatedly, to a crucial point which 
relates not only to the attitudinal indicators, but which has implications for the 
assessment of picture responses too. 
For what does one say in the face of questions like "What's this?", or "What's 
happening here, then?", or - worse still- "What does it mean?"? 
Figure 10 
If someone were to find me poring over figure 10 in the Sunday paper, asking 
any of the above questions, my answer might be: 
"It's a game for grown-ups"; 
"It's a chessboard"; 
"It's the chess"; 
"The white queen has the black king in check but if the black knight takes her, 
it exposes the king to check mate from the white rook"; 
"It's that famous 1858 Morphy/Allies set-up". 
There are few situations under which I could see myself answering "White 
stands at K on QB1; Ron Ql; QRP on QR2; QKtP on QKt2, etc.", or 
commenting on the asymmetry of the black pawns - certainly not without a good 
deal of provocation, for a complete verbal rendering of all that I see, even 
assuming its feasibility and my motivation, would be a lengthy business. 
What I choose to say will certainly depend upon what I see, what I recognize 
and what I understand of figure 10. But it will undoubtedly depend more on 
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who is asking me. How is their eyesight? What do they see, recognize and 
understand of figure 10. What do they want to know? Why are they asking me? 
Why are they asking me? 
If the enquirer is a young relative, I will have a fair idea of how much is 
required. If the enquirer is a blind chess player, I will modify my response 
accordingly. But if the enquirer is a strange and rather awkward white woman 
with a tape recorder, who brought the picture with her, I am at a loss. Anything 
and everything I am able to tell her will be filtered through a sieve of 
expectations, and will emerge more a product of the relation between me and 
her, than between me, the pigment on the page, and any integration into 
mainstream chess circles I may have had (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1982). 
It is this interactive, context-specific, information which is missing from the 
analysis above; the lack of which, moreover, renders any meagre findings 
practically worthless. 
8.1 The communicative context re-viewed 
In fact the informants possessed more information than that contained in "strange 
and rather awkward white woman with a tape recorder" though that in itself is 
plenty to go on. 
They knew that I was staying with Juan and Erminigelda. They'd seen me 
around. Some of them had given me vast meals, and others had smoked half my 
cigarettes. They knew, in the beginning, that I was asking questions in order to 
improve my Quechua - and this was at least half true at the time. Later - and 
especially if they were in church the day it was publicly announced, they knew 
that I was doing a study on the efficacy ("how well they work") of some of the 
posters which found their way to Amantani. This again was at least half true. 
Even so, it is difficult to imagine that this information would have entirely 
dispelled the feeling of being put on the spot; nor indeed put an end to any 
doubts as to the confidentiality and destination of the results. 
Add to this the seeming pointlessness of the task, and one can readily see how 
responses may have been inhibited. 
Or not, as the case may be. For some informants seemed positively to revel in it: 
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For example: 
Ah, si sit Estos son los serpientes. Mira! Ahi! Estos son los serpientes. Esto ... 
esto es ... esto mundo, por ejemplo. Avion. Luna, no? 0 mundo tambien? (Me: No se) 
Luna sera. Mas 0 menos la luna. Luna, eh? No se. Mondo. [laughs] Huevecito. Ellos, por 
infierno. Infierno, no? Mas 0 menos, pues, tado esto fuego asi. Entonces ellos veian. 
Oyian, con ruido asi. Entonces 10 admiraban esos. Tenian pena. Se escuchaba mas 0 menos 
ya. Querian que hacen? Esto es ... Entonces ez ha escuchado mas 0 menos. Por ejemplo 
podia hacer un ruido. [makes a noise; then, like unit A, covers his ears] "Ah!! que paso?" 
Esta en pena. Pero ellos ... tambien estan en pena. Pero mas 0 menos estos son los creyentes 
afavor de Dios. Estos mas 0 menos casi no. Esto esfeliz. Tranquil/o, si, mas 0 menos. 
Ah yes! These are the serpents. Look! Goodness! These are the serpents. This ... 
this is ... this is the world, for example. An airplane. The moon, isn't it? Or the world too? 
(Me: I don't know) It'll be the moon. The moon, eh? I don't know. The world. [laughs] It 
could be a little egg. That's hell. It's hell, isn't it? More or less, I mean, what with all this 
fire. So those ones [units A, B and C] could see it. They could hear it, with noise like that. 
So they were surprised by it. They were distressed. They could hear it more or less. They 
wanted to know what they could do. This is ... So he's heard it more or less [unit A]. For 
example, I could make a noise [makes a noise; then, like unit A, covers his ears]. "Oh!! 
What's happened?" He's distressed. But them [units Band C] ... they're distressed too. But 
these ones more or less [units K and L] are the believers in (the) favour of God. These ones 
[units A, Band C], not really, no. This one's quite happy [unit D]. He's unperturbed, more or 
less. (lnf. 3; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 11) 
Informant 3 is Benerijto Pacompia, ex-gobernador of Incatiyana, and 
comparatively rich for an islander (he has shares in a passenger boat, he owns a 
windpump, and occasionally receives tourists as paying guests). I see I have 
written in my notes "nice old bloke", though in fact was only forty-seven. 
Though he was obviously used to being listened to, he did not seem so 
conscious of his own importance (nor of mine) that his responses are devoid of 
fun. Far from it (see (about one third of) his response to Picture 13 in §5 
above). 
Other informants were entirely at the mercy of their audience. Informant 34, 
Julian Quispe, is employed to run the wawawasi (formally, the Centro Materno 
Infantil), a pre-school playgroup attended by around twenty children three 
mornings a week (see Photograph 4 in Appendix B). The children sing songs, 
play games, practise marching, and generally get used to the idea of going to 
school. I had told him I would come at lunchtime, and I was early. The tape 
begins: 
Julian: 
Children: 
Kaypi noqa kashani como wawawasi promotor de voluntaria de 
Incatiyana. Wawakuna ya ama ch'aqwanldchiqchu! Ya, kay pi 
fi.oqayku parlasaqku, ya. Qankuna parlaytachu munankichiq nichu 
munankichiq? Wilmacha? Noqa imata kani? 
I'm here as the voluntary leader of Incatiyana playschool. Look, 
children, don't shout! We're going to talk here, ok. Do you lot want 
to talk too? Or don't you want to? Wilma? What am I? 
Julian. 
You're Julian. 
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Julian: 
Children: 
Julian: 
Julian. Pronwtor? 
I'm Julian. Am I the leader? 
Promotor. 
You're the leader. 
Yo soy Julian, promotor de Incatiana voluntario. Si. Bueno, kay 
senora hermananchiq Juan chaypi kashan. Hoq senora - Katalina, no? 
Disculpe, no? Senora Katalinawanparlasaq. Parlaripusaqku, no? Ya, 
si. Los wawitos tambien pueden grabar, no? 
I'm Julian, Incatiyana's voluntary leader. Yes. Right, this lady, our sister, 
she's staying at Juan's. This lady .. (To me:) It's "Katie", isn't it? Sorry. 
(To the children:) I'm going to talk: to Miss Katie. We're going to talk, ok? 
Yes. 
(To me:) The children can go on the tape too, can't they? 
The picture responses which follow, accompanied by scuffles and giggles, are 
all of much the same form as this response to Picture 4: 
Julian: 
Child: 
Julian: 
Child: 
Julian: 
Children: 
Children: 
Child: 
Julian: 
Children: 
Ama ch'aqwankichiqchu, ya. 
Stop shouting, alright? 
Waka. 
A cow. 
Ima nashantaq kaypi? Kaypi trabajashanku kaypi. TrabajarqOshanku. 
Ama saruwankichiqchu! 
What's going on here, then? Here they're working. They're working very 
hard. Don't squash me! 
Yapushan. 
He's ploughing. 
Yapushan. Imawanmin yapukun? Taqllawan yapukun. 
He's ploughing. What do you (does one) plough with? You plough (one 
ploughs) with a plough. 
Taqllawan! 
With a plough! 
Taqllawan! 
With a plough! 
Chi/we. 
Baby chicks. 
Chilwe ya. Qaraykushanchu? lmatataq qaraykushan? Siwarata qaraykushan. 
Kay ima iskapasqa chayta hap'ishanchu manachu? Hap'ishan. 
Imamantataq hap'ishan? Kunkamantachu? Kunkamanta. 
Yes, baby chicks. Is she feeding them? What is she feeding them? 
She's feeding them barley. This one that's escaped, is he catching it or not? 
He's catching it. And how's he catching it? Is he catching it by the neck? 
He's catching it by the neck. 
Kunkamanta! ! 
By the neck!! 
... and so on. 
Clearly this response is not only generally geared to its (most obvious) audience 
of small children (in its abundance of "doing-words", its question-and-answer 
format, and perhaps its focus upon single small areas of the picture at a time), it 
is also determined by the elements individual children select and upon which 
Julhin subsequently elaborates. 
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These are not, however, the responses on the basis of which Julian was 
allocated his scores. For the children eventually disappear for their lunch, 
leaving Julian and me to do the pictures "properly". Here is his fIrst response, 
to a photograph of Philippine women making jewellery while in the background 
others scavenge a rubbish tip for food: 
Chinos, no? Mercadopi tiyashanku kanastakunawan aretekunawan 
They're Chinese, aren't they? They're sitting in a market with baskets and earrings 
And here is his response to the reappearance of Picture 4: 
Kaypitaq animalkuna - ovejakuna llamakuna alpacakuna wakakunataq ima. Chakrata 
ruwashanku runakuna 
Here there are animals: sheep, llamas, alpacas, cows, all those. People are working 
the field (Inf. 34; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 4) 
All of Julian's second batch of responses are shorter and more enumerative; 
there is less movement and less imaginative detail 1. There is also what might be 
seen as an immediate initial demonstration of some specialized knowledge 
(Chinos, no?) to mark his switch from ChildSpeak to (alien) grown-up talk. 
The same demonstration of specialized knowledge is fairly frequent within 
Informant 43's responses. 
Informant 43, Juan Carl Yucra, had just returned from a spell in a Lima fur 
workshop. He was interviewed as he sat catching up with some friends outside 
the salon artesanal. Although his picture interpretations are not so explicitly 
geared to his audience as those of Informant 34 above, I had the distinct feeling 
that he was trying to impress his friends and/or me with his fancy sunglasses, 
his huge bunch of keys, and the cosmopolitan nature of his responses. 
He begins in Quechua with firm evidence that he knows what a television looks 
like: 
Kay runakuna kay televisorta qhawashanku. Kay television kay hatun runa kaypiqa 
qhawachishan. Paykunataq punkunta hina televisionta waykuykuyta munanku 
These people are watching this television. The big man here is making them watch 
the television. And they want to go through the television as through a door. (Inf. 
43; Cat. 17.5; Supplementary Picture 3, reproduced in Appendix D) 
switching to Spanish when we reach Picture 1: 
1 Of course the novelty will have worn off by this time. 
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Kaytaqmin hoq india warmi risakushan. Esta rezando ... Debe ser en la puna. 
Here an Illifum woman is praying ... She's praying ... It must be in the puna ... (lnf. 
43; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 1) 
almost as though to dissociate himself from the "Indian" woman in the picture l . 
Subsequent responses continue to manifest the same ever so slightly ostentatious 
modernity: 
Este es batalla. Aqui ... debe ser terrorista. Aqui estan conversando. Aqui el senor 
est! can su enamoradito. Aqui el senor est! mirando este avian de cuetas (= cohete). 
Ya, muy bien. 
This is a battle. Here ... this must be a terrorist. Here they're chatting. Here the man 
is with his. Here the man is watching this rocket plane. Ok, fine. (Inf. 43; Cat. 
17.5; Pic. 11) 
in which the helmeted man is not just a soldier but a terrorist; and the plane not 
just any old plane but a rocket plane. He later pursues the matter of three 
(photographic) characters' nationalities: 
Aqu{ hay uno tambien de bonito. Ya aqu{ lindo. Ya tambiin un ... Este debe ser ... 
debe ser un estudiante. Un estudiante debe ser esto tambien. Kay uno tambien. Ya mas 0 
menos que ... De Japon me parece es esto, no? De Jap6n 0 de China? (Me: De China) Ya, de 
China. Este debe ser ya de otro pats. Tambiin el otro debe ser. Los tres. Dos. De tres, no? 
De tres tambiin que ... Aqu{ esta volando ya un ... avion. Avion panamericana, no? Ya, muy 
bien. 
Here's another nice one. Yes, it's lovely. Another ... This must be ... it must be a . 
This must be a too. This one too. Well, more or less ... This one looks as if he's from Iru2illl, 
isn't he? Is he from .twan..-or from...china? (Me: From China) Yes, from.Qllna. This one 
must be from. And the other one must be too. The three. Two. All three of them are, aren't 
they? And all three... Here there's an airplane flying. A Pan-American airplane, isn't it? Ok, 
fine. (lnf. 43; Cat. 17.5; Pic. 3) 
with the same persistence I had remarked upon with regard to animal 
identification above (§2). It is not all bluff, however. To a (wordless) 
advertisement for a film version of a Tennessee Williams work, he responds: 
Ya, estas ni;ias. Pe/{cula, no? Pel{culas. 
Yes, these girls. It's a film, isn't it? Films. (Inf. 43; Cat. 17.5) 
reacting, I can only suppose, to the typically cinematic composition and soft 
focus of the photograph. 
1 Only one other informant uses the word "indio" anywhere in response to any question or 
picture. This is Informant 22 (Cat. 2.5), responding to a shakily drawn picture of traditionally 
dressed people having a meal in the open: Runakuna. Wawakuna. Nino indio (people. 
Children. An Indian child). 
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It should be noted, finally, that each of these three informants (3, 34 and 43), 
whose responses differ markedly from one another, has been allocated the same 
cumulative intergration score (that is, 17.5). And though their attitudinal 
rankings differ (D4, B3, andA2, respectively), the attitudes most to the fore in 
the picture test context will not necessarily have had anything to do with coca, 
fiestas, etc.; but rather more to do with me. 
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1 Introduction 
CHAPTER V 
Pictures and Representation 
The results of chapter IV's picture test were disappointing, and the reasons for 
that disappointment hinged most crucially upon an inattention to the test context 
itself. 
But we noted, additionally, that we were hard put even adequately to describe 
the types of response informants provided, having no systematic basis for our 
categorizations of response types, and no clear idea of what we meant by 
"pictorial element". Neither had we any clear idea of what could be taken for 
granted as regards the picture's communicative capacity, and what was 
somehow "extra" to the picture'S basic meaning. 
In this chapter we begin the task of clarifying our terms; eventually to offer a 
theoretical framework for the assessment of verbalized responses to pictures. 
This is, in a sense, a step backwards. Should any practical application of this 
framework be envisaged, it should, of course, adopt a context sensitive 
approach to the responses it describes. 
In §2 we offer a definition of pictorial representation, and discuss how pictorial 
representation may be distinguished from other types of indexical relation. 
Subsequent sections compare pictorial perception with non-pictorial perception, 
examining in more detail the notion of physical resemblance, in a continuation of 
chapter II's attempt to disentangle to what extent pictorial perception is a 
universal and biologically determined human ability, and to what extent it is 
culturally mediated. 
The first and already belated task, however, is an explicit formulation of what 
we understand by "pictorial representation", and a tentative siting of the notion 
within a typology of message-bearing entities. 
2 Indication and pictorial representation 
Communication comes about through the conveying of infonnation by a signal. 
The word "car" may convey to me a sense of "that red vehicle outside"; the 
approach of lights may tell me that my taxi has arrived; a certain configuration of 
colours on a tie may indicate that the wearer is a member of the Automobile 
Association. In each case it is the presence of a certain phenomenon, x, which 
allows me to infer a second phenomenon, y. To have any expectation that such 
an inference will be valid, there must be a correlation between x and y, where x 
indicates, or acts in a capacity of conveying, y. Phenomenon x, then, may be 
tenned an "indicator", y an "indicated" and the relationship existing between 
them one of "indication" (see, for example, Saussure 1974; Prieto 1966; Mulder 
and Hervey 1980; Hervey 1982; Martinet 1980). 
2.1 In search of a definition of''picture'' 
Here is a preliminary attempt to delimit the range of possible representational 
indicators and that of the indicated, along with a general pointer as to the 
relationship between the two: 
"A picture is a repraesentans in its capacity of conveying, via the visual 
stimuli alone, a repraesentatum; where the repraesentans is an essentially 
two-dimensional, essentially continuous surface, and the repraesentatum 
is a real or hypothetical experiential correlate, which, if it were to exist, 
would be a visible object and which, if it exists, is a visible object." 
This is really only the start. It establishes the medium and delimits, in a 
preliminary way, the domain of the representable. Some points need 
clarification: 
"essentially two-dimensional" 
such that the expression-substance does not reveal three-dimensional 
properties which are, in their tum, indexical of a represented content 
Thus, while this qualification excludes from picturehood a table-top model of 
Buckingham Palace and Michaelangelo's "David", it admits not only the 
particularly knobbly oil painting and the etching, but also "faces in the fire", 
"chariots in the clouds", etc. 
"essentially continuous" 
such that the expression-substance does not reveal discontinuities which 
are, in their tum, indexical of a represented content 
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This admits the jigsaw and the mosaic. 
"real or hypothetical experiential correlate" 
This admits pictures of mythical beasts, events which never happened; for 
example, a meeting between Confucius and Oliver Cromwell (see Harre 1970b; 
Hervey 1979). 
"which if it were to exist, would be a visible object" 
This is an awkward categorization to attempt, but I believe the idea is evoked 
easily enough through illustration. A unicorn, for instance, would be visible, an 
angel's voice audible and the smell of a demon's lunch olfactory. Note that 
these do not need to appeal to metaphor or synaesthesia as would, for example, 
"the smell of victory". 
"which, if it exists, is a visible object" 
This may seem unnecessarily restrictive and even counter-intuitive, since it 
excludes probably hundreds of great works of art (see, for example, Steinberg 
1953). In fact, this condition, along with that preceding it, becomes a corollary 
of the requirement of a visual resemblance introduced below. 
Imagine, meanwhile, two paintings each entitled "Fear". One represents a man 
screaming at the sight of a giant spider, and the other a collection of dark shapes. 
I should maintain that neither qualifies as a picture of "fear"; the first is a picture 
of a man screaming at the sight of a giant spider, and the second a collection of 
dark shapes. Fear may well be alluded to, symbolized, or even evoked, but it is 
not, and can never be, pictorially represented. 
"via the visual stimuli alone" 
This excludes the unlikely situation in which a tape recorder concealed behind a 
plain red canvas suddenly announces: "remember what a tomato looks like". 
2.2 The relationship of representation 
The definition above deals with the general nature of a picture in terms of its 
concrete being, but as yet only cursorily with the relationship between 
repraesentans and repraesentatum. As it stands, it permits as pictures of a car 
each of the following with equal validity: 
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Intuition tells us that only band f are pictures of cars. But we need a definition 
that will account for, and perhaps amend, this intuitive stance; one that will 
distinguish pictorial representation from other types of indexical relationship. 
2.2.1 Indexical relationships 
There are basically two types of indexical relationship: those wholly mediated by 
naturaVcausallinks, and those dependent, at least partially, upon conventions 
(Mulder and Hervey 1980; Hervey 1982, etc.). 
Natural indices 
Causal and co-occurrentiallinks in the physical world give us reason to 
anticipate thunder after lightning, to diagnose measles from a particular rash, etc. 
Lightning and rashes may function as natural indices. No element of convention 
is needed to explain the connection between signal and information. "Cause 
may be inferred from effect, effect from cause, or one phenomenon from the 
other in a pair of co-occurrent phenomena," solely through a knowledge of 
natural relations (Mulder and Hervey 1980: 179). As soon as there is any 
evidence of convention the index may no longer be termed natural (Hervey 
1982). 
d I In figure Id, there is a completely natural link between the tyre-track and the information "car (has passed this way)" (but see chapter VIII). 
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Likewise, the photograph has been "caused" by the 
response of photo-sensitive paper to light emitted and 
'~~'3:'k reflected by a car. 
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Conventional indices 
Conventional indices are those which, for their correct interpretation, depend at 
least to some extent upon conventions, tacit or otherwise. 
a car 
c 
Motivated indices 
Words are perhaps the most common wholly conventional 
indices. There is nothing natural about the relation 
between figure 1 a and "that red vehicle out there", and no 
amount of knowledge of "how the world 
works" that would allow us to guess at the message 
"Mercedes" given signal c. Such correlations must be 
established by convention 1. 
Motivated indices are neither wholly conventional nor wholly natural. There 
exists in the relation between indicator and indicated an element of "naturalness" 
and also an element of conventionality. 
g 
b 
Properties of the indicated entity have motivated the 
choice of indicator (a heraldic lion rampant may call up 
notions of strength, tradition, royalty, etc.), but, 
without knowledge of the convention, we should most 
probably guess that it represents a lion, not a car, let 
alone a Peugeot. 
Figure 1 b, on the other hand, certainly has elements of 
conventionality incorporated into it, but it is understood 
by virtue of the motivation: visual resemblance. 
Classification of motivated indices may be made by distinguishing those which 
are understood by virtue of the motivation (while necessarily permitting a degree 
of conventionality) from those which are understood by virtue of conventions. 
1 The Mercedes symbol, possibly visually reminiscent of a steering wheel, should perhaps be 
classified as a motivated index understood by convention. 
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Where an index is understood by virtue of a resemblance of visual attributes 
between indicator and indicated the former category may be termed "iconic" 
(Peirce 1940; Martinet 1980, etc.). 
Motivation does not always boil down to visual resemblance. Other types of 
motivation might include auditory resemblance (the "cuckoo" played by the 
clarinet in Beethoven's 6th Symphony, for instance); what might be termed 
"synaesthetic" association of attributes (for example, the advertisement's soft-
feeling silk ~ soft-tasting cigarette); the association of attributes not available to 
the senses (e.g. strong lion ~ strong car, or scales ~ justice); what may be 
• 
termed "habitual contextual association" (such as ? ~ swimming pool), etc. 
Visual resemblance, however, is not only more easily apprehended than any 
"metonymical" association (a chimpanzee can do it; chapter II, §2), but, as is 
apparent from the above, (where the indicator is visible) the apprehension of a 
visual resemblance must precede metaphorical association. It is not the habitual 
contextual association of "swimming pool" with the smudge of pigment which 
allows us to infer the presence of the former from that of the latter; the 
association is between "swimming pool" and the entity represented by i ' 
that is to say, a person diving. 
g 
2.2.2 Pictorial indices 
The same is true of what might be termed "synecdochic" 
association (see chapter VIII), by which figure 19 may 
indicate a car, in that it is reminiscent of a part of a car. 
But, while the figure finds an easy correspondence with 
a fairly common self-contained experiential entity, 
unless a convention has been established by which, say, 
Speedo Cars is indicated, we will settle for 
"speedometer" . 
We have arrived at a classification of visual indices into four categories: wholly 
conventional indices (figure 1, a and c); wholly natural indices (d and f); indices 
motivated by a visual resemblance but understood by virtue of convention (e and 
g (indicating a type of car»; and, finally, indices motivated and understood by 
virtue of a visual resemblance (figure 1b). 
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Given that other conditions are met, it may still be a matter of choice as to which 
class of object is termed "picture". But if there is to be any real correspondence 
at all between our "picture" and the layperson's "picture", then that class must 
be the fourth of these. Were we instead to label "picture" the indices understood 
by virtue of convention, objections would not be difficult to raise. We should 
need to have learned by rote the convention linking each repraesentans to the 
appropriate repraesentatum, and we should not recognize any unfamiliar picture 
as being "of' anything. But we see pictures of new things all the time - the 
shape of an angler fish, or the fire damage sustained by York Minster. How 
may this be, if convention alone ties together picture and pictured? Moreover, 
some animals (chapter II, §2), and very young children raised with extremely 
limited exposure to pictures of any sort, can match outline pictures with objects 
(Hochberg and Brooks 1968). 
We seem, however, to have satisfied intuition only to some extent, in that we 
have excluded photographs. 
Photographs, in many ways, constitute a special case. We may accept that, 
whatever the artifice involved in the set-up, so long as the photograph itself has 
not been "touched up" or otherwise tampered with, the link between photograph 
and photographed object remains essentially causal. For this reason, 
photographs are often excluded from "iconhood" (see, for example, Hervey 
1982: 201; Peirce 1940: 106). 
The classification of indices above, however, is based upon the manner of 
construction of the link between picture and pictured, with the unstated 
assumption that this is paralleled in the understanding of that link. Nevertheless, 
there may be room for a distinction between construction and understanding, 
which will find picture and photograph in accord. This is aided by a 
consideration of the parts played by picturer and intention. 
2.2.3 Pictorial intent 
As it stands, the definition makes no claim for the necessary participation of a 
pictorially intent picturer, or, indeed, any other kind of picturer. 
Suppose the definition to have included the line: 
" ... a repraesentans intended to convey ... " 
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This would imply not only a pictorial intent, but also, therefore, an intender. By 
this account, for all that they may be essentially two-dimensional and convey an 
awareness of chariots, unless we genuinely suppose God to have been busy 
with a paintbox, "cloud-pictures " would not qualify. Scratches on a rock caused 
by glacial deposits and taken to be neolithic man's fIrst attempt at a pictorial 
bison may well be responded to as a picture but, again - without investing the 
glacier with a certain animation - the scratches would not constitute a picture. 
As to pictorial intent in itself, the "beetle" which seems to appear on a fabric as a 
result of an accidental spillage of paint would not qualify as a picture; nor indeed 
the "face" fonned by the application of turpentine to clean off the paint. Yet an 
observer may understand as a picture something never intended as such. The 
chances are that in an art gallery somewhere in the world there hangs a 
celebrated fabric "Beetle of Fate", or that the contents of an overturned shopping 
bag have collected a few pennies in recognition of laudable if unorthodox artistic 
endeavour. And if the beetroot jar spills its juice into a fonn which - like it or 
not - does bear an extraordinary resemblance to the late Duke of Sutherland, 
how, one might ask, may it not be a picture? 
For this reason, the requirement of intention is omitted. So long as the 
appropriate relationship holds in the understanding of the link, this constitutes a 
picture - regardless of intention or picturer. 
With this in mind, the status of the photograph may be reconsidered. It is 
probabl y true that the photograph carries with it a connotation of reality that even 
the most careful oil painting fInds hard to match (Metz 1974; Arnheim 1958, 
etc.). It is certainly true that the bona fIde photograph is a direct result of that 
which it presents. Nevertheless, I should maintain that this is not how 
photographs are understood. We do not reconstruct mentally the chain of 
physical processes involved in order to decipher the photograph - in the way we 
might investigate the cause of an unfamiliar rash. Photographs, familiar or not, 
are understood in the same way glacial bisons and beetroot dukes are 
understood: by virtue of an immediately appreciable visual resemblance (see 
chapter VII, §6.1). 
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2.3 Summary 
Given the above, the definition of "picture" may be re-phrased: 
"A picture is a repraesentans in its capacity of conveying, by virtue of a visual 
resemblance, a repraesentatum; where the repraesentans is an essentially two-
dimensional, essentially continuous surface, and the repraesentatum is a real or 
hypothetical experiential correlate." 
While it is tempting to take for granted the implications of the phrase "by virtue 
of a visual resemblance", it merits inquiry nonetheless. 
3 Seeing 
Firstly, however, we should undertake a brief investigation of the processes 
involved in ordinary perception. 
The literature on this topic is both vast and varied. Neuropsychologists have 
approached the problem by investigating visual impairments following brain 
damage; psychophysical studies have sought to observe how different stimulus 
characteristics affect performance in perceptual tasks; neurophysiologists have 
examined the responses of single cells in the visual pathway to different images. 
Computer models of the human visual system have also contributed significantly 
to the study of visual cognition. The reader is referred to Humphreys and Bruce 
(1989) for an overview. 
Our aim, meanwhile, is not to explain perception, but merely to provide an 
outline by which we may judge whether explanations for our ability to see and 
recognize objects and spatial arrangements in the real world translate well into a 
limited, two-dimensional medium. 
3.1 Light and retina 
Light emitted or reflected by surfaces in the environment is projected on to the 
retina of the human eye by the lens. Exposure to light brings about a 
photochemical reaction in the 125,000,000 or so light-sensitive cells of the 
retina. This reaction generates the neural impulses which carry the visual signal 
to the brain. 
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An "optic array", or structured bundle of light rays, converging upon a particular 
station point (which may, but need not be, an eye) contains information about 
the structure of the ambient environment - about relative contrast and intensity, 
but, most importantly, information about the direction of the light source. In a 
uniform medium like air, light leaving a surface maintains its direction. 
Consequently, the direction of the light is identical with the direction of its 
source, and adjacent elements of an optic array come from adjacent directions. 
While the conditions of illumination and absolutes of intensity and colour may 
alter, the structure and relative composition of the optic array remain constant. 
This gives us some measure of confidence in the stability and predictability of 
visual information, but goes little of the way towards an explanation of our 
ability to see "things". 
3.2 Perceptual organization and seeing things 
What the retina experiences upon reception of an optic array is a pattern of 
energy - a mosaic of photochemical activity; but what we see is not merely a 
pattern but, say, a bowl of fruit. The brain must make sense of the retinal 
image. According to Gestalt psychologists it achieves this primarily using 
various "principles of organization" (Weintraub and Walker 1968). The most 
basic of these is "figure and ground", whereby objects are seen to stand out 
against a background (Rubin 1958). "Good configuration", or the Law of 
Pragnanz, predicts that observers will organize their perception of the 
environment as simply as possible. Spontaneous, natural combinations and 
segregations are perceived through the operation of, for example, "closure", 
"familiarity" and "good continuation" (Wertheimer 1958). The pitting of these 
principles against one another occasionally leads to alternation between 
groupings (the foundation for many optical illusions; for example, Rubin's 
figure ground vase faces (1958: 201), or Escher's woodcut "Sun and Moon"). 
The isolation of a stimulus grouping and an analysis of sensory features (angles, 
curves and colours, for instance) is not, however, sufficient to account for the 
identification of an entity. Any single object may project a myriad of different 
images on to the retina according to illumination, distance and angle of 
observation, and location with regard to other objects. Moreover, different 
objects may project like images. Were we to organize our world solely in terms 
of outward appearances, a constant identity for any object would be impossible 
to establish. 
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An "ironing out" of variations in stimulation is achieved by matching stimulus 
patterns with a collection of relatively simple visual stereotypes, or "visual 
percepts" (Arnheim 1970), also termed "stored representations" (Humphreys 
and Bruce 1989)1. It is important to note, however, that such "representations" 
are structural descriptions (ibid.), rather than "internal pictures". Unlike the 
retina's indiscriminate registration of all observable detail, the brain is selective; 
only certain structural features are attended to, while others are imposed, in the 
search for an approximately corresponding template - a "categorical shape rather 
than a mechanically faithful recording of a particular stimulus" (Amheim 1970: 
81). Successful recognition of the object, however, still requires that the 
matched stimulus pattern be classified as a realization of a particular concept 
image. Only then may its registration on the retina amount to seeing, say, a ball 
as a ball, and not as some unspecified round shape. Where ambiguity results in 
the acceptability of several concept images, context (§5.4.4) will help determine 
the appropriateness of a particular interpretation. 
3.3 Depth perception 
Normal perception recognizes three dimensions. Depth, the third, is 
apprehended through interpretation of visual and muscular cues. Muscular cues 
include accommodation of the lens and convergence of the eyes. Of the visual 
cues the most obvious is the small angle sub tended by distant objects, 
convergence of horizontal lines, and partial overlap, as well as binocular parallax 
(Leonardo da Vinci 1954). By interpreting that subtension, convergence, etc. as 
a result of depth, distance information can be extracted. Only some of these 
cues may be incorporated into a picture to give the illusion of a scene in depth 
(Weintraub and Walker 1968). 
4 A return to visual resemblance 
With some idea of the processes at work in normal everyday perception, we are 
now in a position to ask whether the problem of pictorial visual resemblance is a 
problem at all; whether picture perception simply exploits those same processes, 
or whether we need to look further. 
1 Although there are important differences between template models and stored representation 
models of object recognition (see Humphreys and Bruce 1989; Lindsay and Norman 1977), I do 
not believe such differences to be crucial to the account here. 
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4.1 Pictures and the same elements of light 
The first option to be considered is that: 
the elements of light projected by a repraesentans are isomorphic with 
those projected by the repraesentatum 
According to this "point-projection theory" (Gibson 1954) a picture can 
represent a real object in so far as the light rays from the picture match the light 
rays from the original. So, given that points of colour and brightness are all that 
the eye can receive, "a picture that reconstitutes or represents the mosaic of color 
sensations from an external scene will arouse the same process of perception that 
the external scene would" (Gibson 1971: 29). The evidence comes from 
experiments said to demonstrate that it is possible for an observer, under 
specified conditions, to mistake a representation for the real thing (Gibson 
1960), and vice versa (Hochberg 1964). 
But what are the specified conditions? Even if the picture is highly naturalistic 
the giveaways are fairly obvious: if the observers move they will not experience 
movement parallax; they will not be able to see behind near objects; as they 
focus upon different parts of the scene they will not experience any straining of 
the eye muscles. So the observers' field of vision should be restricted to prevent 
head and eye movement, and the picture should be so carefully lit that muscular 
depth cues become unhelpful (Goodman 1976). In short, the conditions under 
which an illusion of reality (or an illusion of picturehood) may take place are so 
far removed from normal viewing conditions that such an experience in 
everyday life will be rare. 
Further limitations are revealed when the picture concerned is a line drawing, or 
a painting of a unicorn, since, in the first case, there is no point-by-point 
correspondence of brightness or colour between the two optic arrays; and, in the 
second, because there is no second optic array for the first to correspond to 
(Kennedy 1974). A theory of pictorial perception which holds good only when 
it so closely approximates normal perception that the two are more or less 
indistinguishable is not explaining pictorial perception at all. 
4.2 Pictures and optic information 
In a deceptively naturalistic picture the elements of light presented to the 
observer may be isomorphic with those projected by the actual scene. In a less 
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naturalistic picture capable of fooling no-one, we may still, with Gibson, speak 
of a picture'sjunctional fidelity: "the degree to which the variables to which the 
eye is sensitive are the same in one array as the other" (1960: 223). Thus 
allowances are made for the greater range of light intensities available in the 
environment compared even to a photographic slide; and also for the 
discrepancies in additional information available from the two sources (under a 
microscope, for instance). But we are still a long way from an explanation that 
will embrace the caricature. 
For Eco, there are two kinds of optic information which we come to understand 
to be equivalent; that is, we view "as one and the same perceptual result what are 
in fact two different perceptual results" (1976: 193). So a conjunction of light 
and film (on a sparkling glass of frothing beer) may not provide the same 
perceptual structure as the conjunction of two or more different colours on a flat 
surface (a picture of a sparkling glass of frothing beer), but will provide 
equivalent optic information. 
But any theory of representation based on the optics of our environment is 
bound to falter before the imaginary and the non-naturalistic. We need instead to 
look at instances where the repraesentans is not lifelike but is nonetheless 
perceived as an acceptable index for the repraesentatum. 
4.3 Pictures "look like" what they represent 
the repraesentans is like / is similar to / has something in common with 
the repraesentatum 
The temptation is to see these as basically equivalent statements, but a closer 
look reveals that this is not necessarily the case. 
4.3.1 Shared properties 
Morris states that a sign is iconic "to the extent to which it itself has the 
properties of its denotata" (1946, quoted in Eco 1976: 192). An elephant has 
four legs, flappy ears and a trunk; find four legs, flappy ears and a trunk and 
there you have your icon. But according to this, a fully iconic sign would be its 
denotatum, and the most lifelike icon of an approaching shark the approaching 
shark itself (Eco 1976; Martinet 1973). 
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Peirce recognizes that a representation has "common qualities" with its object, 
and also that representation is always "in some respect or capacity" (1940: 99) 
rather than in all respects. While avoiding the absurdity of the extreme implied 
above, this still does not make explicit the fundamental requirement that an icon, 
or a picture, must refer to something outside of itself, and that no sharing of 
properties or qualities may ever amount to identity with the represented object. 
Even with such a qualification, there remains the question of what properties the 
two sharks do share. One has a large three-dimensional body, rough grey skin, 
the capacity for movement, growth, reproduction and so on; the other might 
have a collection of pigment deposits and a smooth surface, or a small, three-
dimensional, empty, plastic body, no capacity for movement, growth, etc. 
Require, moreover, that a picture be essentially two-dimensional and there 
remains specifically in common very little - and, at a pinch, everything has 
something in common with everything else; with the result that, in saying that 
pictures have qualities in common with represented objects, we have said 
virtually nothing at all. 
4.3.2 Similarity 
Claims that a repraesentans is "similar" to the repraesentatum should fare better 
since clear formulations of "similarity" do exist, in the notion of geometrical 
similitude, for example (Eco 1976). 
Geometrical similitude is the property of two figures having corresponding 
angles equal, and all corresponding sides in the same ratio; that is, they are alike 
in all respects except in size (McLeod 1912). Eco suggests (1976: 195), that 
this is what Peirce means in maintaining that "a sign may be iconic, that is, may 
represent its object mainly by its similarity" (1940: 105). Perhaps this is also 
what is invoked by Langer when she claims that an outline picture shares "a 
certain proportion o!parts" with its object (1957: 69). But plane figures cannot 
correspond to solid figures by similitude; the third dimension is always lost. 
Thus this is not a satisfactory account of the correspondence between picture and 
pictured. 
5 A n alternative view 
Expressions of the relation between picture and pictured seem applicable only 
while they remain vague. A characterization of visual resemblance in terms of 
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"looking like" is unsatisfactory; "sharing properties" does not stand up to 
scrutiny; "similarity", if honed down, finds severe limitations in application. 
One source of the problem is in assuming another's term "icon" to be 
coextensive with the term "picture"l. Another stumbling block may be in 
supposing that one simple rule will apply to all types of picture. 
5.1 Three dimensions reduced to two 
But we are also overlooking Gibson's elementary observation that what the 
retina receives is never intrinsically three-dimensional; vision deals in optic 
arrays (§4.1). Rather than compare picture with object, we should compare the 
light from each. This seems a rather trivial point, since how may we view the 
object other than at a certain angle and under certain conditions of illumination, 
etc.? Yet we are forgetting that some of the information contributing to an 
appreciation of an object's three-dimensionality is not retinal but muscular 
(§3.3); some is the result of a bifocal coordination of two optic arrays, and some 
that of a succession of optic arrays. The purely visual information obtainable 
from a picture is no different in type from that available from a three-dimensional 
object; its only abnormality is its relative purity. Moving, using both eyes, or 
focusing differently yields no additional information2. Thus the translation of 
three dimensions to two is not something to which we must adapt in picture 
perception. 
With the questionable validity, then, of non-visual aspects of one's viewing of 
an object, the explanations offered so far may merit reconsideration. That there 
be shared properties, for example, is much tighter as a condition once we know 
that these are restricted to the visual. Similitude too regains its relevance, since, 
for all that a pyramid may not strictly correspond to a triangle, retinally 
speaking, the pyramid was only a triangle in the first place. And once confined 
to the realm of the two-dimensional, other geometrical expressions of 
correspondence may also come into play; equality of area, for example (McLeod 
1912). 
1 Peirce, for example, states: "it is a familiar fact that there are such representations as icons. 
Every picture (however conventional its method) is essentially a representation of that kind. 
So is every diagram, even though there be no sensuous resemblance between it and its object, 
but only an analogy between the relation of the parts of each" (1940: 105); and that "many 
diagrams resemble their objects not at all in looks; it is only in respect to the relations of their 
parts that their likeness consists" (1940: 107). 
2 That moving should yield no additional information is not strictly true of impressionistic 
painting. 
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Take figure 2a to be (already, for simplicity's sake) a picture of a pyramid, and 
suppose figures 2b to 2f to be tentative pictures of 2a itself. Figure 2a 
corresponds exactly to 2b to 2d, in terms of area (b and c), nodes (b), size of 
angles (c), and length and orientation of lines (d). 
Figure 2 
a b c d e 
Of course an exact correspondence in terms of all measurables simultaneously 
would yield a figure indistinguishable from 2a itself. But we should still be left 
with 2e, which, regardless of omissions and extras, is surely acceptable as a 
graphic substitute for 2a, and which here, I should maintain, best succeeds in 
conveying the essentials of 2a. 
5.2 Reduction to essentials 
In other words, we are looking for essentials, or distinctive features, in pictorial 
objects in precisely the way we look for essentials in non-pictorial objects 
(§3.2). Pictorial objects may correspond to existing visual percepts and norm 
images as readily as do non-pictorial. All that is necessary here, as there, is to 
transcend the variations in stimulation. "Whether or not a particular figure, 
encountered in daily life or in a picture, is recognized and accepted as human 
[for example] depends on whether the beholder can see it as a derivate of his 
norm figure" (Amheim 1970: 94). 
Amheim's "acceptable derivation from a norm figure" finds an echo of sorts in 
Gibson's "new theory of pictorial information" (1971), where he claims that 
"the optic array from a picture and the optic array from a world can provide the 
same information without providing the same stimulation. Hence, an artist can 
capture the information about something without replicating its sensations" 
(ibid.: 31). 
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Figure 3 ?[ 
Operating hierarchically, there may then be a level upon which the information 
available in a photographic transparency and that available in a landscape is 
equivalent; and a higher-order level upon which viewing a caricature (figure 3) is 
equivalent to viewing, say, Alfred Hitchcock (but see below). 
5.3 Essential differences? 
But Arnheim also states that "what is recognized in daily life is not necessarily 
accepted in pictorial representation also. Pictorial recognition takes its clues 
from the more limited set of declensions admissible in a particular style of 
representation rather than from the richer store of experiences available in the 
same observer for his coping with the physical world" (1970: 94-5). 
There is certainly a case for the inadmissibility of something within a style. An 
outline picture, for example, must ignore all features of its object save the 
boundary which marks it off from the space outside, or cease to be an outline 
picture. It is still a perfectly feasible, if not ideal, choice of style within which to 
represent a landscape (figure 4b). 
Figure 4 
8. b 
But my own view is that the "set of declensions" available in a picture is no 
more limited; any seeming discrepancy lies only in the relative likelihood of the 
spectacle in question, and in the relative availability of supplementary 
information. Figure 4b, for example, would give rise to comparable difficulties 
in interpretation whether encountered on paper or, albeit improbably, in daily 
perception. Likewise, while figure 5 provides few clues to its being intended 
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Figure 5 
as a spider emerging from beneath a skirting-board, a similar array, viewed non-
pictorially, is no more informative in itself. An encounter with the actual 
objects, however, may offer supplementary information through successive 
images, muscular cues, interaction with the object, etc., and through the 
explicitness of the context (§5.4.4). It is here that the difference lies. In fact the 
set of declensions available in a picture in practice is surely considerably the 
greater, since it is only on paper that we are ever really likely to meet with sights 
such as figures 3 and 5 above. 
5.4 Some constraints on acceptability 
A repraesentans, then, presents an "acceptable derivation from a norm figure" if 
an observer accepts it as such. Moreover, a repraesentans yields the "same 
information" as the optic array from an object if the observer feels inclined to 
extract the same information from it. Such conclusions are not very satisfying, 
with the basis of equivalence seeming more elusive and intuitive by the minute. 
It should be emphasized, however, that the information extracted is equivalent 
optical information l (Gibson 1971); and that "acceptability" is not an intellectual 
acceptability (see §6.2), but a visual acceptability, although some decision-
making may be involved in the interpretation of competing organizations (see 
§5.4.4). If an observer fails to recognize a landscape in figure 4b, I may say, 
"Look, there's the top of the church", not, "Let this signify the top of a church"; 
not, that is, referring to, or establishing, a convention (§2.2.1), but merely 
alerting the viewer to one among a collection of visual possibilities. 
What are, then, the essential features, or timeless invariants, of an object? 
What, in other words, does the percept underlying acceptability "look like"2? It 
must be reasonably immune to changes in both size and orientation of stimulus 
object since the linear size of any retinal image varies with distance, and since 
1 For Gibson, optical information consists of "invariants", in the mathematical sense, of the 
structure of an optic array" (1971: 31). Eco's "equivalent optic information" (§4.2) appeals, as 
did Gibson's earlier version (1960), to a replication of sensations. 
2 It should be re-emphasized that a percept, though most easily imagined as an internal 
picture, is not a visible entity, and cannot be said to "look like" anything (§4.2). 
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we readily compensate for orientations of repraesentantes which do not conform 
to normal viewing angles. In fact, though we may not succeed in pinpointing a 
necessary minimum for acceptability, we can, in a number of ways, determine 
some of the constraints within which it must operate. 
5.4.1 Sir.nJJlici~ 
One means of approach is to provide pictures of objects only very briefly, and 
require that they be reproduced (Amheim 1974). Since the original figure must 
have entered the consciousness via the percept, the reproduction may be 
assumed to err, if at all, in the direction of the percept, maintaining the essentials 
of the original. A figure such as 2e above may be reproduced as in 2a; figure 6a 
as in 6b; each showing, that is, a simplification of detail. 
Figure 6 
a b 
A further attempt at demonstrating the simplicity and resilience of the percept 
might investigate how the number of elements presented in an acceptable 
repraesentans may be reduced and varied while still conveying the essential 
features of the repraesentatum (Eco 1976). 
The spider, for example, has a relatively simple, relatively distinctive shape. A 
fairly naturalistic picture of a spider is not difficult to achieve, since we are not 
usually aware of a great deal of detail, or of a great variety of projections. What 
does a spider look like? Small and black with eight legs. Let us suppose 
initially that a spider-percept must also be small and black with eight legs, and 
that figure 7a is an acceptable spider repraesentans. The flexibility of the percept 
may then be considered by observing how simple variations on figure 7a affect 
its acceptability. 
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Figure 7 
a b c d e 
I find even figure 7c an acceptable representation of a spider, although only six 
legs are represented; figure 7d seems less acceptable; 7e is unacceptable. Were 
only 7a and 7b acceptable, it might still be concluded that it is not necessary to 
reproduce all eight legs in order to trigger the spider percept. 
Figure 8 
a b c d e 
Yet the configuration of the parts (figure 8b seems to me more like an octopus; 
8c a ballet-dancing frog (more six-legged percepts?); 8d and 8e alien beings) 
may also contribute to, or detract from, an apprehension of resemblance. 
So, not surprisingly perhaps, the essential features seem not to be describable 
purely in terms of number of elements. 
But the variations attempted are somewhat random, and do not, if we follow 
Hochberg's outlining of simplicity, necessarily constitute simplifications. 
Hochberg characterizes the simplicity of a figure in terms of the amount of 
information necessary to describe it (Hochberg and McAlister 1953, reported in 
Arnheim 1974). What the anchor figure hints at, and further experiments 
endorse (Alexander and Carey 1968, for example, reported in Amheim 1974) is 
that simplification should entail an enhancement of symmetry, the repetition of 
similar elements, a tying off of loose ends, a smoothing out of curves, a 
conversion of oblique angles into right angles ... , in fact, all the reorganizations 
predicted by the Law of Pragnanz (§3.2). Thus some of the above spider-
figures are not actually simplifications at all, since, although fewer elements are 
presented, the structure has been complicated. The vertical symmetry, for 
example, is lost in figure 7d, the horizontal symmetry in 8b and 8d, and in 8e 
we no longer observe the repetition of the angle subtended by the spider's legs. 
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5.4.2 Strength and ambiguity a/percepts 
How much simplification a figure can withstand depends upon the strength and 
potential ambiguity of the percept, both of which are, to a great extent, 
influenced by context (Wohlwill1960, reported in Elkind 1969, and see 
§5.4.4). Figure 7e (above) is surely a simplification of figure 7a but now risks 
ambiguity, since the human percept may be more strongly suggested. In fact, 
the human form seems able to tolerate a great deal of simplification and general 
obfuscation (figure 9). Indeed, so strongly are we attuned to human-ness that it 
may not be an infrequent experience to glimpse from the comer of an 
Figure 9 
, 
a b c d 
eye what is supposed human, only to find that some other object of only 
approximately the same proportions has evoked, momentarily, the human figure 
percept. 
5.4.3 Wholeness 
A figure's acceptability is also determined by its relative wholeness, as distinct 
from the degree of simplification achieved. Figure 9c, for example, remains 
humanesque despite its incompleteness. Likewise, figure lOd below offers a 
projection of only the top half of a man, and may not, strictly speaking, 
represent a whole man. The viewer is intended (and indeed tends (Green and 
Courtis 1969», however, to go beyond the represented information; that is, to 
"interpolate" a remainder as appropriate. The petering out of the clearly 
delineated portion persuades us to take the man's lower half "as read". The 
incompleteness of figure lOc's man, on the other hand, is "explained" by the 
presence of an occluding object. 
A preliminary distinction may be drawn between the information given l and any 
interpolated remainder. Taken together these constitute what we may term 
1 "The information given" is not intended here as synonymous with "the given", introduced in 
§7.3 below 
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provisionally an "interpolated whole". Figures lOb to IOd below may, together 
with their respective interpolated remainders (represented (redundantly) in 
figures 10fto 10h) constitute an interpolated whole, equivalent, in each case, to 
figure lOa, yet in differing ways. 
Figure 10 
a b c d 
, 
'. .' 
rf rf , - I 
j.J. j.J. 
e f g h 
1) The first might be termed "configurative completion": the seeming 
continuance of the intermediate graphic discontinuities presented in figure lOb 
(and in figure lOc, between man and wall). 
2) The manner by which the man in figure lOc is rendered equivalent to figure 
lOa may be likened to normal non-representational perception. An object 
partially obscured from view by the overlapping of a second (opaque) object is 
understood nevertheless to continue behind the second object. 
Correspondingly, represented objects are understood to continue behind 
represented coverings and even beyond the bounds of the frame, as through a 
window. The interpolated remainder may be said to stand in a (spatially) 
"paradigmatic" relationship with the obstruction; if there were no wall, the other 
half of the man would be visible l . 
Now consider figure We. A repraesentans will usually represent only one 
aspect of a repraesentatum. Again, there is nothing novel or exclusively 
representational in this; the projective nature of light and the location of human 
1 Such an interpretation depends of course upon the assumption that an occluded whole man is 
indeed intended. 
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eyes generally prevent us from seeing the back of an object while simultaneously 
viewing the front. The relationship here between the given and the interpolated 
is also paradigmatic since presentation of one aspect precludes the presentation 
of another. 
3) In figure IOd there is no represented obstruction to account for the absence of 
the remainder of the man's legs. "Fade-outs" of this type are common in the 
graphic arts, especially where illustrations standing alongside text have no frame 
by which to hypothesize a "window". We may tenn this type of relationship of 
given to interpolated "potentially co-visible", since interpolation of a remainder 
does not necessitate the forgoing of any represented part. 
A distinction may be drawn between the potentially co-visible and the 
configurative interpolations. Whereas the latter may be perfonned on any non-
representational figure, simply by observing the angles and proximities of lines 
already given, the fonner may be perfonned only with reference to an 
appropriate percept; a desire for symmetry may generate figure IOd's second 
hand, but only a potentially co-visible interpolation could give him feet. 
There is undoubtedly a limit to the power of potentially co-visible completion. 
In a still from "Dracula Returns", given a ghastly hand protruding from a grave, 
we may well infer its attachment to a ghastly body; but where we meet with a 
reasonably self-contained visual, conceptual and nameable entity en route (see 
figure Ig above), 
Figure 11 
representation stops, and a type of "anatomical synecdoche" begins (chapter VIII, 
§5.1). Consequently, if figure 11 fails to trigger a human figure percept, it may 
be that the whole-part completion is obstructed by the triggering of a booted-foot 
percept. 
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5.4.4 Context 
Context has, throughout, a bearing upon the acceptability of a repraesentans. 
There are four general realms in which contextual information may operate: 
Intra-pictorial (a) 
The relative size, orientation, colour and schematization of repraesentantes 
within one picture (§5.4.5) are interdependent. Elements conflicting with one 
another in terms of degree of realism, for example, result in the positing of a 
norm, or "verisimilitude level" (Riffaterre 1978), by which other elements are 
judged (Arnheim 1974). In figure 12 it is the simpler figure which seems out of 
place. 
Figure 12 
Intra-pictorial (b) 
The identity of pictorial objects is, to some extent, determined by that of other 
repraesentantes in the same picture, but also by the visual nature of the object 
itself; even in a naturalistic picture a loaf of bread may look suspiciously like a 
rock. There is potentially greater leeway here than there is in everyday 
perception (§5.3); if it looks a bit like a man eating a bag of gravel, perhaps it is 
just that. In figure 13, however, despite the strength of the human percept 
(figure ge), the context is such that another 
Figure 13 
organization wins over. Realistic probability vies with strength of resemblance 
in the search for a meaningful interpretation (Gregory 1977, Amheim 1974, 
Humphreys and Bruce 1989). 
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Extra-pictorial (a) 
Verbal hints and gallery guide-book descriptions dispel much potential 
ambiguity in the interpretation of a repraesentans (Humphreys and Bruce 1989). 
Reproductions of an indeterminate figure, rendered on the understanding that a 
table (and not, say, a sand-glass) was intended, bear a far more compelling 
resemblance to a table than did the original (Amheim 1974). Once our 
apperceptual faculties are pointed in a certain direction, we are, much of the 
time, happy to be led. Thus the content of other pictures recently viewed 
provides a short-term "list of possibles". 
Extra-pictorial (b) 
General knowledge and experience of the world is of a less immediately 
impressionable nature than the above. Suffice it to say here that the avid bird-
watcher, for example, is more readily attuned to the white-backed-woodpecker-
percept than is the train-spotter, and that the Freudian determined to see 
nakedness in everything is working with a particularly individual list of 
possibles. 
5.4.5 One picture: one pictured? 
A notion not explicitly stated, and yet probably unchallenged throughout the 
above, is that a single picture may represent more than one object. This 
possibility need arise neither through an ambiguity (figure ge, for instance, may 
represent a man or a puff of talcum), nor through an ontological requirement 
(chapter VI, §4); but merely through the juxtaposition or contiguity of smudges 
of pigment, each of which, as a repraesentans in its own right, may correspond 
to a distinct repraesentatum - whether that juxtaposition represents juxtaposition 
or contiguity, or refers to some non-spatial relationship (see §6.2). Part of 
figure IOc's man, for example, is occluded by a wall; in figure Ib we can pick 
out wheels, windows and a headlight. 
In fact, that a picture may represent more than one object necessitates no 
explanation beyond that already offered for the representation of a single object. 
Suppose I take a pair of scissors to chapter II'S figure 2, chopping it first from 
the surrounding text, and then into sections as in figure 14 below. Each of the 
sections A to D fulfils the criteria of picturehood above. If I continue to chop, 
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there will come a point at which the ambiguity is such that no particular percept 
is evoked, and no repraesentatum conveyed. Until this point arrives, however, 
any successively isolated portion of figure 14 may be understood to be a picture. 
Figure 14 in its entirety may be interpreted similarly, as the (rather peculiar) 
juxtaposition of four distinct pictures. Or it may be viewed as a single picture 
composed of distinct "constituent" pictures, the boundaries of which are more 
likely to be predictable 
Figure 14 
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on the basis of the Laws of Pragnanz (§3.2, and see Kennedy 1974) in isolating 
(by percept rather than by scissors) a man, an elephant and an antelope (of 
sorts). 
We shall speak, therefore, of "consitutent" pictures (or of "constituent 
repraesentantes", or of elements "in" (a concession to normal usage) a picture); 
and of a "constituted" picture (or "constituted repraesentans"), where serious 
ambiguity would otherwise result. In chapter VI (§7), we shall see that a 
specification - to some extent arbitrary - of the spatial extension of each 
constituent is a methodological necessity. 
6 Summary 
This, then, I maintain, is the basis of pictorial perception. To a great extent it is 
no different to everyday perception in that it provides information that is, at 
some level, equivalent to the information available in an actual scene. Rooted in 
an intuitive and immediate grasp of essential features, and a matching of features 
with percepts, the success of a picture in representing an object is measurable in 
terms of its acceptability to a particular observer, and this acceptability will 
depend upon the relative ambiguity, the observer's flexibility and experience as 
well as upon the immediate context. 
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6.1 Unicorns and angels 
With this in mind, the depiction of dragons, angels, etc. need present nothing of 
the anomalousness with which it entered the discussion. "The experience 
obtained by a picture is as if one were confronted with a material layout of light-
reflecting surfaces but only as if' (Gibson 1971: 33). Just as we may compare a 
mentally perceived (or remembered) image of the physical form of a car with 
figure Ib above, so may we compare a mentally perceived (or hypothesized) 
image of the physical form of a centaur with figure 15. The distinctive features 
of a hypothesized centaur may be derived from 
Figure 15 
verbal descriptions and from other pictures we have seen. Moreover, the visual 
components of mythical creature pictures are by no means wholly new to us. 
We have seen humans and we have seen wings; an angel resembles a human 
with wings. Alternatively, it may simply be a case of apprehending something 
we have seen before, but on a larger or smaller scale; a serpent is like a big 
lizard, and a Liliputian is a tiny person. 
6.2 Cross-cultural relativity 
Now that we have a clearer idea of the relationship between pictorial and non-
pictorial perception, we are in a better position to assess the extent and 
significance of the cross-cultural and cross-species relativity first observed in 
chapter II. 
Firstly, even if we accept that all pictorial perceptual processes are normal 
perceptual processes, success at pictorial object recognition on the part of 
pictorially deprived viewers is not necessarily to be anticipated. On the contrary, 
since pictures cannot exploit all components of everyday perception, a picture is 
always ambiguous - even one so basic as figure 1 b. It is the lack of any 
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seriously competing organization which renders it so nearly unambiguous that 
even the (urban) chimpanzee might consider it a (picture of a) car (chapter II, 
§2). 
Figure 16 
But what should we make of the split-represented bird in figure 16 (chapter II's 
figure I)? By our account, it may readily represent a two-headed bird; but, if the 
viewer will accept it as a derivate of a norm bird-figure (§5.2), it may also 
represent a normal-looking bird, thus licensing precisely the kind of "valid but 
idiosyncratic" interpretation we have sought to constrain. 
It is time to come clean: frankly, figure 16 does not resemble a normal bird; 
neither, I should venture, did it resemble a normal bird to the artist of the 
original upon which figure 16 is based. If the task was to draw the "seen" (and 
if the seen was a normal bird), figure 16 is not a success, and we might expect 
the challenged artist to concede not yet having acquired the knack of paring 
down the invariants of an object to a single projected form. Alternatively, if the 
task was to draw the (intellectually acceptable (§5.4» "known", the same 
confrontation would elicit an indignant denial that the picture was ever intended 
to represent a bird, but, rather, to capture its essence, to indicate it somehow, 
unhampered by superficial restrictions such as visible spatial arrangement and 
simultaneous availability to the eye, "the importance of communicating ideas 
[outweighing] the artistic interest" (Boas 1955: 68). Either task, 
representational or "symbolic" (ibid.: 73), and however successful, requires a 
"distinct mental attitude" (ibid.: 80), much as the architect, the cartographer and 
the cartoonist deliberately and conveniently adopt distorted projections (see 
chapter VII's figure 6), in pursuit of some goal other than merely a reproduction 
of what would be seen at a given moment l . 
1 Indeed, it is not insignificant that split-represented figures should often feature on flat but 
circular surfaces (see §2.l, "essentially two-dimensional"), such as pots and bracelets. It might 
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The line between the two approaches, which in principle may be clear enough to 
the artist, is less obvious to the open-minded viewer, since "in most cases 
symbolic representations are at least in part perspective, either in so far as the 
general form is maintained, or as parts are shown in perspective form; while 
perspective elements may contain symbolic elements" (ibid.: 78). When non-
Western artists draw a moustache upon a figure's forehead to depict a male 
Westerner (ibid.), the "symbolicity" may be reasonably unambiguously inferred. 
In other cases, the viewer may remark only a slight distortion, as in the 
seemingly twisted feet, or "canonical" eye of Ancient Egyptian figures (Arnheim 
1974). Sometimes, however, that the artist has adopted the symbolic approach 
may not be initially obvious at all. Male genital organs, for instance, drawn on 
certain human figures by South American Indians should be interpreted as an 
"emblem of manhood" (Adam 1949: 66), and as far from representation in intent 
as the symbol" d" "on a bird-identification chart. 
As regards pictorial depth perception, there are two points to be made. The first 
relates to ambiguity even within the perspective tradition, and the second, as 
above, to the ambiguity of approach. 
Figure 17 
./ 
To the observer who adheres rigidly to perspective cues, figure 17 (chapter II's 
figure 2), may nevertheless correspond as plausibly to a scene featuring a distant 
and averagely gigantic elephant, as to one in which a miniature elephant perches 
only inches from the hunter's lance, the interpreted correspondence promoted or 
hindered not by exposure to a tradition of perspective drawing but by a "reality-
oriented" attitude to pictures. Such an attitude would predispose the viewer to 
well be deemed misleading to reproduce the figures on paper, and to assess their lifelikeness, 
without some attempt to "de-distort" them, or at least to make explicit their provenance. 
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opt for the normal-sized elephant at a correspondingly normal distance; but this 
is only one of infinitely many valid interpretations. 
Now suppose that in describing figure 17 one of Hudson's informants reports 
that the pictured man is an elephant-hunter (1960; see chapter II, §5). Hudson 
would claim that this informant has not responded to the perspective cues 
provided by (realistic) relative size and by the sketched hillside. Explicitly, at 
any rate, this is true enough. But the informant may not have approached the 
picture with perspective in mind. Within a non-representational approach, the 
figure may be held not to depict part of an event, as witnessed; but, through the 
juxtaposition alone of hunter and (choice of) hunted, and rather in the manner of 
the cartoonist's "think-bubbles", or of cinematic montage (Eisenstein 1949), to 
refer to some non-spatial association of the two (chapter VIII, §7). 
6.3 The represented and the given 
In the coming chapters, it is such non-spatial associations, and "symbolic" 
interpretations which I hope to some extent to be able identify in verbal 
responses to pictures. We shall reject figure 17, therefore, as an acceptable 
(one-headed-) bird-picture, preferring an interpretation of visual resemblance 
which confines representation to a single projection, abridged as necessary, plus 
or minus the odd twisted foot and a metre or two in (represented) spatial terms. 
It must be said that, as Boas put it, "this method is more realistic than the other 
only if we claim that the essence of realism is the reproduction of a single 
momentary visual image" (1955: 72). In fact, for our purposes, concerned as 
we are with interpretation, as opposed to either artistic skill or intention, it is 
indeed convenient to claim some such thing; since, armed with a fairly narrow 
view of representation, we are at least somewhat better prepared to recognize 
deviations from it. 
Our assumption, then, is that the symbolic approach to pictures will manifest 
itself in interpretation too. Of course, deviations from the represented will often 
go unobserved; the discrepancy may be neither sufficient, nor sufficiently 
explicit, to be remarkable. Deviations may also be misconstrued as such; an 
interpretation of perspective cues which seems awry to the point of being" a-
spatial" may be nothing of the sort; achieved, instead, either through the 
contrivance of a tortuous spatial scenario (as in Ames' "Distorted Room" 
(Gregory 1977)), or by proposing a highly unrealistic, but nonetheless 
represented, content. Such caveats notwithstanding, it is hoped that, through 
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the verbalized identification and interrelation of pictured objects, tendencies to 
deviate from the represented information may be brought to light. 
In an effort to minimize, or at least to contain, this inevitable insecurity, 
however, I have opted not to attempt to distinguish at one throw the symbolic 
interpretation from the entire range of representational interpretations - tortuous 
and unrealistic inclusive; but artificially and by fiat to demarcate within that range 
a narrow area, the boundaries of which are at least reasonably clear. This area, 
corresponding to a single representational reading from among the infinite valid 
representational alternatives, and termed "the given", will constitute a standard 
against which alternative readings will initially be matched. 
Without some such strategy any decision as to the symbolic component of a 
response will rarely be without qualification in terms of the caveats above, 
leaving our interest centred upon an area which, while the most crucial, is also 
the fuzziest. Of course, this strategy merely postpones confrontation with the 
fuzzy area. The given does, however, provide a means of sifting out other 
interesting and reasonably distinct approaches within representation itself (the 
"two-dimensional" approach, for example) which, in the absence of any such 
standard, would simply be swallowed up as valid representational options. 
Additionally, the given affords a far greater degree of explicitness than would 
otherwise be available, and avoids our having to deal at every turn with the 
possibility of representation ally valid miniature elephants, deformed people, and 
wire outlines suspended in space. 
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1 Introduction 
CHAPTER VI 
Specificity 
In the previous chapter we examined the basis of pictorial perception, arguing 
for an interpretation of visual resemblance which confmes representation to 
something closely approximating a single projection; arguing, that is, that 
pictorial perception differs little from everyday perception other than in the 
relatively minor contribution of muscular information, in the consequent 
ambiguity, and in the wider range of objects picturable. Where such ambiguity 
is minimal, recognition of pictured objects is achieved easily by both the 
untutored child and the adult brought up with little exposure to pictures. 
This is not to say that responses to a picture do not tend to differ. On the 
contrary, they differ markedly; varying not only cross-culturally, but between 
any two individuals, and even between successive viewings by a single 
individual. A print bought on the strength of its pleasing colours may, over the 
years, acquire a highly elaborate interpretation through a gradual awareness of 
representational alternatives or through the interrelation of its elements on many 
different levels. Our concern, however, is not with gradual awareness, but with 
immediate response; and the task before us that of assessing how much of the 
variety evident is explicable in terms of the approach adopted - symbolic or 
representational; and how much in terms of representational ambiguity diversely 
resolved. 
In order to address the second of these sub-tasks, and to render the first more 
manageable, I propose to select, from the infinite valid representational 
alternatives, a single interpretation: the "given" (chapter v, §6.3); an admittedly 
egocentric interpretation passing at best for ethnocentric, and generally (though 
incidentally) consistent with my intention in composing a picture. This 
interpretation, if not consonant with the reader's own, is at least available for 
review. 
If it is to be operable, the given must be carefully circumscribed in a number of 
respects. It need not overtly specify that figure 1 represents a dog rather than a 
giraffe, for instance, since giraffe is representationally unacceptable. The given 
should, however, distinguish the chosen correlate from the valid 
representational alternatives - even where plausible examples of the latter are 
unforthcoming. In opting for "dog", then, we rule out, for example, "Isis 
hippuris" (a pied coral-like organism which, conveniently, can mature into 
almost any conceivable shape). 
In distinguishing our chosen interpretation from both valid and invalid 
representational alternatives, we have of course already made explicit its identity. 
Yet the choice of "dog" (rather than "vertebrate", say) is, as we shall see, 
somewhat arbitrary (§2); classificatory "obviousness", despite the work of the 
prototype theorists (§3), remains a variable. For this reason I have found it 
methodologically necessary to dictate a "norm" (§3.3); a ruling on the identity of 
the chosen correlate, not only in terms of what it is, but also in terms of what it 
is called. Courtesy of this methodological nicety, however, - seemingly an 
extended exercise in hair-splitting - we are provided with a means by which to 
compare specificity across a range of responses. In fact, in the course of the 
coming chapters, we do not exploit the full potential of the norm in this respect. 
Nevertheless it remains a crucial preliminary to the assessment of any picture 
response. 
The other aspect of the given to be considered in this chapter is the incorporation 
of a decision as to the spatial extension of any repraesentans (§7). Again there is 
a certain amount of apparent" self-evidence" to be countered here. Yet even 
within figure 1 there is choice; and within any more complex configuration 
(most notably where intuition would persuade (some of) us of to interpolate 
occluded portions (chapter Y, §5.4.3», that choice is significantly wider. The 
resolution of this spatial ambiguity necessitates a second methodological 
preliminary: the "delineation" of a picture. This is again a somewhat arbitrary 
matter, but one which results in the explicit specification of the unit, or units, to 
be considered "anatomically basic". 
2 Specificity of repraesentatum 
There is no single "correct" interpretation of a picture. Any particular reading 
may nevertheless be evaluated as to its representational acceptability. Figure 1, 
for example, cannot be interpreted as a pictorial representation of "fidelity" 
(chapter Y, §2.l); it cannot, moreover, constitute an acceptable "giraffe-picture" 
(chapter Y, §5). But a particular reading may also be evaluated as to its validity 
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with respect to the given. Figure 1 may not, according to our preferred option, 
validly correspond to the interpretation "coral". 
Figure 1 
But of other hypothetical interpretations offered: "object", "animal", "domestic 
canine", "mammal", "dog", "overweight beagle bitch", "a chihuahua", "Fido the 
dog next door"; none seems invalid in quite the same way, although "animal" 
may strike us as rather vague, "overweight beagle bitch" as unnecessarily 
restrictive, and "Fido the dog next door" as (in most contexts) unjustifiably 
particular. The question is one of the specificity of the verbalized 
repraesentatum; it is concerned not with whether a dog or an octopus is 
represented, but with whether the repraesentatum is labelled "dog" or "animal"; 
"octopus" or "mollusc". 
We shall tackle this problem first (and perhaps perversely, given chapter v, 
§2.2.3) via the more conscious visual abstractions undertaken by the picturer, 
before considering any implications this may have for interpretation. In doing 
so, we shall briefly compare pictorial representation with verbal representation 
along lines which are, for the most part, merely a condensation of 
Bhattacharya's own (1984). 
2.1 Verbal and pictorial abstractions 
"Fido is Mr. Green's overweight, rather bad-tempered beagle who likes chasing 
a chihuahua called Rex". In representing verbally a particular dog thus, I 
classify Fido according to the ready-made pigeon-holes provided by language, 
as an agglomeration of standardized communal attributes: "overweight", "rather 
bad-tempered", etc. The success of such a representation depends, of course, 
on a shared understanding of the meanings of terms used. If my interlocutor 
does not know the meaning of "chihuahua" , I may resort to a classification of 
greater generality ("a breed of dog", for example), or, if "dog" is similarly 
unenlightening, say, "a kind of pet"; but, although my classification remains 
valid, as it becomes more general, so is it less informative. An alternative option 
in explaining "chihuahua" is a move towards the particular, at the extreme of 
which I may, pointing to the nearest available chihuahua, say, "That is a 
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chihuahua. Fido likes chasing one like that" (Bhattacharya 1984; Lyons 1977; 
Quine 1974, etc.). 
My pictorial representation of Fido presents more of a problem, although the 
initial strategy is basically the same. It involves an analysis of my perception of 
Fido into only a selected number of properties, that is, an abstraction; and a 
synthesis, or recombination, of the selected properties into a construct with 
which I may represent Fido. But, whereas in the verbal mode the representable 
properties abstracted may be structural, "relational" ("Mr. Green's"), 
psychological ("bad-tempered"), or whatever (Bhattacharya 1984), abstraction 
for pictorial representation is, as we have already observed, restricted to 
(simultaneously) visible properties. 
If I know what a beagle looks like, drawing a picture of one presents no 
problems we have not already touched upon. Now suppose that I simply wish 
to draw a dog. The word "dog" applies to every dog, regardless of shape, 
proportions, breed, etc. Yet, in rendering "dog" pictorially, I am forced to 
commit myself to some sort of size or general shape. Perhaps, however, a 
generalized dog-shape is manageable (see Rosch et al. 1976). A generalized 
pet-shape, on the other hand, is significantly less so, necessarily referring as 
validly (and not in any alternative or figurative sense) to cats, budgerigars and 
perhaps goldfish and pythons too (but see below). This is a problem we tend to 
overlook as interpreters, and yet it has not inconsiderable implications for our 
interpretation of a picture. 
Assuming that, for example, "<2>,, at a road entrance is understood 
conventionally to mean: "No __ allowed to enter", we should most probably 
interpret figure 2 as "No dog allowed to enter". We are less likely to consider a 
second interpretation; that figure 2 
Figure 2 
forbids entry to overweight beagles, while chihuahuas and wolfhounds may do 
as they please. The seeming unorthodoxy of this alternative only calls attention 
to the difficulty picturers would experience should they intend to specify just 
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that; that is "No overweight beagle allowed to enter"l. If figure 2 is intended to 
mean "No pet allowed to enter", the symbolic status of the central dog-figure 
seems unquestionable; if it refers solely to overweight beagles we have no 
qualms about calling it a picture. That it should mean "No breed of dog allowed 
to enter", however, hints at a new and hazy line between picture and symbol. 
In everyday life, however, the need for economy and effectiveness in visual 
signification will entail acceptance of conventions whereby, for instance, an 
overweight beagle may stand for all breeds of dog. Bhattacharya speaks of 
classes of objects, the members of which have "identical maps", that is, sets of 
spatial relationships (1984: 233), a condition failing which "symbolization" is 
said to occur (cf. chapter v, §6.2). Thus figures 1 and 2, as overweight 
beagles, are pictures; but, as dogs, symbols, since different breeds of dogs do 
not have congruent mappings. Bhattacharya distinguishes from iconic 
representation two types of symbolic visual signification: that of invisible 
entities, that is, the "culturally symbolic"; and the "classificatory symbolic" 
(ibid.: 236), where the signified is a class of visible entities characterized by 
(Wittgenstein's) family resemblance (e.g. "dogs"). Whether a particular figure 
qualifies as an icon or as a classificatory symbol also depends upon the 
perceived variation in the class to which it belongs. So, were a road sign to 
signify "No falcon allowed to enter", probably the only quibbles over its 
application to merlins as distinct from kestrels would come from ornithologists 
(see chapter v, §5.4.4, and below). 
My own view is that the undisputed (culturally) symbolic status of" 0 ", the 
ring border, may confer a parasitic (classificatory) symbolic status on any 
potentially iconic representation, which gains, thereby, a wider range of 
application. It may be, therefore, a matter of context rather than of intrinsic 
significatory capacity. As to "identical spatial mappings", we saw earlier 
(chapter v, §4.3.2) that such a severe criterion, while crucial, no doubt, in 
geometry, has so rare an application in the field of pictures as to offer little 
explanatory value. We shall return to the "classificatory symbolic" in chapter 
VIII. 
1 The context (say, at Crufts) may render such an interpretation less unorthodox. 
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2.2 The unique correlate 
If there is a limit to the explicit generality of a pictorial representation, there is 
also a limit to the degree of specificity which may be achieved. Of course, many 
pictures do indeed have a unique real-world correlate (Van Dyck's "Charles I of 
England", for example). The problem is, rather, how to convey this 
uniqueness, and how validly, then, it may be claimed in the process of 
interpretation. 
Suppose I want to draw a picture of the concrete physical, overweight "Fido". 
The more of Fido's visible features I am able to specify, the narrower the class 
of possible repraesentata, and the nearer I move towards to specifying Fido 
uniquely. I may, in principle, eventually so narrow the class that it could 
contain only one member; that is, Fido1. This is what was implied above with 
the caricature of Alfred Hitchcock (chapter v, figure 3). 
But only those who know Fido and understand the picture to be an acceptable 
representation of Fido may say "That is a picture of Fido". Uniqueness, even 
where so strongly suggested by the context that it is barely avoidable (Prieto 
1964; Eco 1976; Lyons 1977), may only be asserted, or signified by some 
extra-pictorial means, such as the written label: "Mr. Green's dog, Fido"2, or 
the (pictorial) knife which symbolically identifies St. Bartholomew (Panofsky 
1955). This is true of all pictures, from the photograph to the most skilfully 
sparse caricature. This matter will be taken up again in chapter VII (§6), and in 
chapter VIII (§7). 
2.3 Implications for interpretation 
It seems clear, then, that there are limits not only to the degree of generality 
explicitly and unambiguously conveyable in a picture, but likewise limits to the 
degrees of specificity. This need not imply that no degree of generality or 
specificity was intended, but that interpreters have, in either case, no purely 
pictorial way of knowing. Neither are interpreters prevented from proposing a 
1 Robinson maintains that this is not possible even in principle; "every analysis of [a 
particular] into [its] specific characteristics gives a complex that could logically belong to 
some other particular also" (1950: 97-8). 
2 Note that uniqueness in verbal representation is likewise handicapped. Speakers must resort 
to proper symbols ("Mr. Green", etc.), or to pointing, or to unambiguous contextual clues (see 
chapter IV, §). 
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certain level of generality or specificity. Indeed, they are forced to opt for some 
level, whether that of "thing", or that of a unique real-world correlate. 
Since we want to be able to account for the "unjustifiability" of the response 
"that's a lesser Siberian beagle bitch" and for the "vagueness" of "that's a 
thing", we should establish that a certain level of generality, somewhere between 
the two, is "normal"and "right". Against this, the relative specificity of any 
response may be measured. As to where the appropriate level lies, it might be 
anticipated that it will correspond to "the name of a thing, the one that tells what 
it 'really' is" (Brown 1958: 17), that is, to a "basic-level category" of the sort 
described by Rosch et al. (1976), Brown (1965), Berlin (1972), etc. By this 
account, while it would be correct to say that figure 1 represents a mammal, it 
would somehow be more "natural" to say that figure 1 represents a dog. 
After a short outline of the notion basic category as presented by its adherents, 
we examine briefly just how tenable this notion is. 
3 Basic-level categories 
What Berlin, Brown and Rosch found was that there appears to be a level within 
a taxonomic hierarchy, which is somehow conceived of as more basic than other 
levels; and that this basic level corresponds to the "natural discontinuities" in the 
real world (Rosch et al. 1976: 385), and (usually) to the genus-level in Linnaean 
biological classification (Berlin et aI1973). "Dog", then, is psychologically and 
intrinsically more basic than either the superordinate category "mammal" or the 
subordinate "beagle". 
Basic objects are (sic) the most inclusive categories: 
1) at which highly similar sequences of motor movements are used to interact 
with category members; 
2) at which a cluster of attributes, believed common to the class named, is 
listed; 
3) at which an averaged shape of an object is identifiable as that object; 
4) at which the objects of a class look very much alike; 
5) for which a concrete image of the category as a whole can be formed. 
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Moreover: 
6) basic level names are the first linguistic labels for objects acquired by the 
child; 
7) basic level names are the most commonly used labels for category members 
(Rosch et al. 1976)1; 
8) the shortest primary lexemes are found at the basic level (Berlin 1972); 
9) folk-biological categories often correspond to scientific categories at this 
level (Berlin et aI1973). 
Let us examine characteristic (1) to begin to understand how such a wealth of 
information might centre upon one level of specificity. 
If a parent, in the process of teaching a child, refers to objects by particular 
names, the reasons may be entirely practical. There is little point, for instance, 
in telling a child that a certain dog is a beagle, or that a certain knife is a stainless 
steel carving knife; nothing the child needs to know about beagles or stainless 
steel carving knives is not true of dogs in general and knives in general. 
Concerned for the safety of a newly-mobile infant, for example, and for the 
safety of other objects, the parent provides the child with a kind of utilitarian 
classification (knives are sharp, dogs are patted, etc.), which emphasizes the 
equivalence of objects in certain selected respects (categorizing them "at [their] 
level of probable non-linguistic equivalence" (Brown 1965: 319)), and which 
prescribes appropriate and safe means of interaction with those objects. 
Whereas objects at the basic level may have many distinctive actions in common, 
superordinates have very few ("mammal" is not characterized by patting as 
"dog" is), and, at subordinate levels, no more distinctive actions emerge 
("beagle" and "spaniel" are still characterized by patting) (HaUpike 1979). Thus 
"dog" is a more useful category than "mammal", since "mammal" possesses few 
attributes2 common to all members of the category; that is, "mammal" has a low 
"cue validity" (Rosch et al. 1976). "Dog" is also a more useful category than 
"beagle", which also has a low cue validity, since most attributes of "beagle" are 
also attributes of "dog". Basic-level categories, then, are maximally distinct, 
1 These are by no means all the characterizations of basic-level objects. For example, the 
basic level is also held to be that at which children frrst sort objects taxonomically, sorting 
superordinates complexively. 
2 "Common attributes" is understood to include distinctive actions (Rosch et al. 1976: 386). 
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since the properties shared by category members are many, while those shared 
across categories are at a minimum (Lakoff 1987). 
Although the literature gives at times the impression that the correspondence of 
the above is so extraordinary a coincidence that one could not but accept the 
fundamentality of the categories so designated (see, for example, Lakoff 1987: 
34), their interdependence is not, however, in dispute; given anyone of them, 
others follow quite automatically. Imaging capacity (characteristic (5)), for 
example, will depend upon overall shape (4) (Hallpike 1979), as will 
identification of averaged shape (5); characteristic (8) will depend upon (7), 
given Zipfs finding that the length of a word is negatively correlated with its 
frequency of usage (Zipf 1935, reported in Brown 1965). 
In fact, the degree of this interdependence is perhaps not emphasized enough. 
Provided that the learning situation hypothesized above is not atypical (see, for 
example, Brown 1958), it would be surprising if the names first learned by the 
child did not correlate with the levels of generality established as basic through 
distinctive actions; as it would be surprising if these labels were not initially the 
most commonly used. Given, moreover, that the basic level corresponds to the 
level of the genus in Linnaean biology, characteristic (9) is no coincidence 
either. Lakoffpoints out (1987: 36) that, although organisms may interbreed 
only at the level of the species, at genus-level organisms may still possess 
approximately the same overall shape. Genus level in folk taxonomies too 
depends upon overall shape (Hallpike 1979). 
With the realization that possibilities for motor interaction are of course also 
determined by overall shape, we find that we have come full circle, convinced 
that there is something unavoidably, intuitively and demonstrably very right 
about the notion of basic category, and that the basic level is eminently suitable 
for use as a "true" specificity level, from which our picture responses may 
deviate. 
3.1 Basic categories and any level at all 
What is not so frequently emphasized is that the indisputable interdependence of 
many of the above characteristics will operate at any level of generality. 
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If we accept, for example, that there is a level (any level) both determined by, 
and learned in association with, distinctive actions and attributes, it is wholly 
predictable that subjects in tests should list significantly more attributes for a 
category at that level- wherever it should feature in a taxonomic hierarchy-
than at superordinate or subordinate levels (cf. Rosch et al. 1976). 
But (or indeed consequently) basic levels, although the universally 
psychologically salient categories, must sometimes be abandoned in favour of 
other levels: "functional" basic-levels (Berlin, reported in Lakoff 1987: 37 
(personal communication», which take into account such factors as cultural 
underutilization of general human capacities, and specialized training. Thus, on 
the one hand, the urban individual may possess a functionally basic category 
"tree", instead of the "true" basic categories "oak", "maple", etc.; and, on the 
other, the Hanun60, with ninety-two words for different types of rice, make 
little use of the basic category "rice". 
More seriously still, the true basic level is sometimes shifted downward to 
accommodate specialized knowledge (the antique furniture dealer's basic 
category "Chippendale chair", for example (Rosch et al. 1976: 432»; and at 
other times, the lack of correspondence with the true basic level is explained 
away as the result of "selective ignorance and exaggeration of the attributes and 
structure of [the] environment" (ibid.: 435). 
That "the basic category cuts in the world should be those which yield the most 
information for the least cognitive load" (ibid.: 428) seems fair enough. But is 
there not bound to be one level of which this will be true - but the location of 
which within a taxonomy will vary from object to object, person to person, 
hobby to hobby, culture to culture, and even situation to situation? Rosch's 
experiments were throughout calculated to discourage the type of variety which 
would characterize differently perhaps every member of society. As a final and 
astonishing throwaway, Rosch stresses that it is not, after all, the content but 
"the principle of category formation that is claimed to be universal" (ibid.: 435, 
my emphasis). This, it seems to me, is quite a different matter. 
3.2 Responses and prototypes 
It has also been observed that "many natural categories are internally structured 
into a prototype (clearest cases, best examples) of the category with 
nonprototype members tending towards an order from better to poorer 
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examples" (Rosch 1975b: 544). There is therefore a risk that, if a test-picture 
selected is not prototypical, prototype effects, or "asymmetries within 
categories", will distort the specificity of responses to it. Figure 1, for example, 
may well represent a dog, but, if the picture is not perceived ideally to embody 
dog-nessi, "dog" will be hindered as a response, in favour of some subordinate; 
just as a penguin (a "deviant" item (Rosch et al. 1976)) is identified as a penguin 
more readily than it is identified as a bird (Jolicoeur, Gluck, and Kosslyn 1984, 
reported in Humphreys and Bruce 1989). In fact, the prototype cannot but 
bolster up the basic category notion, by affording its exponents an all-purpose 
escape-clause. When given to understand, for example, that dogs are 
characterized by patting, the natural objection "unless it's a Rottweiler" may be 
invalidated by the Rottweiler's non-prototypicality. 
3.3 Summary and introduction of asserted norm 
It would appear that basic-level categories do not provide a suitable standard by 
which to measure response specificity, since 1) basic levels would have to be 
established separately for each informant and for each test-picture, and 2) each 
test-picture would also have to be verified as to its prototypicality. 
With the demise of the basic-level category, and in the absence of any more 
objective alternative, I remain convinced, nonetheless, of the methodological 
need for a standard. 
I therefore propose to assert by fiat a standard (no doubt heavily influenced by 
my own basic categories and prototypes) which I shall term an "asserted 
specificity norm", notated, for example, *DOG*. 
In order to clarify the nature of the specificity norm, some consideration of the 
ontological status of rep rae sen tans and repraesentatum is necessary. The 
notions presented below are, to a certain extent, already implicit above, in the 
discussions of basic categories, equivalence of visual information, etc. It is time 
to make them explicit, and, with regret, but in the interests of minimizing 
ambiguity, to introduce some notational conventions. Further justification for 
1 Figure 1 was in fact intended as (and remains, for me) an unambiguously doggish dog, but 
consultation with only one other individual already revealed a discrepancy! While I find I am 
intuitively receptive to the idea of the prototype, it is doubtless as relative as the basic 
category. 
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this digression will be found, I hope, in chapter VIII, where it plays an important 
part in the account of generic and ostensive responses. 
4 Ontological considerations 
The equivalence of visual information, outlined in chapter V, suggests the 
existence of collections of entities between which a certain degree of difference 
goes unremarked. Just as the favourite joke may be told repeatedly, without 
ceasing to be, essentially, the same joke, so the following: 
although they obviously do not have the same material identity, are, in a 
significant way, the same repraesentans. Conversely, each (real or hypothetical) 
hairy thing out there, to which any from among the above may correspond, is, 
in a sense, the same repraesentatum. A description of the constancy underlying 
any collection of repraesentantes or repraesentata provides us with a definitive 
"type" against which any individual repraesentans or repraesentatum may be 
matched. 
Consequently, in speaking of pictorial entities, it is essential to be able to 
distinguish between the collection, or class, and the member; between the type 
and the "token" (Peirce 1940; Hervey 1979). The token repraesentans I shall 
notate, for example, " [dog] "; the token repraesentatum " DOG ". 
4.1 Class-membership 
I propose, therefore, to speak of the "class of repraesentantes" and the "class of 
repraesentata", notated, respectively, { [dog] } and {DOG}, for example. 
Between the two classes exists a relationship of representation. Between the 
members of each class exists a relationship of equivalence!. 
For Prieto, indication may not occur unless both indicator and indicated entity 
are recognized as members of respective classes (1966: 18). Indicator and 
indicated entity are associated with one another, but this relationship must be 
1 Although there will, of course, exist between repraesentans tokens of a single type, for 
example, a relationship of equivalence of visual information, this is not the "equivalence" to 
which I refer here. It is, rather, an equivalence in capacity to convey; motivated, but not 
constituted, by equivalence of visual information (see Hervey 1979: 16-17). 
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mediated by a more regular association between the class to which the indicator 
belongs and that of which the indicated entity is a member. It is this latter 
relationship which constitutes indication. Thus the relationship between the 
repraesentans: [dog] and the repraesentatum DOG is mediated by the relationship 
between the class ofrepraesentantes: { [dog] } and the class of rep rae sent at a 
{DOG}. This requirement should hold even in those cases where to posit a class 
of rep rae sent at a seems unnecessary (for example, where [dog] refers to FIDO, 
THE DOG NEXT DOOR (see §2.2 above, and chapter VIII, §7). 
Since it is not always clear whether Prieto's indicator and indicated entity are 
intended as concrete events or as models for concrete events, we are left, 
potentially, with something of an anomaly: an abstract class, the members of 
which are realizations, or concrete pictorial events (Hervey 1982). 
4.2 Model and realization 
In order to clarify the necessary distinction between model and realization, and 
explicitly to maintain the set-member relation between a class of equivalent 
repraesentantes and an individual repraesentans, and that between a class of 
equivalent repraesentata and an individual repraesentatum, we should interpose 
another level. 
The realized repraesentatum will be termed a "referent" (cf. Hervey 1979: 21), 
(notated, for example, 'DOG'l ). Where significant ambiguity would 
otherwise result, "repraesentans" will be qualified "realized repraesentans" 
(notated, for example, ,[dog]'), and "picture": "realized picture"2. 
1 When we eventually come to consider picture responses from the data in their entirety, we 
shall dispense with this notational convention. 
2 Note that this will entail a slight modification of the definition of "picture" in chapter II 
above: "a picture-token is a repraesentans in its capacity of conveying, by virtue of a visual 
resemblance, a repraesentatum; where the repraesentans is a model for an essentially two-
dimensional, essentially continuous surface, and the repraesentatum is a model for a real or 
hypothetical experiential correlate." 
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Figure 3 (adapted from Hervey 1982: 210) 
type 
token 
picture-type 
{ [dog] } 
class of repraesentantes R 
[dog] 
repraesentans 
picture-token 
{DOG } 
class of repraesentata 
DOG 
repraesentatum 
realized picture 
realization '[dog]' 
realized repraesentans R 
'DOG' 
referent 
where R is, in each case, the relationship of representation. Referents, in so far 
as they exist independently of representation, may belong to any number of 
overlapping classes (Hervey 1979), that is, "classes of potential referents", or 
"reference classes", which we shall notate, for example, {'DOG'}. Mr. Green's 
(single, flesh and blood) beagle may belong simultaneously to the classes 
{'BEAGLE'}, {'ANIMAL'}, etc.; and each instance, '[dog]', may evoke in Mr. 
Green anyone of the above. 
5 Asserted norms and vague responses 
The asserted specificity norm * DOG * , then, dictates the boundary of a reference 
class. Unlike the denotation class of the sign "dog" (cf. Hervey 1979), this 
class does not include every entity which might validly be called "dog", but only 
those which retain an acceptable correspondence with the figure in question. 
The class {'CHIHUAHUA'}, for example, is in total non-overlap with figure l's 
* DOG * , whereas its linguistic counterpart would be properly included within a 
denotation class corresponding to the sign "dog". 
Each response is an attempt at circumscribing a class to which the referent 
belongs. Thus we are dealing with the potential intersection of response 
reference classes offered (via the realized repraesentatum) with *DOG*. In 
anticipation of §4.6 below, we shall term the relevant response classes of 
potential referents (counter-intuitively, but much less of a mouthful) "label 
classes", and any member thereof a "label". 
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The label class may bear one of the following relations to the norm *IX>G*: 
1) non-intersection of label class with *IX>G* 
2) proper inclusion of *IX>G* within label class 
3) total overlap of label class with *IX>G* 
4) proper inclusion of label class within *IX>G* 
5) "partial overlap" of label class with *IX>G* 
The last of these, partial overlap (dealt with in §6 below), serves to introduce 
some criteria failing which a response classes of potential referents is deemed 
irrelevant (that is, disqualified as a label class). The gist of this, as I hope will 
become clear, is that certain descriptions of repraesentantes are unjustifiable, 
given the visual information available. 
5.1 Non-intersection of label class with *DOG* 
a) 'GIRAFFE' 
Provided that informants are using the term "giraffe" in the accepted sense, the 
("translated") response to figure 1 'GIRAFFE' is eliminated as a possible 
representational correlate. The class {'GIRAFFE'} is in total non-overlap with 
*OOG*. 
Figure 4 denoting the empty set 
throughout 
The possibility that an informant has stipulated a new and idiosyncratic 
correspondence between {DOG} and the word "giraffe" (Hospers 1967; 
Robinson 1950), unless made explicit, must be ignored. 
b) 'CHIHUAHUA' 
Figure 5 
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The response 'CHIHUAHUA' is similarly unsuccessful within representation, 
since nothing which could be represented by figure 1 could acceptably and 
validly be called "chihuahua". It is only "post-representationally" that figure 1 
may signify 'CHIHUAHUA' (see chapter VIII, §6.5). 
c) 'CORAL' 
Figure 6 
The response 'CORAL' is also unsuccessful- not with respect to the represented 
information this time, but with respect to the given. As with {'CHIHUAHUA'} 
and {'GIRAFFE'} above, however, the class {'CORAL'} is in total non-overlap 
with *DOG*. 
5.2 Proper inclusion of*DOG* within label class 
'ANIMAL' and 'MAMMAL' 
Figure 7 
The response 'ANIMAL' is not eliminated by figure 1. But, while all members of 
*DOG* are also members of {'ANIMAL'}, the converse is not true. *DOG* is 
properly included in {'ANIMAL'}. The response 'ANIMAL' is thus an 
approximation in that it generates too wide, or too "vague", a class. The same is 
true of the response 'MAMMAL'. 'MAMMAL' is, however, less vague than 
'ANIMAL' since while every 'MAMMAL' is a member of {'ANIMAL'}, not every 
'ANIMAL' is a member of {'MAMMAL'}. 
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5.3 Total overlap of label class with *DOG* 
a) 'DOG' 
Not surprisingly, the class {'DOG'} is in total overlap with *DOG*. For such 
infonnants as realize 'DOG', figure 1 may be understood to function perfectly 
well as an all-encompassing dog-picture, or at any rate as prototypical (§3.2) a 
dog-picture as it is for me. 
Figure 8 
b) 'DOMESTIC CANINE' 
The class {'DOMESTIC CANINE'} is also in total overlap with *DOG*. 
Figure 9 
It might well be argued, however, that the infonnant who responds 'DOMESTIC 
CANINE' intends the class to embrace any member of the family Canidae which 
has been domesticated (a jackal trained to fetch the Sunday papers, for example); 
and that this response constitutes, therefore, a vague approximation (CANINE) 
qualified by a characterization (see §6, and chapter VII). While this alternative 
interpretation of the response is perfectly valid, two points persuade me to treat 
'DOMESTIC CANINE' here. 
Firstly, "domestic canine" is an established English rendering of "Canis 
familiaris" (Storer 1951: 735); "domestic", in this context, need not denote the 
property of being "domesticated" (in that sense entailed by the amenable jackal 
above) (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980, on "pseudo-composites and pseudo-
words"). Thus {'DOMESTIC CANINE'} is relevant as a label class in its own 
right. Secondly, the methodology requires that a response portion be 
"accounted for" at the first available opportunity. Since the treatment of labels 
precedes that of characterizations, treating {'DOMESTIC CANINE'} as a label 
class also affords the simpler account of the response 'DOMESTIC CANINE'. 
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Where there is total overlap of the label class with the norm, a response will be 
termed "normal". 
5.4 Proper inclusion of label class within *DOG* 
'BEAGLE' and 'LESSER SIBERIAN BEAGLE' 
The classes {'BEAGLE'} and {'LESSER SIBERIAN BEAGLE'} may each be 
understood to be properly included in *DOG*. That this choice exists depends 
upon the perceived variation within the class (cf. chapter v, §5.4.4). 
Figure 10 
In any consideration of specificity we may imagine a point at which 
disagreement may be attributed to a distinction between the respective 
knowledges of layperson and specialist. But specialists, no matter what the 
hobby or profession, will not only conceive of a larger and more discriminating 
range of potential referents; they will be able to ascertain precisely what visual 
justification there is for the representation of any particular one of these. Thus, 
while the layperson will be unaware of the distinctions LESSER SIBERIAN 
BEAGLE - HUNTER'S ARCTIC BEAGLE, the specialist will realize the insufficient 
evidence for such an interpretation (and even, if we are honest, for the 
interpretation 'BEAGLE'). Unless some other factor underlies the response (the 
airing of specialized knowledge, for instance), 'BEAGLE' and 'LESSER 
SmERIAN BEAGLE' are unlikely - above all where the picture concerned is 
rudimentary, and the picturer no expert on dogs. The responses 'BEAGLE' and 
'LESSER SIBERIAN BEAGLE', should they be forthcoming, however, are 
"approximations" in that they generate too "narrow" a class. 
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6 Partial overlap? 
6.1 Biological entities in biological taxonomies 
Relations of subordination and superordination are not difficult to establish with 
the backing of a Linnaean biological taxonomy. Whether the classification is 
held to express the phylogenetic relationships between the groups, or whether 
considered only utilitarian, there is nonetheless little disagreement among 
Western taxonomers as to the way in which the animal kingdom should be 
classifiedl (Villee et al. 1978); that, for example, beagles are dogs, and dogs 
mammals; tarantulas spiders and spiders arachnids. Many response reference 
classes, however, do not fit the taxonomic mould. 
A crucial criterion for a taxonomy in Kay's sense is that it should involve 
partitions, that is, "a division of a set into subsets that places each member of the 
original set in exactly one of the subsets" (1971: 869). This, and the 
requirement of strict-inclusion is expressed by Kay's second axiom: 
"For any ti E rr, the set c ( ti) = { tj I tj E rr, ti ~ tj and there is no tl( E q-
such that ti ~ tl( and tl( ~ tj} is either null or is a partition of ti" (ibid.: 881), 
where c ( to stands for the set of all those taxa immediately preceded by the 
taxon ti. 
Since this classifies an organism "for life", as it were, the features by which its 
place in the hierarchy is determined must be reasonably stable (Hallpike 1979), 
and must apply equally to other entities in the extension of the class (Harre 
1970a). Perhaps needless to say, obvious structural (or "diagnostic" (Villee et 
al. 1978)) features have, even since the flowering of genetics, remained high on 
the list of defining characteristics. 
In these respects, a zoological taxonomic category differs from {'BULLY'} and 
{'PET'}, for example. An individual who refrains from bullying is no longer a 
1 It should be noted, however, that, as Lakoff (1987) observes, genus in Linnaean biology 
was established in part on bases similar to those described for basic categories above, and that 
"Linnaean taxonomy is simply the particular folk: taxonomy with which Western Europeans 
are most familiar" (Kay 1971: 867). This does not prevent Rosch from employing biological 
taxonomies (albeit sparingly) as "independent linguistic evolutionary data" to verify the 
potential hierarchization of a category, on account of their "official taxonomic legitimacy" 
(Rosch et af. 1976: 388-9). Ironically, zoologists themselves confess that "in some ways the 
methods used in grouping organisms resemble those which form the logical basis of any 
system of cataloguing other objects, whether of merchandise in a store or books in a library" 
(!) (Grove and Newell 1953: 697). 
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bully, and a dog abandoned on the motorway no longer a pet (see Harre 1970b). 
Are there not, moreover, degrees of pet- and bully-dom? Structurally, or 
visibly, too, {'BULLY'} and {'PET'} differ from a zoological taxonomic 
category. A bully is a bully through habitual behaviour, and an animal is a pet 
through its being loved or "owned", housebroken, fed regularly, etc. None of 
these is readily representable. 
Any classification which does not correspond to a fairly 1 orthodox zoological 
category, and which depends, moreover, upon non-representable features will 
be termed a "characterization" either inferred or asserted, as compared with the 
norm. This is only really partial overlap with *000* in the sense that some pets 
are dogs and some dogs are pets; but, the distinguishing features by which one 
so classifies an entity are not representationally available in a picture. 
6.1.1 Two exceptions 
There are two exceptions we shall make to this. My hope is that they will be 
accepted as extensions of, rather than contradictions to, the taxonomy presented 
above. 
The first exception is not strictly in contravention of Kay's first axiom: 
"There is a unique tt E q; called the UNIQUE BEGINNER, such that, for any ti E 
'I (ti'# tt), tI:::> ti' (Kay 1971: 881) (that is, there is exactly one member of 'I 
which strictly includes every other member), 
but "in a taxonomic structure of plants [for example], 'plant' is the unique 
beginner; it strictly includes every other taxon, such as 'tree', 'oak', grass', 
bamboo' etc." (ibid.: 869). Since this does not provide us with the means to 
classify as "vague" the response to figure 1 'THING', what I propose is simply to 
extend the more inclusive end of the orthodox hierarchy in order that the "unique 
beginner" may be constituted by "thing", "stuff', "area", or "entity", or some 
such2. 
1 I am not proposing that characterization treat all responses bar LARUS ATRICILLA L., 
and the like. 
2 Care must be taken, however. 'THING' is not necessarily a response to an entity conceived 
of via representation, and may refer merely to, say, figure 1 as a patch of pigment upon the 
paper, without acknowledgement of its doghood. 
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The second exception concerns "structurally-motivated" gender. Since the sex 
of an organism does not constitute a partition to be found in any biological 
taxonomy, consistency would require that we disqualify 'WOMAN as a valid 
label, classifying it instead as an "inferred characterization" (chapter VII, §2.2) 
(and that we accept 'MAN' as though 'NON-GENDER-SPECIFIC HUMAN' were 
intended). One implication of such a policy is that, while we may be able to 
distinguish the Caucasoid from the Mongoloid on the basis of visual 
characteristics, we do not, under any circumstances and on the same basis, 
distinguish between men and women. This, of course, makes nonsense of the 
notions of perceived variation and specialized knowledge, each a reworking of 
"extra-pictorial context (b)" (chapter V, §5.4.4). Few humans, surely, of above 
a certain age fail to possess this degree of specialized knowledge. 
It is important to note, however, that attribution of gender to a pictorial human 
often has less to do with facial hair, hip width, breast protrusion, etc., than it 
has to do with clothing and hair length (Morris 1978). I shall admit *WOMAN* 
as a norm (and, consequently, 'WOMAN' as a label) if the "gender signals" 
(ibid.: 230) seem to me to be structurally overt. 
6.2 Non-biological entities in "non-taxonomic" taxonomies? 
For Rosch, "a taxonomy is a system by which categories are related to another 
by means of class inclusion. The greater the inclusiveness of a category within a 
taxonomy, the higher the level of abstraction. Each category within a taxonomy 
is entirely included within one other category (unless it is the highest level 
category) but is not exhaustive of that more inclusive category" (Rosch et at. 
1976: 383). 
That partitions do not feature explicitly is a useful omission when it comes to the 
classification of non-biological entities; thus "chairness" is quite at liberty to 
shade into "couchness" and the book into the pamphlet. Another consequence 
of this definition of "taxonomy" is that, without the definitional tampering 
necessitated in §6.1.1, the classifier may resort to "thing" in the absence of any 
more likely or less ambiguous-looking superordinate. There is also less 
emphasis on stability of attribute. 
Such a definition might admit 'PIECE OF FURNITURE', 'PIECE OF CUTLERY', 
and 'TOY', as valid labels - vague approximations on *CHAIR *, *KNIFE* and 
*OOLL*, respectively. But even 'TOY', say, involves functional considerations; 
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that is, it involves features sufficiently unrepresentable as to disqualify a 
biological analogue (,PET', for example) from labelhood. 'TOY' is, moreover, 
by no means exceptional; functional, relational, and "locant" (Robinson 1950) 
considerations are often at least as important to the identification of non-
biological entities as appearance (Hospers 1967; Lyons 1968; Robinson 1950). 
A toy, essentially, is surely anything played with - from a Hamley's spinning-
top to a couple of bottle tops and a piece of string. Thus, as far as representable 
features are concerned, even Rosch's "taxonomy" seems too rigid for our 
purposes. 
This lack of a constant and regulated system of superordination and 
subordination will be borne in mind. Nevertheless, I shall assert a specificity 
norm for non-biological entities where necessary. This will be based, so far as 
is possible, on structural features of the object. Approximations, as above, will 
be proposed only where superordinates and subordinates seem plausible. 
Despite my reservations about basic-level categories, I shall make use of 
Rosch's determination of the potential hierarchization of non-biological entities 
(Rosch et al. 1976). Where the relation of the response reference class to the 
norm does not constitute one of plausible subordination or superordination, I 
shall again treat the response as a characterization. 
I appreciate the double-standard involved in employing one definition of 
"taxonomy" for biological entities, and a second for non-biological entities. The 
adoption of Kay's definition throughout, however, would allow us no means by 
which to classify as "vague" a response to a [spinning-top]: "That's a thing". 
Were we, on the other hand, to adopt Rosch's definition throughout, we should 
be deprived of the advantages of an available scientific classification. Since the 
distinction in everyday life between biological entities and non-biological entities 
is fairly clear; and since, in pictorial life, any ambiguity may be side-stepped 
through the assertion of a specificity norm, I conclude that there is no great harm 
in this. 
Neither definition, however, deals very readily with a response to figure 1 such 
as 'TAIL'. The solution, only anticipated here, requires that any norm be 
matched with an explicitly delineated spatial area. It is introduced here in an 
attempt to close the present chapter with the norm fIrmly tethered to the 
repraesentans. 
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7 Delineation of the basic anatomical unit 
It has been taken for granted above, that, in assigning a nonn to a particular part 
of a picture, precisely which part that will be is self-evident. This assumption 
has been eased along by the presentation of fairly simple pictures (such as figure 
1) in which figure and ground are easily distinguishable, and potentially 
confusing discontinuities minimal. Even in such cases, the area to which the 
nonn is intended to correspond should be made explicit; figure 1, for example 
(reproduced as figure lla) is delineated as in 11 b: 
Figure 11 
a b c 
Figure 12a offers a little more scope; yet few people, I should venture, would 
contest the delineation of units as in figure 12c (rather than as in 12b), where A 
corresponds to *MAN*, and B to *W ALL *. 
Figure 12 
A 
B 
a b c 
Of course we may well still register the internal details: [individual bricks], 
[shirt and trousers], etc.; nevertheless, [man] and [wall] may be assumed to 
have a certain intuitive precedence. Implicit support for such an assumption is 
already contained in the above; in the simplicity of perceptual organization 
predicted by Hochberg, Wertheimer and others, the economy of verbalization 
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(§2), etc. This is not, however, an attempt to defend the perceptual reality of the 
"anatomically basic" units delineated; in fact, many of those proposed will be 
either more extensive or less extensive spatially than the percept might dictate 
(see chapter VII, §5, and, especially, delineations in Appendix A). Far less is it 
a preliminary to an investigation of genuine perceptual, rather than 
representational, tendencies. 
The reasons are these: 
1) to make explicit that area of a picture to which a norm is intended to 
correspond; 
2) to make more explicit that one interpretation of the fundamentally 
ambiguous represented spatial arrangement which to me seems self-evident 
within a traditional, three-dimensional, projective approach; and through 
comparison with which responses may be judged to contain "two-
dimensional" or "non-spatial" associations. 
There is, therefore, a strong subjective element to the units proposed, paralleling 
(in all but delay of acknowledgement) the subjectivity of the specificity norm. 
The consequent simplification of the accounting procedure, though not at the 
root of this preliminary, is a by-product not to be scorned. One result, for 
instance, is a considerable constraint on the number of elements to be dealt with 
within "specificity". In delineating figure 13a as in 13c, for example, we are 
spared the necessity of asserting norms *BRICKl*, *BRICK2*, BRICK3*, etc., 
along with further norms for any other potentially miniscule area an informant 
may choose to pinpoint (figure 13b). 
Figure 13 
a 
F~ 
G~ 
H~ 
J~ 
etc. 
B 
b c 
A procedure for dealing with the responses of the 'A BRICK, ANOTHER BRICK, 
ANOTHER BRICK, ... ',or 'TORSO, LEGS, HEAD, .. .', type is offered in chapter 
VII, §5.2.1. 
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Another result is the opportunity to make explicit those instances where "fade-
out" is incorporated. Strictly representationally-speaking, figure 14's [man] has 
no [feet], but a description specifying a "footless" man (delineating, that is, as in 
figure 14b) would seem odd within a tradition accustomed to such fade-outs (see 
chapter v, §5.4.3). The anatomical norm allows us to make explicit the 
(asserted) limits of any such fade-out, and the extent of the "potentially co-
visible" interpolated portion (figure 14b). 
Figure 14 
a b c 
In chapter VII, we shall see that a similar procedure makes explicit the spatial 
extension of partially occluded pictorial objects (§5.1); and that anatomical 
norms may be manipulated to facilitate the treatment of taxonomically 
problematic entities (§5.2.2). 
8 Summary 
In our efforts to make explicit that one interpretation of the represented 
information to constitute the given, we have seen fit to assert a specificity norm 
by which to assess the validity and the relative particularization of a verbalized 
repraesentatum. In the case of a biological entity, the norm will correspond to a 
fairly orthodox biological category; in the case of a non-biological entity, to a 
plausible and, where possible, structurally motivated, alternative. In either case, 
the norm will be assigned to a particular delineated area of the picture concerned. 
That part of a response to be compared with the specificity of the norm will be 
termed a "label", and will also correspond to a fairly orthodox biological 
category or to a plausible and structurally motivated alternative. Residue within 
a response, once the label has been tackled, will constitute, provisionally, a 
"characterization" . 
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Thus, in answer to the question "what is represented in figure I?", we are finally 
in a position to reply "let it be *000*"; to claim 'DOG' and most of its taxonomic 
approximations justified with respect to the given. We are also in a position to 
claim the label 'ANIMAL' as "given but vague"; 'BEAGLE' as "given but narrow", 
and so on. Labels, however, do not exhaust a picture's given information. We 
shall meet up with the remainder of the given in chapter vn, where it will be 
presented as a particular type of characterization. 
161 
1 Introduction 
CHAPTER VII 
Characterization 
We now have a plausible but nonetheless arbitrary fonnulation of both the identity 
and the taxonomic specificity of a referent: the asserted specificity nonn. We are 
also in a position to assess the relative particularization of a response through the 
isolation of labels. But the infonnation which may be gleaned from a picture 
extends well beyond that contained in a label; and it is with the representational 
residue that this chapter is chiefly concerned. 
A number of such remnants have already been encountered in our consideration of 
"partial overlap" (chapter VI, §6). 'PET', for example, was invalidated as a label 
through the unrepresentability of its defining features. But in no way would we 
wish to claim that 'PET', in response to a [dog], is "wrong". While there may 
indeed be insufficient visual infonnation to guarantee that pethood is in evidence, 
there may be nothing at all to guarantee that it is not. Beyond the core of 
representation - and yet without transgressing its outer limits - there remains a 
good deal of interpretative scope. The aim of this chapter is to define those limits 
and to provide a framework for the assessment of responses falling within the 
bounded domain. But the aim is also further to circumscribe the given (§5), not all 
of the boundaries of which are coincident with those of representation. 
Offigure 1 (*MAN*), then, MAN (or any taxonomic approximation) is by no means 
all there is to say. We may care to add that he is TWO-LEGGED, TUBBY, SUITED, 
FROWNING, WRINKLED, HOLDING A STICK. We may also describe him as an 
ANGRY, MEAN-MINDED BUSINESSMAN, RUNNING AFfER A PICK-POCKET, etc. In 
other words, he may be accorded a placement in time and space, he may experience 
emotion, and he may possess the capacity for thought, action and change. 
delineated: 
Figure 1 
These descriptions, invalid as labels, constitute (provisionally) "characterizations". 
Characterizations are, however, of relatively distinct types; while none of them is 
"counter-indicated' by (that is, inconsistent with ) the visual information available, 
some may more reasonably be said to be represented than others. The relativity of 
this "reasonableness" derives from the assorted characterizations' progressively 
more (visually) tenuous relationship with the represented information. 
1.1 Relative reasonableness 
The response 'SUI1ED', for example, affords the viewer no interpretative choice 
whatever (beyond that resulting from the picture'S fundamental ambiguity). That is 
to say, SUI1ED isjully motivated, thus qualifying as an "elementary 
characterization" (§2.1 below). A response may, by contrast, appear to have 
brought into play not only that likely degree of cognitive involvement described in 
chapter II, but also a certain amount of reasoned inference (BUSINESSMAN), or 
gratuitous imaginative input (RUNNING AFIER A PICK-POCKET). Such 
descriptions, so long as they are not counter-indicated by the visual information 
available, will be termed (provisionally) "true characterizations" (§2.2 to §2.4), 
either "inferred" or "asserted" as appropriate. 
Thus my assumption is that, ambiguity notwithstanding, there is an upper limit to 
the amount of information which may reasonably be said to be represented. 
Beyond this limit, as the purely visual motivation is weaker, so an inversely greater 
interpretative input is presupposed, in terms of either the exercise of creative 
imagination, or the recourse to a convention. In this respect, the array of 
characterizations, from "elementary" (§2.1) (or rather, as we shall see, from 
"formal" (§2.5» through to "asserted" (§2.3), is somewhat analogous to the 
typology of indices (chapter V, § 2.2.1), with its interchange of naturalness and 
conventionality, mediated by various degrees of motivation. 
Figure 2 
+ ~( ------ visual motivation ) 
characterizations 
elementary inferred asserted 
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12 Relational characterization 
A second dimension in the classification of characterizations is presented in figure 
3's vertical series; that is, complexity, "non-relational" being the simpler of the two 
types featured. Such a classification may be held to bear a similarity to a typology 
of semiotic systems. As we have seen, a great many (to some extent arbitrarily) 
distinct elements may feature as parts of a single picture (chapter V, §5.4.5; chapter 
VI, §7), and thus their plurality may allow of numerous meaningful interweavings 
of those elements in the search for a more holistic reading. The interpretation of 
any such picture which neither interrelates (§3 below) nor integrates (§4) the 
constituent elements treats that picture as though pictorial representation, as a 
communicative genre, is a "simple semiotic system" (Hervey 1982; Mulder and 
Hervey 1980); or, equivalently, as though each constituent picture is a distinct 
constituted picture (chapter V, §5.4.5). However extensively characterized non-
relational/y, each individual element is, in this event, a "sentence" (ibid.). 
Figure 3 
+ ~(------------- visual motivation ) 
characterizations 
elementary inferred asserted 
non-relational 
relational 
Looking forward to figure 8 below, for instance, the characterizations TWO-
LEGGED, ANGRY, and RUNNING are non-relational in that no second represented 
element is explicitly brought into play. But as soon as one represented element is 
ANGRIER THAN, or ANGRY AT, WATCHING, or STRIKING, BEHIND or even just 
WITH, a second represented l element, that characterization will be termed 
"relational" . 
1 I have chosen to treat as "relational" only those characterizations which relate represented 
elements, and which relate them explicitly; thus invalidating, with respect to figure 2A, the 
descriptions HE'S THINKING ABOUT HIS WIFE, and HE'S A FATHER. I believe that much 
of interest could be derived from the inclusion of the former within the scope of relational 
characterization. Nevertheless, as a well-meaning step in the direction of simplicity, this type of 
description will constitute a non-relational characterization. In the second example, since 2A and 
2B are not explicitly placed in a relationship of paternity (as they would be in THE SHORT MAN 
IS THE TALL MAN'S FATHER), this description is also non-relational. The alternative would 
be to treat as relational every characterization the definition of which incorporates some sense of 
relation (AGGRESSOR, FARMER, PERUVIAN, etc.). This I am not prepared to do since, 
given that labels are already accounted for, the residue would be negligible. 
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1.3 Summary 
These, then, are the two general dimensions along which responses to pictures will 
be classified: the extent of visual motivation and the degree of complexity. 
In the course of the present chapter, a number of further distinctions will be 
introduced: "static" and "temporal" characterizations (differentiating responses on 
the basis of interpreted motion) (§2.4); and "interrelated" and "integrated" 
complexity (§3 and §4). All these distinctions are, to some extent, refinements; the 
former pair along the horizontal dimension; the latter set along the vertical. 
Additionally, it will be observed that a fully motivated, non-representational type of 
characterization ("formal description" (§2.5» should preface figure 3's columns, as 
in figure 4 below. In essence, however, the scheme which will ultimately result is 
roughly the following1: 
Figure 4 
+ t-( ------ visual motivation ) 
formal labels, and inferred and 
descriptions elementary asserted 
characterizations characterizations 
non-relational 1 2 3 
relational 4 5 6 
distinguishing six very general types of description in verbal response to a picture: 
1) formal non-relational descriptions (see §2.5); 
2) those confined to represented information, without relating constituent 
elements; that is, labels (chapter III) and elementary non-relational 
characterizations (§2.1); 
3) those which offer justifiable "deviations" from the represented information, 
without relating constituent elements; that is, true non-relational 
characterizations (§2.2 to §2.4); 
4) formal relational descriptions (see §3); 
5) those confined to represented information, while relating constituent elements; 
that is, elementary relational characterizations (§3 and §4); 
1 Note that the numerals here refer only to the catalogue beneath figure 4, and should not be 
confused with the numerals used to score responses in chapter VI. 
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6) those which offer justifiable "deviations" from the represented information, 
and which relate constituent elements; that is, true relational characterizations 
(§3 and §4). 
None of these characterizations is inconsistent with the visual information available. 
Where a description is counter-indicated by the represented information, we shall 
look to "n-ary" signification (chapter VIII) for an explanation 1. 
2 Non-relational characterizations 
2.1 Elementary characterizations 
Elementary characterizations are represented. There is full visual motivation for the 
characterization of figure 1 WEARING A SUIT - we only have to look. Likewise, 
that the man is FROWNING; everyone is able to distinguish a frown from a smile 
(Morris 1978, Knapp and Hall 1992, Ekman and Friesen 1969). Further 
elementary characterizations might include ON ONE LEG2, DOUBLE-CHINNED, 
HOLDING A STICK and GREY-TEMPLED. That HOLDING A STICK and WEARING A 
SUIT should be non-relational is a consequence of figure l's delineation, [stick] and 
[suit] being spatially included within the basic unit. The response 'UGLY' is also 
elementary, even while a second viewer may counter 'HANDSOME'. These, though 
perhaps better classified as "evaluative" characterizations, may be assumed to be as 
obvious to respective respondents as that the man is frowning. 
With the above qualification, then, elementary characterizations seem to be purely 
"descriptive" in that they tell us something about how the repraesentatum looks3. 
When we come to examine responses in their entirety, rather than in isolated 
segments, another, rather less infonnative, type of elementary characterization 
emerges. It is exemplified by the (again isolated) segments 'THIS', 'THE', 'IT', 
'ONE', 'THERE IS A', etc. These, in so far as they merely locate the 
1 In §5 we shall see that "given" should be substituted for "represented" in the outline above; and 
that this entails a modification of the foregoing as follows: where a description is counter-justified 
by the given we shall look first to representational alternatives for an explanation;failing that, 
we shall look to n-ary signification. 
2 In fact "on one leg" is not, strictly speaking. elementary. We should perhaps describe the 
posture "with left leg bent at the knee such that the lower leg forms an angle of approximately 
65° with the upper leg; and with the lower part of the right leg ... ". For the sake of brevity, 
however. we shall stick with "on one leg". 
3"How the repraesentatum looks" is bound to have an uncomfortable feel to it. It is distinguished 
from "how the smudge of pigment looks" in §2.5 below. The question of how - or indeed 
whether - it can be distinguished from "how the repraesentans looks" is addressed in §6. 
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repraesentatum, identifying it only as an object occupying space, a perceptually 
discrete body, will be termed "corporeal" elementary characterizations. We may 
anticipate their being numerous in any lengthy response, and that their frequency 
will be heavily language-dependent. 
2.2 Inferred characterizations 
Figure 1's man, like it or not then, is FROWNING. That we should go so far as to 
say that he is ANGRY is an inference based upon the represented frown. It relies on 
the assumption that when people feel angry they behave pretty much alike; that is, 
there is a regular association of "basic emotions" (happiness, sadness, anger, 
surprise, fear and disgust) with a limited number of facial expressions (Morris 
1978; Knapp and Hall 1992; Ekman and Friesen 1969). Likewise the less transient 
'MEAN-MINDED'. A number of studies indicate that a physiognomy-personality 
correlation does indeed exist - not only in stereotypical association (thick eyebrows 
4 choleric temperament, etc.), but also in fact; depressed people do look 
depressed, and forty years of constant and overt cheerfulness cannot but impress 
themselves upon a person's facial features (Fridlund, Ekman and Oster 1987, 
reported in Knapp and Hall 1992). Nevertheless, despite the plausibility of an 
occasional match, since there is no necessary congruence, the response 'MEAN-
MINDED' is inferred. 'BUSINESSMAN' is also inferred. The man may not be a 
businessman, but (especially in rural Peru, where suits are fairly thin on the 
ground), the assumption is not an unreasonable one. Had the man been pictured at 
a desk, pen poised over the quarterly projections, and lapel badge visibly reading 
"Mr. Green, Accounts Manager", the characterization BUSINESSMAN would be 
considerably more plausible, but still an inference, for all that. 
Inferred characterization is based, therefore, upon the regular (but not necessary) 
co-occurrence of some elementary feature (explicitly described or otherwise) with a 
second feature: an interpretation of the fIrst, neither directly represented nor even, 
unambiguously, representable (cf. partial overlap, chapter VI, §6). Thus the 
interpreter may be said to have taken a small but signifIcant step away from the 
represented information. In ways denied to elementary characterization, inferred 
characterization always offers choice, albeit restricted choice. Figure 1 could 
represent a POLITICIAN - but not a SMILING POLITICIAN WEARING SHORTS AND A 
T-SHIRT. 
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2.3 Asserted characterizations 
Asserted characterizations are those descriptions which may not be inferred from, 
but which are not counter-indicated by, the represented information. There are, 
however, a number of caveats with respect to this category. Assertions should not 
be confused with what might be termed "culture-specific inferences" (see Ekman 
and Friesen 1969). Consider responses to an imagined [human figure]: 'THINKS 
SOMEONE'S WIFE IS BEING UNFAITHFUL TO HER HUSBAND', 'IS A MEMBER OF 
Figure 5 
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS', and 'AWARE 
OF THE IMMEDIATE PRESENCE OF EVIL' . 
On the face of it, each seems highly 
gratuitous. But suppose closer inspection to 
reveal that one hand of the depicted figure 
forms the "vertical horn" (figure 5). This 
gesture is used to indicate "cuckold" in parts 
of Europe and South America, as an of 
solidarity within the University of Texas, 
and to ward off the evil eye worldwide (Knapp and Hall 1992; Morris 1978). 
None of the above interpretations need, therefore, be any more than an inference l . 
Even the content of speech may be inferred if a viewer is sufficiently well versed 
in, for example, "pious gesticulation" (Baxandall1988); that is, the exaggerated 
poses of fifteenth and sixteenth century itinerant preachers, adopted to overcome 
language barriers, codified in instruction manuals: 
"[3] And whan thou spekyst of any heuenly or godly thynges to loke vp and pointe towards 
the skye with thy finger. 
[4] And whan thou spekest of any gentilnes, myldeness, or humylyte, to ley thy handes 
vpon thy breste" (Mirror of the World, ca. 1527, cit. in Baxandal11988: 65). 
and enshrined in the art of the period. 
These examples serve to alert us to the possibility of culture-specific inference, and 
to dissuade us from hasty assumptions of an interpretation's being wholly without 
foundation. 
1 Note that the response 'CUCKOLD' to figure 5 itself would be counter-indicated within 
representation, subsequently classified within n-ary signification (cf. Hjelmslev's "metasemiotic" 
(1961». 
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Returning finally to figure 1, asserted characterizations which, I should maintain, 
stand the test include 'FIFTY-FIVE YEAR-OLD', 'DEAF', 'IN LOVE', and 
'PONDERING ON THE MERITS OF VIOLENCE', 'MR GREEN' (but see chapter VIII, 
§7); and, with certain reservations (see §2.4.3 below), any description of an event 
imagined to have occurred before, or about to occur after, the picture's time-
context, such as 'HAS ruST BEEN ROBBED'. Each of these is ultimately attributable, 
surely, only to a certain imaginative input; and it is just such excursions into 
asserted characterization, with their assumption of creative control over represented 
characters, which mark the romancer from the diagnostician and the witness. 
2.4 Movement 
With the possible exception of SPEKYNGE OF HEUENL Y THYNGES, none of the 
examples so far accounted for incorporates movement. Reference to movement in 
response to both representational and non-representational figures was, in the 
heyday of the projective test (chapter 11), considered a clear indicator of creativity 
(Barron 1969; Bell 1948; Adcock and Ritchie 1958), whether that creativity was 
subsequently qualified as, for example, egocentric wish-fulfilment in the manic, or 
rudimentary fantasy in the feeble-minded (Bell 1948: 123-4). The briefest of 
skimmings through the data themselves, moreover, reveals a clear tendency on the 
part of some informants to offer frozen, movement-free interpretations, in which 
represented characters are JUST THERE, or WATCHING other represented characters. 
It seems, therefore, that a differentiation of responses on the basis of incorporation 
or non-incorporation of movement may be an interesting and perhaps useful 
distinction to make. This section attempts to locate interpreted movement within the 
framework proposed, asking first whether, under any circumstances, movement 
may qualify as an elementary characterization. 
2.4.1 Elementary motion? 
Let us begin by considering the response 'RUNNING'. What is represented in 
figure 1 is a man ON ONE LEG, perhaps ON TIPTOE, admittedly an awkward 
postition to maintain for any length of time. To conclude that the man is RUNNING, 
however, necessitates the hypothesizing of other unrepresented postures: the before 
and after, as it were. This insufficiency on the part of the represented information 
qualifies RUNNING as an inference at the very least. 
Indeed, the representation of "impossible" postures, such as that of a person 
seemingly suspended in mid-air, perhaps with an unattached shadow beneath, 
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renders movement more plausible as an inference and more likely as an 
interpretation, but no less an inference (see Panofsky on the "hovering" Infant 
Jesus in Roger van der Weyden's "The Vision of the Three Magi" (1955: 59». An 
impression of speed may be conveyed by a represented stirring up of dust particles 
(Leonardo da Vinci 1954: 251). The cartoonist's "speed clouds" and "impact 
markers" are, it seems to me, a schematic update of just such a strategy. "Shudder 
lines" in cartoons too, often reinforced by a written "statement of intent": 
SHAKEn, and the like, may be tracings of a character's previous positions. As 
an extreme, they may verge on a quasi-cubist (or indeed quasi-palaeolithic 
(Prudhommeau 1990» approach in their simultaneous representation of non-
simultaneous postures: 
Figure 6 
(adapted from The Beano, 26/9/1992) 
Since such devices will seem incongruous in any more naturalistic picture (cf. 
chapter v, §5.4.4), the painter may resort to a subtler, but related, means of 
expressing motion: the "natural-looking unnatural posture". Arnheim (1974) cites 
an informal experiment by Salomon Reinach which indicates that the postures best 
conveying motion are often those which may not (through anatomical 
unfeasibility), or simply do not (through impracticality and awkwardness), occur in 
reality. Such postures are absent from any series of photographs of the movement 
concerned, but constitute a "composite posture" (ibid.; see also Gombrich 1989). 
Delacroix's "Liberty Guiding the People", for example, shows the goddess striding 
forth, standard aloft, amidst a hazardous array of upturned bayonets, whilst 
looking over her shoulder to urge on the masses. Were she human and non-
pictorial, she would as likely set about her leading thus, as Reinach's horses gallop 
with both pairs of legs simultaneously outstretched. 
Arnheim concludes that "Consequently, the immobile image is not momentary, but 
outside the dimension of time. It can combine different phases of an event in the 
same image without committing an absurdity" (1974: 424). I disagree only with 
170 
the implied relation between these two sentences. The unnatural composite posture 
succeeds in conveying an impression of movement not because "real time" is not an 
issue, but because the unnatural posture is perceived (however erroneously) to be 
natural. I do, however, agree that it is not possible to represent motion in a picture. 
As we have seen, though, it is not difficult to imply motion, nor, correspondingly, 
for it to be inferred (Carello, Rosenblum and Grosofsky 1986). 
2.4.2 T empora/ - static inference 
Even so, ANGRY and RUNNING may strike us as inferences of different kinds. If 
we divest the former of its underlying represented information (FROWNING), we are 
left with a rather nebulous residue which co-occurs with FROWNING, but is 
unrepresentable; if we perform the same operation on the latter, the residue is 
representable, but may not co-occur (within the representational approach we have 
adopted). In order to capture this potentially significant contrast I have seen fit to 
differentiate "static" and "temporal" inferences. 
The term "temporal" is perhaps misleading since "real time" is not at the root of the 
distinction between the temporal inference RUNNING and the static inference 
ANGRY; anger occurs in time too. Neither is the difference one of "length of time 
involved", even though it might, in practice, be possible to be angry for a 
millisecond or for a year, whereas to run for either duration is not feasible. Anger 
could, moreover, result in many postures: 
"An angry figure should be represented seizing someone by the hair and twisting his head down to 
the ground, with one knee on his ribs, and with the right arm and fist raised high up; let him have 
his hair dishevelled, his eyebrows low and knit together, his teeth clenched, the two comers of his 
mouth arched, and the neck which is all swollen and extended as he bends over the foe, should be 
full of furrows" (Leonardo da Vinci 1954: 247-8). 
Anger needs, however, only one: the FROWN. RUNNING, on the other hand, is not 
a single posture; it is a series of different postures, constituting what might be 
called a "temporal set", no single member of which (on paper or in reality) is 
sufficient to constitute RUNNING. Imagine a length of film, each frame of which is 
indistinguishable from figure 1. After two hours of such a film, viewers might still 
be receptive to the idea that the man is ANGRY, BREATHING, WAITING, STARING, 
and BALANCING; but to convince them that RUNNING is occurring, the frames must 
differ appreciably from one other. 
171 
Within temporally inferred visual justification, then, are subsumed many 
movements of which the represented posture constitutes a part. As with static 
inferred characterization, there is choice; the man in figure 1 may as validly be said 
to HOP. Some movements, however, may not be inferred, even from a likely-
looking posture. It is to these we now turn. 
2.4.3 Temporal assertion 
Temporal assertions require that the characterization refer to a temporal set of which 
the represented posture is a member, but that it contain, in addition, an element of 
"gratuitousness", not inferrable from the given. The examples offered in §2.3 
above do not qualify; they are static assertions. Assertions which do qualify 
include our initial RUNNING AFTER A PICK-POCKET, and actions which themselves 
presuppose some previous action; for example, RUNNING AGAIN, in which a like 
event, unwitnessable within a single picture, is imagined to have occurred; and 
ESCAPING, in which a complementary event, "being imprisoned" perhaps, is 
envisaged. 
In these cases, the temporal assertion may be viewed as the combination of static 
assertion and temporal inference since the gratuitous element is a static 
gratuitousness (RUNNING AGAIN and ESCAPING may be rephrased respectively: HE 
RAN AND CEASED TO RUN (static assertion): HE IS RUNNING (temporal inference); 
HE WAS PREVENTED FROM RUNNING (static assertion): HE IS RUNNING (temporal 
inference». Although there may be a case for maintaining that in other examples 
(V ANISHING, being, in fact, the only one which comes to mind) the temporal 
element is itself asserted, I have opted not to complicate the framework further. 
Moreover, since the vast majority of temporal assertions are of the first type, and 
since even the extremes of temporal assertion seem less tenuously linked to the 
represented information than those of static assertion (alone) (§2.3), their relative 
positions as regards visual motivation are as presented in figure 7 below. 
2.5 Non-representational description 
Responses may refer to the configuration of marks on the paper and not to any 
represented character; they may refer, that is, to the formal attributes of a two-
dimensional array perceived non-representation ally. Figure 1 may be described as 
SMALL, BLACK AND WHITE, THERE, etc. Evidence of representational 
interpretation will automatically reclassify such descriptions as elementary 
characterizations. 
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2.6 Summary 
We have arrived at a six-fold classification of non-relational characterizations: 
Figure 7 
+ +-( ------ visual motivation ) 
inferred asserted 
formal elementary 
static temporal temporal static 
SMALL FROWNING ANGRY RUNNING ESCAPING DEAF 
It should be noted that any particular response is assessed not only in itself 
(RUNNING, for instance, may never be elementary), but also with respect to the 
picture concerned; ESCAPING, for example, is indeed an assertion with respect to 
figure 1, but we may readily imagine a picture with respect to which it would be an 
inference. 
Now let us add the second dimension. 
3 Inte"elational characterizations 
All the characterizations examined above are "non-relational". Our framework so 
far does not of course permit them to be otherwise, since figure 1, as delineated, 
presents only a single repraesentans. Turning to figure 8, in which two distinct 
elements are delineated (*MAN* and *MAN*), 
Figure 8 
delineated: 
integration and interrelation become interpretative options; options which need not, 
however, be taken up. The characterizations of MANA, 'ANGRY', 'MEAN-
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MINDED', 'IN LOVE', 'RUNNING AFTER A PICK-POCKET', etc., are still non-
relational since MANB's participation is not explicitly called for. Once MANB's 
participation is required, whether as the object of MANA's anger, the target of 
MANA's stick, or simply as a co-constituent of the picture, the characterization is 
relational. I repeat here that relational characterizations should be explicit (§ 1.2), 
and may only involve represented elements. Since the classification of relational 
characterization at this stage attempts to parallel that proposed for non-relational 
characterization, above all with reference to the degree of visual motivation, the 
points to be made need not be laboured a second time. 
1) Relational characterizations may be elementary; for example, MANB 'IS 
TALLER', 'THINNER', and 'LESS WRINKLED THAN', MANA. That is, they 
may consist in the comparison of attributes which non-relationally would be 
considered elementary (TALL, THIN, WRINKLED). They may also consist in 
a limited number of "inference-neutral" (WITH), and more obviously spatial 
(BEHIND, BESIDE, etc.), relations; and in the recognition of certain relative 
physical postures (PACING EACH OTHER). 
2) Relational characterizations may be static inferences; for example, MANB 'IS 
YOUNGER AND HEALTHIER THAN', or 'WATCHING' MANA. Once again, 
we should be alert to the possibility of culture-specific inferences. 
3) Relational characterizations may be temporal inferences; for example, MANB 
'IS SWISHNG AN UMBRELLA AT', or 'TALKING TO', MANA. Although the 
postures necessary for the latter need differ only slightly, a temporal 
remainder is required nonetheless. 
4) Relational characterizations may be static assertions; for example, 
MANB 'IS THE SON OP' MANA; MANB 'TOLERATES', 'FEARS', 'STRUCK', 
'IS ABOUT TO STRIKE' MANA. 
5) Relational characterizations may be temporal assertions; for example, MANB 
is 'PERSISTENT IN CHASING' MANA. The characterization 'GIVING BACK', 
though inappropriate here, is also a temporal assertion. It is, I am 
convinced, practically impossible to judge the intended direction of many 
reversible pictured transactions (see, for example, Fran~ois de Troy's 
"Truth Unmasking (or is it masking?) Envy"). Since we are not concerned 
with any intended direction, and since one direction is as inferrable as 
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another, either may be an inference. It is the presupposition of sequentiality 
contained in "giving back" which renders it an assertion. 
6) Relational characterizations may beformal. As in §2.5 above, fonnal non-
representational comparisons, not properly tenned "characterizations" are 
also possible; for example, SMALLER and GREYER. With these are 
included the fairly basic BESIDE, THERE TOO, and even ABOVE, although 
the latter will depend upon the orientation of the paper. As with non-
relational characterization, if these fonnal descriptions are accompanied by 
clear hints of representation, they are reclassified as elementary 
characterizations. 
Obviously the interrelations considered above are comparatively straightforward in 
that, whether "relata" refers to repraesentata or to delineated units, there are, in each 
case, only two of them. It is not difficult to see how matters may be complicated; 
either by the introduction of further delineated units, or by the reintroduction of one 
of the relata. A strategy we might propose for dealing with such responses as 
'MANA IS ABOUT TO CHASTISE MANB FOR MANB'S ATTEMPT TO WREST FROM 
MANA HIS (MANA's) SEAT ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS', would take little 
account of either "anaphora" or "embedding", and would focus instead, simply 
upon the nwnber of delineated units involved; in this case: two. 
4 Integration 
All the relations considered above maintain the integrity of the individual constituent 
picture. MANA may be JABBING HIS STICK AT MANB; he may be a JEALOUS 
RIVAL, a FATHER, or an ENRAGED EMPLOYER, with respect to MANB; but in none 
of these instances does the characterization overstep the boundaries of either 
delineated unit; MANA does not cease to be, however deviantly, in a one to one 
correspondence with the basic unit A. We shall tenn the type of relational response 
described in §3 an "interrelation". 
Where a response portion corresponds to an anatomical unit which (spatially) 
includes two or more of those deemed basic, we shall speak of "integration". 
"Integrated" responses to figure 8 include 'COUPLE', 'MEN', 'PAIR', 'RIVALS' and 
even 'THE JONES FAMILY'. 
175 
4.1 Singular and plural integrations? 
It might be supposed that there are clearly two types of integration in evidence here; 
'COUPLE', 'PAIR' and 'FAMILY' being of one type; 'MEN' and 'RIVALS' another. 
The distinction between them might be formulated in terms of "singular" versus 
"plural", or "collective" versus "distributive", integrations. On the face of it, this 
seems a potentially significant contrast. The "singular integration" might be said to 
be more complex than the "plural integration", in so far as the former offers a new 
and intrinsically different unitary whole the import of which transcends the import 
of the integrated parts. 
I do not believe, however, that such a distinction may reasonably be upheld - the 
idiosyncrasies of "countability" in the English language alone (see Lyons 1968) 
should suffice to inhibit the attempt. Of course we may choose to disregard the 
relative consistency with which countability is encoded in a particular language. 
Instead we might concentrate upon the singularity or plurality of the individual 
response portion, perhaps incorporating in corroboration some notion of the 
"recoverability" of the integrated elements. Since MEN, for example, is pluralized, 
the respective integrities of MANA and MANB are still in evidence. FAMILY, on the 
other hand, is singular, and with its singularity comes the impossibility of 
recovering the integrated elements' original identities, other than in a purely 
intensional manner. Although this distinction has a certain plausibility, a closer 
examination reveals problems. 
Imagine a picture in which a [man], a [suitcase], a [guitar], a [birdcage] and a [golf-
bag] are delineated as distinct constituent repraesentantes. The following responses 
are offered: 
'MAN WITH HIS PROPERTY' 
'MAN WITH HIS PARAPHERNALIA' 
'MAN WITH HIS EFFECTS' 
'MAN WITH HIS POSSESSIONS' 
'MAN WITH HIS THINGS' 
'MAN WITH HIS CHATTELS' 
'MAN WITH HIS BELONGINGS' 
We might classify the portions 'PROPERTY' and perhaps 'PARAPHERNALIA' 
(,PARAPHERNALIUM'?) as singular integrations, which may be said to achieve a 
somewhat higher order of complexity than the plural integrations 'EFFECTS', 
'POSSESSIONS', 'THINGS', 'CHATTELS', and 'BELONGINGS'. But in the course of 
our attempting to recover the integrated elements underlying 'POSSESSIONS', 
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EFFECfS', etc., it becomes apparent that (unlike MEN = MANA + MANB above) 
only some of the presumably "corresponding" singular referents could possibly 
have been the conceptual ingredients used to construct the plural. 'POSSESSION' 
and (at a pinch) 'CHATTEL' may pass the test; while 'EFFECT', 'BELONGING', and 
'THING' do not. Thus the plural integration may also offer a new and intrinsically 
different unitary whole the import of which transcends the import of the integrated 
parts. 
Yet we have omitted the most important point: with the possible exception of 
'THINGS', these responses are practically synonymous with one another; each 
succeeds in integrating all the various bits of baggage, and there is certainly 
insufficient difference in import - even without the picture concerned - to merit 
their being differentiated in terms of visual motivation. Thus classification on the 
basis of singularity or plurality may entail classification purely on the basis of 
etymological or realizational accident, and it seems counter-intuitive that this should 
be understood to influence complexity. Consequently, 'COUPLE', 'PAIR', 'MEN', 
'FAMILY' and 'RW ALS' are all subsumed within a single level: that of integration. 
42 Integrated characterizations 
The distinction between integrations on the basis of "transcendent" or "non-
transcendent" import, however, seems a valid one, and if there is a sense in which 
this is felt to have been sacrificed on the basis of a single set of examples, this need 
not be so. Integration constitutes a level of analysis, and, like the two preceding 
levels, possesses a horizontal dimension as well as occupying a place on the 
vertical dimension of complexity (see figure 9). 
MEN belongs within "integrated labels" while 'RIVALS' and 'FAMILY', for 
instance, should be located within "inferred and asserted characterization". It is the 
increase in imaginative input, necessarily complementing a decrease in visual 
motivation, which accounts for any "transcendent" import imputed to 'RW ALS' and 
'FAMIL y' above. 
Ranking 'MEN' as a label alongside 'MAN', 'DOG' and 'LARUS ATRICILLA L.' 
does, however, call for some comment, since Linnaean taxonomies and the like 
have neither room nor use for plural suffixes, infixes, etc. Yet I do not think it 
would be entirely misleading to view the label as a conceptual analogue of Lyons' 
"semi-mass" noun (1968: 282). An observer might be said to register, through the 
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perception of shape alone, a certain quantity of, say, elephantine matter. The 
difference between 'ELEPHANT' ("safari" plural) and 'ELEPHANTS' (plural) is that 
only the latter, courtesy of the suffix -S, makes it explicit that the substance occurs 
in at least two perceptually distinct portions (cf. Quine 1971, 1974). 
It should be noted that the provision of examples within this section has been to 
some extent misleading in its exclusion of less obvious, but equally valid, 
integrations, for example: 
'THEY' and 'TWO' 
'THEY' and 'TWO' 
'PEOPLE' 
'CARRYING STICKS' 
'ARE WATCHING EACH 
OTHER' 
'USED TO BE GOOD FRIENDS' 
'SWISHING STICKS' 
'JONES FAMILY' 
in the absence of evidence of representation: 
formal integrated description 
in the presence of evidence of representation: 
elementary integrated characterization 
label 
elementary integrated characterization 
static inferred integrated characterization 
static asserted integrated characterization 
temporal inferred integrated characterization 
static asserted integrated characterization 
and that the options available to the viewer within representation may be 
summarized as follows: 
Figure 9 
+ f-( ------ visual motivation ) 
formal labels, and inferred and 
descriptions elementary asserted 
characterizations characterizations 
non-relational 
integrated 
interrelated 
5 The given revisited 
At the beginning of this chapter, *MAN* was proposed as the norm for figure 1. 
Though I hesitate to offer 'FISH EATING PEAR, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY PIECE 
OF SEAWEED' as an alternative representational correlate, the fact remains that MAN 
is only one of an infinite number of possibilities - however unlikely, unprecedented 
and unnameable those alternatives may appear to be. Since § 1, however, we have 
throughout seemingly abandoned the given in favour of the represented, as though 
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the assertion of *MAN* resolved all representational ambiguity. Nevertheless it 
should be apparent that ambiguity does not cease with the label, and that it is a 
particular interpretation of the represented infonnation which underlies many of the 
characterizations described above. 
For example, only by perceiving that mouth-like line on the man's face as a 
[mouth] may we describe him as FROWNING; only from a [frown] may we 
reasonably infer that he is ANGRY. The characterization INJURED would come as 
something of a surprise; and since there appears to be no elementary feature from 
which INJURED might be inferred, we should accord INJURED the status of "static 
asserted characterization". Were we instead to have seen that same line as a [rather 
nasty facial scar], SCARRED would become a valid "alternative elementary 
characterization". INJURED, then - its gratuitousness in this case undermined-
should be re-classified as an inferred characterization (and ANGRY perhaps as 
asserted). Thus, ostensibly dealing with represented infonnation, we seem once 
again to have been dealing with a particular interpretation of that infonnation: the 
given. 
Although the scar-alternative may seem altogether too far-fetched to warrant a 
reintroduction of the given at this point, further examples reveal ambiguity of a 
more conspicuous nature. 
5.1 Ambiguity and occlusion 
Take figure lOa. How should we cope with a response 'THIS MAN HAS NO LEGS'? 
It was observed in chapter V (§5.4.3) that the percept can withstand a certain 
amount of impoverishment of detail and represented occlusion, and that viewers 
tend (within limits) to interpolate an occluded "remainder". Yet this respondent 
would seem to have a point; lOa could indeed represent a man shorn off at the 
thigh. Here is a clear case of representational ambiguity at an elementary level. 
The inclusion of occluded portions within the spatial extension of a basic 
anatomical unit allows us a means of resolving this representational ambiguity. 
This in turn affords a systematic account of the characteristically "two-
dimensional" response in the test data, of which 'THIS MAN HAS NO LEGS' is an 
unexceptional (albeit hypothetical) example. Typically, these responses do not 
attest to the registration of represented occlusion; regularly containing references to 
FOOT-LESS, HAND-LESS, and OTHERWISE CURTAILED, figures. That is, 
infonnants respond as though the limits of the anatomical unit were delineated as in 
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figure lOb; the interpretation I prefer anticipating interpolation of a remainder as in 
figure lOe: 
Figure 10 
B 
a b c 
my preference in this respect, moreover, being another aspect of the given. 
There is still room for ambiguity, of course; and a wholly explicit formulation 
ought, rather like a set of encephalograms, to incorporate sliee-by-slice overhead 
views, side views, and perhaps also some indication of scale. Nevertheless, where 
a picture seems to me to incorporate neither occlusion of one delineated unit by 
another, nor "fade-out" (chapter VI, §7), I shall go only so far as to specify that the 
repraesentatum "has no structural abnormalities"; thus invalidating, within the 
given, the possibility that figure l's left hand protrudes from his stomach, or that 
he possesses three legs, the third of which is obscured by the other two. Should 
we be alerted to an unforeseen ambiguity in the course of the accounting, a more 
explicit formulation of the given will be undertaken. 
5.2 Ambiguity and delineation 
To maintain that a picture incorporates no occlusion of one delineated unit by 
another, however, is entirely, and circularly, dependent upon the (given) 
delineation itself. Classification of a response as relational or non-relational is 
likewise wholly at the mercy of this operation. With respect to figure 1 again, 
'HOLDING A STICK', for example, is only non-relational because the [stick] is 
included within the anatomical unit A. Had the [man] and the [stick] been 
delineated separately, 'HOLDING A STICK' would have been an interrelation, and 
'STICK' (alone) a non-relational response. 
On the basis of the original delineation, however, the response 'STICK' presents 
something of a problem. The solution necessitates the introduction of a further 
level of analysis: "fragmentation". 
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5.2.1 Fragmentation 
Responses which focus upon (spatially) smaller units than that deemed basic, with, 
moreover, no overt indication of their being integrated into the basic unit, will be 
said to be "fragmented". 
Figure 11 
formal labels elementary inferred 
and asserted 
fragmented 
non-relational 
integrated 
interrelated 
The responses to figure 8: 'SOME RATHER SMART TROUSERS, A STICK, A TIE, ... 
" and 'TORSO, LEGS, HEAD, .. .', for example, are fragmented responses (cf. 
chapter v, §7's response 'A BRICK, ANOTHER BRICK, ... '). Where a response 
does also feature the unit itself, that response is not fragmented but non-relational; 
for example, the responses 'A MAN WITH A STICK' (elementary), or 'HE'S VERY 
PROUD OF HIS SMART TROUSERS' (asserted). 
So long as the delineations are effected in a reasonably consistent (e.g. consistently 
intuitive) fashion, the subjectivity involved is no cause for concern. In some 
cases, however, it is convenient to opt for a counter-intuitive delineation. 
5.2.2 Chimera-anatomy 
The acknowledged subjectivity of the basic anatomical unit renders less problematic 
than might be anticipated the "anatomy" of those entities for which, so far as I am 
aware, there is no known precedent, real or traditionally fictional. Figure 12a (a re-
working of Picture 22c, reproduced in Appendix A), for example, shows the rather 
unlikely combination of man and beast, joined - or so I shall assert - vertically 
down the middle (figure 12c). 
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Figure 12 
a b c 
Since its redrawing into anatomical units may be peIformed purely visually, 
mechanically; certainly wordlessly, this is easily achieved. I may readily delineate 
the unit as in figure 12b. The difficulties consist, rather, in labelling the entity, and 
in specifying its taxonomic credentials. 
Common or garden mythical beasts earn themselves names through their sporadic 
appearances if not in the street at least in legend. "Satyr", for instance, refers to 
(roughly) half a goat/half a man; "centaur", to (even more roughly) half a horse/ 
half a man. But no name springs to mind for the entity composed of half a 
man/half a padlock which features in the Peruvian government's Poster 5 
(Appendix C); and, though one might imagine the Minotaur to look something like 
figure 12a, 'MINOTAUR' is surely not a reasonable response to expect in rural Peru. 
Centaurs and satyrs do, however, provide the solution to the chimera problem. 
Figure 13 
a b c 
Were we to delineate figure 13a as in figure 13b, and subsequently to assert the 
norm *CENTAUR*, the response 'HALF A MAN/HALF A HORSE' would constitute a 
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fragmentation. Fragmentation, however, is only the inverse of integration. By 
asserting, rather, *MAN* and *HORSE* as norms for figure 13c's units A and B 
respectively, 'CENTAUR' becomes an integration, fully on a par with 'PROPERTY', 
'CROWD' and 'MEN' in §4 above, in terms of its correspondence to more than one 
basic unit. 
5.3 Swnmary 
We have attempted in the course of this chapter to provide a framework for the 
classification of responses to pictures in terms of their visual motivation and 
complexity. In §5 above, we acknowledged that ambiguity within the represented 
persists beyond the label level, and that the subjectivity involved in resolving that 
ambiguity has repercussions for the status of a response in terms of both visual 
motivation and complexity. In order to distinguish (1) those response portions 
bearing an unacceptable correspondence with the represented information (that is, 
under any conceivable representational reading, and at any representational level of 
analysis) from (2) those which, while not inconsistent with the visual information 
available, bear an unacceptable correspondence with the given, we shall term the 
former: "counter-indicated" interpretations; and the latter "counter-justified" 
interpretations. 
The six general response types listed in § 1.3 merit repetition with the appropriate 
modification: 
1) those which provide no evidence of a representational interpretation, and 
which do not relate constituent elements; that is,formal non-relational 
descriptions; 
2) those confined to the given, without relating constituent elements; that is, 
labels and elementary non-relational characterizations; 
3) those which offer justifiable1.deviations from the given, without relating 
constituent elements; that is, true non-relational characterizations; 
4) those which, while relating constituent elements, provide no evidence of a 
representational interpretation; that is/ormal relational descriptions; 
5) those confined to the given, while relating constituent elements; that is, 
elementary relational characterizations; 
6) those which offer justifiable deviations from the given, and which relate 
constituent elements; that is, true relational characterizations. 
1 Note that "justifiable" has now acquired a more specific sense than § 1.3. 
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With the incorporation of a few numerical mnemonics, figure 11 now provides us 
with the bones of a "score-sheet" (figure 15) with which to begin the task of rating, 
in terms of their deviation and their complexity, verbal responses to pictures. 
Figure 15 
o fragmented 
1 non-relational 
2 integrated 
3 interrelated 
o 
formal 
6 The limits of representation 
1 
labels 
2 
elementary 
02 
12 
22 
32 
3 
inferred 
and asserted 
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But we are a long way from any of the communicative potential of the picture 
envisaged in chapter I. Given the following pictures: 
a) [a man with a structurally abnormal eye]; 
b) [a uniformed man, his foot poised near woman]; 
c) [a bearded man laying hands on a man with a crutch]; 
we can account for the responses: 
1) 'THE MAN WITHOUT THE SAFETY VISOR HAS AN EYE INJURY'; 
2) 'A POLICEMAN IS KICKING A WOMAN'; 
3) 'A BEARDED MAN IS HEALING A CRIPPLE'; 
but we have, as yet, no way of accounting for the following: 
4) 'WEAR YOUR SAFETY VISOR AND AVOID EYE INJURIES'; 
5) 'POLICEMEN KICK WOMEN'; 
6) 'CHRIST HEALS THE SICK'. 
The question is whether our ability to deal only with the first set is simply a 
consequence of the inadequacy of the framework adopted; or whether it points to a 
deficiency within representation itself. 
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I shall argue briefly for the latter, although it brings seriously into question the 
status of the picture as a medium of communication. 
6.1 Repraesentatum or repraesentans? 
A fundamental criterion for communication is the non-identity of signifer and 
signified (see, for example, Mulder and Hervey 1980; Martinet 1980; Eco 1976). 
As facets of a picture, we proposed, on the one hand, a realized repraesentans -
paper, celluloid, or whatever; and, on the other, a real or hypothetical experiential 
correlate (chapter v, §2.l). This seems straightforward enough. Nevertheless, it 
is still not clear that the criterion of non-identity is satisfactorily fulfilled in the 
picture, and that signifier and signified are sufficiently distinct to be termed separate 
entities (Martinet 1973; Hervey 1982). 
In film, to begin with a somewhat peripheral example, this confusion is particularly 
marked (Monaco 1981). The tendency offilm-goers is to become so involved in 
the spectacle, psychologically speaking, that they treat the image on the screen not 
as a representation of reality, but as a presentation of an illusory reality 1 (Hervey 
1982; Eisenstein 1949; Bazin 1967; Arnheim 1958). It is this which leads Hervey 
to speak of a film's "subject-matter" (1982: 234), rather than its "signified" (cf. 
Metz 1974; Monaco 1981)2, and to liken film perception to direct visual perception 
(Hervey 1982: 242). That is to say, because we are prepared to accept the filmic 
image as real, it loses, to a great extent, its significatory capacity. 
In chapter II, the perception of non-photographic pictures was also likened to direct 
visual perception. True, they lack the photographic image's "quality of credibility" 
(Bazin 1967; Metz 1974); the stylized [man] is rarely mistaken for a real man. But, 
by our account, since the [man] possesses sufficient essential visual features to 
evoke a particular percept, visually speaking, it is a man nonetheless. The 
reduction in realism, therefore, seems not necessarily to have entailed an increase in 
significatory capacity. 
Here, we come face to face with the possibility that in naming and describing the 
"referent", all we are really doing is naming and describing the realized 
1 Although there are many ways in which film may differ from reality (jump-cutting, slow 
motion, dissolves, etc.), and although a film's claim to "art" may depend upon such filmic effects 
(Arnheim 1958), for the viewer, the illusion persists. 
2 It should be noted, however, that for film theorists the sense of "signified" is not infrequently 
that of Barthesian "signification", rather than that of S aussurean "signified" (see ,for instance, 
Metz 1974: 98, footnote). 
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repraesentans; that is, face to face with the possibility that the repraesentans is the 
repraesentatum, and that it "indicates" only its own identity. The triviality of such 
"indication" (Mulder and Hervey 1980; Hervey 1982) ought to disqualify the 
picture from the status of index. 
Hervey's criticisms, though levelled at film, are, through our espousal of the 
equivalence of optical information, also levelled at us: 
"If we call the relationship between what is projected on the screen and the portrayed subject-matter 
a relationship of 'signification', we are only one small step away from saying that the relationship 
between a real action perceived by the senses and a real action conceived by the mind is also a 
relationship of 'signification'. In view of diegesis, the psychological basis of 'interpreting' what is 
projected on the screen is virtually the same as that of interpreting the events that really happen 
around us. There is nothing 'sign-like' in this interpretation - consequently 'signification', 
'signifier' and 'signified' (concepts specifically designed to make sense only in the context of 
'signs') are wholly inept when applied in the context of films" (Hervey 1982: 238-9). 
The photographic still (a valid picture (chapter v, §2.2.3», however, seems to 
escape this censure by treading a middle path. It is not sufficiently realistic as to 
present an illusory reality; while not sufficiently unrealistic as to lose touch with 
reality. A photograph of Sophia Loren, moreover, is an entity entirely and 
unambiguously distinct from Sophia Loren herself. Even if the photographed 
individual is unknown to us, it seems reasonable to suppose that such an individual 
exists. It is presumably on this basis that photographs are admissible as evidence 
in a court of law. Here, at any rate, is a picture which refers; a picture which 
denotes. 
62 Pictorial reference? 
Goodman, for one, would seem to think so. 
"A picture that represents [ ... ] an object refers to and, more particularly, denotes it. 
Denotation is the core of representation" (Goodman 1976: 5). A picture of the 
Duke of Wellington, for example, represents the Duke of Wellington (ibid.: 28); a 
picture "of' Pickwick, on the other hand, does not represent Pickwick since there is 
no Pickwick to represent (ibid.: 21). The ontologically ambiguous use of "of" in 
both cases - a quirk of the English language -leads Goodman to substitute for 
"picture of Pickwick": "Pickwick-representing-picture", and to contrast this with 
"picture of the Duke of Wellington"; the latter picture denotes the Duke of 
Wellington (ibid.: 28); the former denotes nothing (ibid.: 23)1; all that "Pickwick-
1 That is to say, the denotation class is empty. 
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representing-picture" specifies is what kind of picture it is (ibid.: 22). "A picture 
must denote a man to represent him, but need not denote anything to be a man-
representation" (ibid.: 25). 
Obviously the distinction Goodman has in mind bears comparison with the 
distinction between sense and reference (see, for example, Lyons 1977). A picture 
may have sense, but it need not have reference. I can distinguish between an angel-
picture and a unicorn-picture, just as I can distinguish between the sense of 
"unicorn" and that of "angel", without either's denoting anything (Lyons 1977: 
199). 
Goodman's distinction, then, between pictures which denote and pictures which do 
not denote is based upon the existence, or non-existence, of the entity concernedl . 
This need not, however, pertain only to fictions. He continues: "where we cannot 
determine whether a picture denotes anything or not, we can only proceed as if it 
did not - that is, confine ourselves to considering what kind of picture it is. Thus 
cases of indeterminate denotation are treated in the same way as cases of null 
denotation" (Goodman 1976: 26). So a picture "of' a man, in the event of our 
entertaining doubts as to that man's concrete existence, is only a man-representing-
picture - for all that men can be shown to exist. 
Here we arrive at the crux of the matter. Pictures, it seems to me, may only ever 
constitute x-representing-pictures, since we can never know, by any purely 
pictorial means, who or what, in specific individual terms, a picture is of 
Let us ask how this might be otherwise. For a picture to denote 2, it should 
constitute a kind of pictorial "referring expression": an expression which will 
"correctly identify for the hearer the individual in question: the referent" (Lyons 
1977: 177). In the verbal realm, individuals are usually identified by means of 
singular definite referring expressions (typically proper names ("Arthur Wellesley 
(lst Duke of Wellington)")), definite noun-phrases ("the man") and personal 
pronouns ("you", "I", etc.); and by means of indefinite specific referring 
expressions ("a man"; that is, a specific but unidentified man) (Lyons 1977). The 
function these share with elements such as "here", "over there", "now", 
"yesterday", etc., is that of "deixis": "the location and identification of persons, 
1 Compare Hervey's treatment of entities which are "not candidates for reality" such as Pickwick 
(1979, after Harre 1970a). "'Fictional' entities are valid denotata, provided that there is no logical 
absurdity implied by admitting them to the status of hypothetical entity" (Hervey 1979: 31). 
2 At this point in Goodman's text "denoting" and "referring to" are synonymous (1976: 5, note 
3). They appear, moreover, to be consistent with Lyons' "referring" in what follows. 
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objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in 
relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance 
and the participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at least one addressee" 
(Lyons 1977: 637). 
A picture, I should like to claim, is, by contrast, inherently non-referring in that it 
lacks any recourse to deixis. There is no pictorial equivalent to "Arthur Wellesley 
(1st Duke of Wellington)" (cf. chapter VI, §2.2)1. There is no pictorial equivalent 
to "here", "that man over there", "two days ago", "you", "I", etc. Indeed, even if 
the latter were available pictorially, so atypically is there any specific context-of-
(pictorial)-utterance2, that they would rarely be of use. Indeed we can only assume 
Goodman's picture of the Duke of Wellington to have been labelled "The Duke of 
Wellington"; its status otherwise being surely only that of man-wearing-a-Iarge-
medal-representing -picture. 
In short, there is nothing purely pictorial which might enable a viewer to pick out 
the actual referent from the class of potential referents. The most definite of these 
means of referring a picture may achieve is indefinite non-specific reference ("a 
man"; that is, "some man or other" (Lyons 1977)). This, however, smacks again 
of Goodman's x-representing-picture, a type of reference Lyons is obviously 
reluctant to term "reference" at all (cf. 1977: 178, 187, and 188). 
Still one might counter that the photograph refers indefinitely but specifically. 
This, however, is only possible through a consideration of its mode of production, 
rather than its mode of interpretation; that is, as a natural index, not as a picture. It 
will be remembered, moreover, that the causal nature of the photographic process is 
precisely that aspect of the photograph's being disregarded in order to justify its 
picturehood (chapter V, §2.2.3). The indefinite specific reference achieved by the 
photograph, then, is not pictorial reference. 
In fact there is one further type of reference a picture might achieve: "generic" 
reference. We shall postpone a discussion of this until chapter V. 
1 The supposed "pictorial" proper names we shall consider in chapter V signify extra-pictorially-
even so seemingly literal or direct a signification as CHIEF WEARS-THE-FEATHER rendered 
by a man-wearing-a-feather-representing-picture (Gelb 1952: 40). 
2 Of course, I may draw a cruel caricature in the margin of my lecture notes, and show it to my 
neighbour, with a nudge and a significant glance towards the person on the dais. I should hazard, 
however, that such a situation is exceptional. 
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As a means of communication, then, representation is curiously detached and 
uninformative. For a picture to have anything general, or anything specific, to say, 
it must transcend not only the boundaries of the given; nor even the boundaries 
determined by the inferrable and the assertable; it must, as it were, transcend itself. 
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I Introduction 
CHAPTER VITI 
Beyond Representation 
Chapter VII was concerned with the variety of interpretation within representation. 
This chapter attempts a classification of those instances where an interpretation 
offered is counter-indicated by the given, and cannot be explained in terms of a 
valid representational alternative. 
The response to figure lc: 'FOX', for instance, is counter-indicated. lc is not a 
picture of a fox. Neither 'COURAGE' nor 'PEUGEOT', moreover, in response to 
figure Id, is accounted for within representation; 'PEUGEOT' through counter-
indication, and 'COURAGE' through its failure ever to qualify as a representational 
option. 
There is a sense, however, in which we would not wish to deny that there is, in 
each of the above, some connection, or conceptual link, between picture and 
response. Indeed, the response is unlikely to be wholly arbitrary (cf. chapter 11), 
and thus its rationality may to some extent be "retraced". The limits to retraceability 
are consequent on practical feasibility (see §5.2, for example); and on the 
questionable validity of the assumption that the encoder's route in effecting any 
such link will be mirrored in the process of interpretation. These pitfalls 
notwithstanding, it is the aim of this chapter to provide a framework for the 
classification of types of conceptual link in an effort to account for responses such 
as those above. 
The first point to be made is that, with few exceptions, the significations we are 
concerned with do not substitute for representation; they function via representation 
(§2). We examine next the possibility of achieving a classificatory framework 
through a second application of the typology of indices (§3). The necessarily 
looser structure which results leads us to a modification which incorporates a 
fundamental distinction adopted from the rhetoric of "Ie groupe~" (Dubois et ai. 
1970): the distinction between modes of analysis "TI", and "1" (§4). This 
adoption, not, in retrospect, wholly alien to the discussion so far, facilitates a 
classification of visual equivalents to figurative tropes; tailored to integrate visual 
motivation as a fundamental factor. 
First, then, a look to see how signification functions via, rather than as an 
alternative to, representation. 
2 Signification: alternative or successor? 
Communication, we recall, comes about through a correlation between x and y, 
where x indicates, or acts in the capacity of conveying, y (chapter v, §2). 
We arrived at a classification of visual indices into four categories: 
1) wholly conventional indices; 
2) wholly natural indices; 
3) indices understood by virtue of a visual resemblance; 
4) motivated indices understood by virtue of convention 
The third category was that adopted in our definition of "picture". 
In the course of the discussion, figure 1 b, for example, was disqualified as a 
picture of a swimming pool (chapter v, §2.2.I), although it is indeed SWIMMING 
POOL which is 
Figure 1 
• 
< • a b c d 
customarily signified. We opted instead for the pictorial interpretation PERSON 
DIVING. We also rejected figure Ia (chapter v's figure 11) as a picture of a person, 
figure Ic as a picture of a fox, and figure Id as that of a (Peugeot) car. We did not, 
however, deny anyone its status as a picture; but pointed, rather, to the failure of 
each to signify, solely through a visual resemblance, the supposed repraesentatum. 
To keep in mind the distinction between representation and (potential) further 
signification, let us, for convenience, notate any such supposed, or counter-
indicated, repraesentatum "SWIMMING POOL b", for example. 
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A repraesentans such as figure 1 b may ultimately rely upon knowledge of a 
convention for the construal of its particular meaning. But it is not entirely 
conventional; there is, courtesy of the repraesentatum, a degree of "guessability" 
absent from a (context-independent) encounter with a wholly unfamiliar word. 
Thus, viewers who in ignorance hazard the significations TAP-DANCING CLASS b, 
or NO SEATS AVAILABLE b, would be wrong; yet, in away, "less wrong" than 
those who propose FREE RANGE EGGS b, or DOUBLE-DECKER BUSES USE REAR 
ENTRANCEb. 
Indeed, if there exists a genuine picture, the intended (further) signification of 
which is entirely unrelated to its repraesentatum, I have yet to unearth one (but see 
§3.4). This is not altogether surprising. On the one hand, the encoder who 
bypasses the invaluable mnemonic quality inhibits the potential efficiency of an 
index; counter-productive, surely, in any user-friendly communicative process. On 
the other, even where no link is intended (the implausible but possible ® ~ 
SKATING PROHIBITEDb, for example), one is almost inevitably forged in 
interpretation, however innocuous the repraesentans, and however mysterious and 
bizarre any resultant metaphor. In the absence of a very well ingrained 
"fossilization" of meaning (§ 3.3 below), such significations do not constitute an 
alternative to representation; they presuppose representation. Thus the 
significations: 
[booted foot] ~ (WHOLE) PERSON b, 
[person diving] ~ SWIMMING POOL b, 
[sly man] ~ FOX b, 
and [heraldic lion rampant] ~ (PEUGEOT) CAR b 
are mediated, respectively, by the repraesentata BOOTED-FOOT, PERSON DIVING, 
SLY MAN, and HERALDIC LION RAMPANT. Yet it is neither the repraesentans 
[person diving] nor the repraesentatum PERSON DIVING which signifies SWIMMING 
POOLb; the representation [person diving] ~ PERSON DIVING, in its entirety, 
functions as a "secondary indicator": 
I [person diving] ~a PERSONDIVING I ~b SWIMMINGPOOLb 
Secondary signification, therefore, builds upon representation: 
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"tertiary" signification upon secondary (cf. Barthes 1982; Hjelmslev 1961): 
II [xl ~'x ~by ~'z 
"n_ary" signification upon "n-I_ary". Henceforth I shall use the term "n_ary" for 
any significatory stage following upon representation. Each stage presupposes the 
former to some extent in that the output of one operation continues the process as 
the input for the next. 
3 A characterization of "~ b " 
The arrow " ~ a " stands for the relationship of representation. The arrow " ~ b ", 
unconstrained by representational criteria, affords a far greater degree of freedom 
both in encoding and in interpretation. There are, however, recognizably different 
brands of freedom. With a view to distinguishing between types of conceptual 
link, a reapplication of the criteria outlined in our typology of indices (chapter v, 
§2) yields a classification of n-ary indices of sorts: 
Figure 2 
"primary" indices understood by virtue of n-ary indices 
~~~~~~//////////////// 
wholly natural natural / causal links ////////////////////// ////////////////////// ////////////////////// 
natural 
motivation visual resemblance motivated 
motivated conventional 
////////////////////// 
other ////////////////////// ////////////////////// ////////////////////// 
////////////////////// 
////////////////////// 
convention ////////////////////// ////////////////////// ////////////////////// 
////////////////////// 
////////////////////// 
wholly conventional convention ////////////////////// ////////////////////// ////////////////////// 
Such a classification is by no means satisfactory in itself, capable of distinguishing 
only the most general types of conceptual link. Nevertheless, it provides us with a 
point of departure. 
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3.1 N-ary natural indices 
To illustrate the second application of the criteria outlined in chapter II, let us 
reconsider another failed picture-candidate with a seemingly straightforward 
secondary signification: figure 3d (chapter v's figure Id). 
Figure 3d was, in chapter V (§2.2), classed as a natural index, since no element of 
convention, it was claimed, was needed to explain the connection between signal 
and information. A re-examination of figure 3d, however, reveals it to be only a 
picture of a natural index; [tyre track] may not signify, by representation alone, 
CAR (HAS PASSED THIS WAY) b, or even WHEEL b - merely TYRE TRACK. 
Subsequent treatment of [tyre track] ~ TYRE TRACK as, itself, indicator, rather 
than (representational) indication, however, yields what may be termed an "n-ary 
natural index". 
I [tyre track] ~ TYRE TRACK ~ CAR b 
We might classify similarly figure 3's remaining components: 
Figure 3 
a 
o 
o 
b 
0···· . .. .. ~ . ..... . ... . .............. ... . 
c d 
where the representation [lightning] ~ LIGHTNING signifies THUNDER b; [cloud] ~ 
CLOUD signifies RAIN b, and so on. The arrow " ~ b ", however, is still not 
adequately characterized since the relationship between the representation 
[lightning] ~ LIGHTNING, and THUNDER b is manifestly not one of cause to effect. 
3.1.1 Problems with n-ary natural indices 
Precedence and constant conjunction do not constitute an adequate definition of 
"cause"; day does not cause night (nor vice versa), and, whereas excessive 
sunbathing may cause skin cancer, it does not always cause skin cancer. If x 
appears to be in constant conjunction with y, whether or not x may be considered 
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the cause of y will depend upon x's status as a necessary, or as a sufficient, 
condition for the occurrence of y. The passing of an equine is a sufficient 
(although not a necessary) condition for the imprints of which figure 3b is a 
representation. Cloud, on the other hand, is a necessary condition for rain; if there 
is rain, cloud is also present. But the presence of cloud does not guarantee that of 
rain. Other conditions, such as a certain barometric pressure, a certain wind speed, 
the fact of gravity, etc. (conditions which we might not normally term causes), are 
also necessary. Where all ofthese are present, rain invariably follows. Together, 
then, they constitute sufficient condition for the presence of rain, that is, the cause 
of rain (Hospers 1967, after John Stuart Mill). 
In daily life, however, we tend to restrict our attribution of cause to one condition; 
either because it is that which immediately precedes the event in question (the cause 
of rain on a particular occasion is more likely to be understood to be a drop in the 
wind speed than the fact of gravity); or that which constitutes a divergence from the 
backdrop of normality (the cause of my stomach upset is taken to be the rancidity of 
the beefburger, not my carnivorousness); or that which is perceived to play the 
major part in bringing about the event in question (for the Hopi, there is a relation 
of cause and effect between the Thunderbird and thunder (Adam 1949)) (Hospers 
1967; Harre 1970a; Quine 1974). 
Thus the attribution of cause is problematic in even the most straightforward of 
examples. This combination of indeterminacy and idiosyncrasy, however, is not 
confined to the n-ary natural index; the classification of an entity as a (primary) 
natural index is also subject to experience, belief system, and the priorities of the 
moment. Reservations such as the above, therefore, ought not to deny the n-ary 
natural index a place in our classification of n-ary indices. Nevertheless, the 
question of its specific location within that framework seems unresolved. The 
problem concerns not the relationship between the concrete phenomena underlying 
the repraesentatum and the n-ary signified, but that between the representation and 
the n-ary signified themselves. 
That is, while the relationship understood to hold between a concrete physical 
instance of lightning and a corresponding concrete physical instance of thunder is 
one of cause and effect (or of co-occurrence), that between the representation 3a 
and the signification THUNDER b implies no genuine causality, although the two are 
closely associated. Thus, in n-ary signification, the link ceases to have that 
"automatic" quality which would lay the true natural index open, at least in 
principle, to scientific investigation. Once we admit that we are no longer dealing 
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with natural phenomena themselves, but with representations and conceptions of 
natural phenomena, the link between LIGHTNING and THUNDER b is no more natural 
than that between CUP and SAUCER b, or between PERSON DIVING and SWIMMING 
POOL b; the link between U and EQUINE b no more natural than that between U and 
LUCK b. To maintain as much would be to hold that cause and effect in nature is 
mirrored by cause and effect in thought. 
In fact, we need not claim that figure 3c causes rain, and 3a thunder; or that figure 
3d was caused by a tyre, and 3b by a passing equine. Nor need we claim that, for 
example, THUNDER is caused by LIGHTNING (each a single real or hypothetical 
experiential correlate); but simply that the relationship understood to /wId between a 
concrete physical instance of lightning and a corresponding concrete physical 
instance of thunder is one of cause and effect (or of co-occurrence). The line of 
thought, then, undertaken upon exposure to figure 3a, may be one which (without 
implying any genuine causality) selects from lightning's domain that phenomenon 
with which it is (without perceptible integrity) most closely associated, namely, 
thunder: 
[lightning] -+ UGHTNING -+ THUNDER b 
In conclusion, although classification of a picture as, even potentially, an n-ary 
natural index necessitates a clearer definition of "cause" than I am able to provide, 
this problem is no more insurmountable than it is within a classification of primary 
indices. Nevertheless, there are reasons for doubting whether a natural indexical 
relation, posited between a representation and a secondary signified (each 
thoroughly divorced from the empirical investigability of the concrete phenomena), 
warrants, within a classification of n-ary indices, that singularity of position it 
merited first time around. While we should like to maintain the "cause and effect" 
pigeonhole, it is perhaps better subsumed within "n-ary motivated indices", as an 
"n-ary motivated index, understood by knowledge of a natural relation", or as the 
rather anticlimactic "picture of a natural index". 
Figure 2's framework, therefore, must be revised; i.e. 
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Figure 4 
not: 
"primary" 
pictures 
n-ary indices 
natural 
motivated 
conventional 
3.2 N-ary (wholly) conventional indices 
but: 
"primary" n-aryindices 
natural 
motivated 
pictures other 
conventional 
An n-ary wholly conventional index is a representation which, treated as an 
indicator, conveys its indicated wholly by virtue of convention. For reasons 
already touched upon above, examples are not readily forthcoming. 
For the Langley cryptographer, however, whose rather primitive code-machine 
churns out the following: 
"~~CbCb ~L,l~ lW"I~Wvl'*~(}~" 
much may depend upon the arbitrariness (or "unguessability") of the alphabetic 
correspondences. 
Even so, to interceptors prepared to engage in a little trial and error, the message 
may be distinctly transparent. If the middle segment is decoded "THE" (an 
inevitable hypothesis, eventually?), subsequent insertion of the known letters into 
the remainder yields: "TExx THE xxExxxExT". In such a milieu, 
"PRESIDENT" is not an unlikely candidate for the third segment. Finally, since 
there exists no sensible English alternative for the remainder, the interceptors may 
come up with "TELL THE PRESIDENT"; and they would be right. 
This guessability, however, stems from hypotheses as to what the message might 
mean; not from any connection between picture and letter. It involves a number of 
assumptions: that the message is in English; that there is a one to one 
correspondence between picture and letter; that the grammar and orthography are 
orthodox; that, given the source of the message, a certain topic is probable, etc; all 
of which have, in this case, proved correct. Such assumptions constitute, 
therefore, a fairly restrictive, though conjectured, context, divorced from which-
say, upon encountering a single component index: " 6d " - the best guess our 
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interceptors might manage is that the signification probably has little to do with 
PAIR OF SPECTACLES. 
Once assured of the validity of the analysis, the interceptor may remark that " ~ " 
is, perhaps coincidentally, a little like an upside-down "T"; that "lorry" (c:;:];) 
begins with an "L"; that "E" is for "egg" and a tortoise (~) lays eggs, and so 
on. Nevertheless, while any such aide-memoire may assist in learning what is in 
fact Apple Macintosh's "Cairo" font, there appears to be no consistent key to, or 
motivation/or, the relationship between picture and alphabetic letter; this 
relationship is wholly conventional. Preceded as it is, however, by representation, 
that relationship is n-arily wholly conventional l . 
In fact, the n-ary wholly conventional index will be of little further concern to us 
since the conceptual link cannot, by definition, be retraced unless the (necessarily 
pre-established) code is known to the retracer. It does not provide an explanation 
for the wholly random guess, however arbitrary; although the two share a lack of 
motivation, the wholly random guess is not conventional. 
3.3 N-ary motivated indices understood by convention 
If we accept that any two entities will have something in common, that is not to say 
that we must, other than in the rather exceptional cases above, forgo convention in 
the secondary index. On the contrary, even where there exists what may be a fairly 
self-evident conceptual link (as with PERSON DIVING ~ SWIMMING POOL) this need 
not prevent that link's being understood by virtue of convention. The Highway 
Code, for example, contains many such indices, sufficiently obviously motivated to 
jog the memory of the seasonal driver, but not sufficiently explicit, as 
representations, to convey their particular meaning. 
But it is not confined to indices with highly codified conventions. All kinds of 
visual cliche, from the ubiquitous [dove] for PEACE b, and [skull and crossbones] 
for DEATH b or DANGER b, to the cinematic tropes [wilting flowers] for LOST 
MAIDENHOOD b and [falling calendar pages] for THE PASSING OF TIME b (Monaco 
1981) fall within the category "n-ary motivated indices understood by 
1 It should be noted that individuals who attain complete "fluency" in such an alphabet may cease 
to register the initially pictorial nature of the index; registering, 
that is: ~ ~ E rather than: I ~ ~ TORTOISE I ~ E b 
Only then, and only as regards those individuals, might the component indices be classified as 
(primarily) conventional, rather than representational. 
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convention"!. What these relatively fossilized significations have in common is 
that an n-ary signified, mSTICE b, for example, may be indicated without any 
thought for what it and a set of scales have in common (Brooke-Rose 1958). 
Figure 5 
This is not to say that representation plays no part in the process; on the contrary: 
I [scales] -+ SCAUS I -+ JUSTICE b 
merely that the motivation underlying the n-ary link - perhaps a shared feature: "fair 
decision following objective consideration of relative values" - need not be 
pondered anew at each exposure to figure 5. The link is much more immediate; that 
is, the motivated secondary index understood by convention short-circuits the 
process of conceptual linking (Dyer 1982; Vestergaard and Schr!2Sder 1985; Johns 
1984), inhibiting the imagination and the free-play of association, except, of 
course, where a viewer has no prior knowledge of the relevant convention. 
The context in which any such index occurs may favour an imaginative 
interpretation over a conventional one. If the index features in a B&B guide, or on 
a road sign, the chances are that a viewer will opt for the conventional signification. 
These indices are, however, primarily, pictures. Thus in other, less formalized, 
contexts they may surrender their conventional n-ary interpretation in favour of a 
representational reading. Alternatively, a conventional motivated secondary index 
may confer something of its symbolism on to other elements within the same 
picture (cf. chapter VI, §2.1). Figure 6, for example, may be interpreted 'A 
KNIGHT FIGHTING OFF A LION', or 'PEUGEOT MEETS WITH OPPOSITION'. A third 
possibility, 'A KNIGHT FIGHTING OFF A PEUGEOT' (in which the [knight] is 
interpreted representationally, the [heraldic lion rampant] n-arily), has a curious 
incongruity worthy of note. 
1 "Cliche". I should venture, is only an expression of the relatively tacit nature of the convention 
concerned. 
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Figure 6 
A measure of an n-ary signification's conventionalization might be its persistent and 
successful functioning in the absence of any immediately relevant context, and its 
failure to sustain alternative interpretations in a variety of different contexts. These 
two conditions fulfilled, however, the index should never been termed 
"representational" in the first place. 
3.3.1 Summary 
There are a number of important and related points to be made on the basis of the 
discussion above. First: it is of no consequence whether the motivation for the link 
between representation and n-ary signified in the examples considered here 
involves common attributes, or common contextual association, or whatever. What 
matters is that they are all understood by virtue of convention. They will all be 
subsumed, therefore, within a single category: "n_ary motivated indices understood 
by virtue of convention". 
Second: we should be alert to the possibility that a convention may be ultimately 
responsible for a seemingly non-conventional n-ary link. So far as is feasible, 
moreover, we should verse ourselves in the repertoire of likely candidates. This 
caveat parallels that of chapter VII (§2.3) with respect to culture-specific inferred 
characterization. 
Finally, in maintaining that a motivation-dependent reconstruction of the n-ary link 
may be inappropriate to these instances, we realize the counter-productivity of 
using n-ary motivated indices understood by convention to bring to light the 
processes involved in imaginative responses. It is true that we can reconstruct a 
motivation for the link between [scales] ~ SCALES and JUSTICE b. The claim that 
this is not a process ordinarily undertaken, however, runs the risk of undermining 
the role of motivation in any n-ary motivated index understood by virtue of the 
motivation. Somewhat perversely, however, I shall continue occasionally to 
employ n-ary motivated indices understood by convention ([lion] ~ LION 
signifying COURAGE b, for example) to clarify the nature of a non-conventional n-
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ary link: (say, [moose] ~ MOOSE signifying HYPOCRISY b), simply in order not to 
clutter questions of rationality with questions of plausibility. In such cases, the 
conventionality should be understood, purely for the purposes of explication, to 
have been abstracted. 
3.4 Summary of n-ary typology of indices 
Although chapter V's typology of (primary) indices translates well enough on to an 
n-ary level, it provides only a very crude framework for the classification of n-ary 
indices: 
"primary" n-ary indices 
natural 
Figure 7 pictures motivated other 
conventional 
conventional 
Natural n-ary indices, visual cliches, and the elusive wholly conventional picture 
are readily dealt with. Residual n-ary significations, however, must all be 
subsumed within "other"; indeed, the majority of the examples with which we 
began this chapter belong in this category. Yet what do [foot] ~ FOOT signifying 
PERSON b and [man] ~ MAN signifying FOX b, for instance, have in common other 
than their exclusion from both natural and conventional motivated categories? If we 
wish to differentiate them, a new strategy is in order. 
4 A rhetorical approach 
In the language of rhetoric, distinguishing between types of n-ary link in 
I [foot] ~ FOOT I ~ PERSON band I [man] ~ MAN I ~ FOX b 
presents little problem; the first is clearly a synecdochic relationship of part to 
whole; the second a metaphorical relationship. 
Traditionally, metaphor is "the application of a strange term either transferred from 
the genus and applied to the species or from the species and applied to the genus, or 
from one species to another or else by analogy" (Aristotle 1927: 81), where 
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"application of a strange term" is understood as the application of a term to an 
object or action to which it is not literally or conventionally applicable (Black 
1962). Metaphors, in fact, seem to resist strict logical analysis (Levin 1977). Mr. 
Green, I may claim, is a fox. He is not really a fox, of course; he is a man. 
Metaphor consists in "saying one thing and meaning another" (Riffaterre 1978). 
Already there are promising hints of a parallel with counter-indication. 
Indeed, many of the visual cliches categorized above as n-ary motivated indices 
understood by convention are commonly couched in rhetorical terms; a [crown] is a 
"metonymic sign" for SOVEREIGNTY b (Fiske and Hartley 1978); a [head] a 
metonym for IDEAS b (Johns 1984); a [foot] a synecdoche for a MAN b (Dyer 
1982); a [pince-nez] a synecdoche for SURGEON b (Eisenstein 1949); a [tiger] a 
metaphor for ESSO PETROL b (Vestergaard and Schrfllder 1985), etc. "Metaphorical 
representation", claims Johns, is a "viable strategy for visually communicating 
abstract information" (1984: 291). A rhetorical approach provides, moreover, a 
vocabulary with which to deal with some of the remaining types of n-ary 
signification. The disadvantage, however, is that this may seem something of a 
change of tack. 
In fact, semiotic and rhetorical approaches to n-ary pictorial signification are by no 
means incommensurable. What I propose is to begin by adopting a fundamental 
dichotomy from the vocabulary of the rhetoricians: the distinction between two 
modes of analysis: "I" and "n" (Dubois et al. 1970); and to incorporate these into 
the framework as follows: 
Figure 8 
"primary" n-ary indices 
n 
[part]-WHOLEb (natural) 
[whole]-PARTb 
pictures motivated [subordinate]-SUPERORDINATEb 
I [superordinate]- SUBORDINATE b 
conventional 
conventional 
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in which §3.1's n-ary natural index features as only one type of signification 
beginning "[part]-WHOLE h". The incorporation of II and L (and" © ", 
introduced in §7.5 below) into the scheme above by no means accounts for all 
residual types of counter-indication, but is an improvement on what we have so far. 
With the adoption of this dichotomy is abandoned finally any prospect of the tidy 
n-ary mirroring of the typology of primary indices originally envisaged. There are, 
however, the following compensations: a more illuminating range of accountable 
eventualities; and a not altogether untidy n-ary mirroring of both "specificity" 
(chapter III) and representation's vertical dimension: complexity (chapter VII, figure 
3). That is to say, a metaphorical excursion affords an alternative viewpoint from 
which to assess the remaining types of n-ary signification recognized. 
Nevertheless, the visual tropes sited bear redefmition in terms of the framework 
already proposed. 
Of Aristotle's four types of metaphor, the first and second constitute what is 
commonly called "synecdoche" (Brooke-Rose 1958), and it is with synecdoche that 
we shall be mainly concerned. 
4.1 Modes L and II 
Any object may be described in terms of the parts of which it is composed (for 
Sapir (1977), the "anatomical mode"; for Dubois et al. 1970, "mode II"). Bones, 
skin, internal organs, tail, legs, etc. are parts of a dog. The same object may also 
be described in terms of what Sapir calls its "class-membership" (but see below), 
or the "taxonomic mode" (for Dubois, "mode L"). Beagles, spaniels and 
chihuahuas are types of dog. The same object can be considered with regard to 
either set of relations. One or other of these modes is fundamental to any 
synecdochic process; the two terms involved are always hierarchically organized as 
regards one another, in a relation of either superordinate to subordinate, or part to 
whole. In either type of hierarchy, the term given will be more "general" or more 
"particular" than the term it replaces (Levin 1977). 
Two types of synecdoche are possible within either mode: "particularizing" and 
"generalizing" (Levin 1977, Dubois et al. 1970, Sapir 1977). There is considerable 
risk of confusion here since Dubois et a/. establish their terms "particularizing 
synecdoche" and "generalizing synecdoche" from the point of view of the encoding 
of the trope, whereas we are concerned, rather, with interpretation - that is, with 
decoding. Thus, where Dubois' poet (or picturer) particularizes, the reader (or 
viewer) must generalize; where the poet generalizes, the reader must particularize. 
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If we employ Dubois' tenninology there will persist in the course of the discussion 
an incongruity which cannot but be unhelpful. To reverse the terms, however, 
using "particularizing" where Dubois uses "generalizing" and vice versa, seems 
little better. Since the distinction is not unimportant to the classificatory framework 
ultimately adopted, the potential for ambiguity should be checked at the outset. 
Consequently, where the direction of the operation is relevant, I propose to use the 
following inelegant mnemonics (columns 1 to 4) which I hope will function 
satisfactorily from either standpoint: 
Dubois Sapir 1 2 3 4 
SpTI anatomical particularizing 'part' - WHOLEb [part] - WHOLEb 
SgTI anatomical generalizing 'whole' - PARTb [whole] - PARTb 
spr taxonomic particularizing 'sub' - SUPER b [sub] - SUPER b 
Sgr taxonomic generalizing 'super' - SUBb [super] - SUBb 
'"sub''' abbreviating "subordinate", and "'super'" "superordinate"; columns 1 and 
2 referring to verbal tropes; columns 3 and 4 to visual tropes; columns 1 and 3 
referring to the realized term, whether verbal (1) or pictorial (3); columns 2 and 4 
referring to the underlying signification, intended by the encoder, understood by 
the interpreter, or both. Thus [part]-WHOLE b, for example, refers to the processes 
involved in both encoding and decoding; that is both: 
WHOU b -+ 1 PART -+ [pa.rt] I and: 1 [pa.rt] -+ PART 1-+ WHOU b 
5 Anatomical synecdoche 
5.1 Verbal anatomical synecdoche 
a) 'pan'-wHOLE b 
For example, "I've six mouths to feed" substitutes for I'VE SIX BODIES TO FEED. 
Instances of 'part'-WHOLE b ("anatomical particularizing" synecdoche; "SpIT') are 
in abundance. Nevertheless, there are restrictions; not just any part will serve to 
evoke the whole. The chosen part must be distinctive; "legs" does not adequately 
differentiate animal bodies and other objects - say, tables. The chosen part must 
also emphasize aspects of the whole relevant to the context. In "six mouths to 
feed", "mouths" is involved in the eating process in a way that "ears" is not (Sapir 
1977). 
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b) 'whole'-PART b 
For example, "You've ruined the whole meal" substitutes for YOU'VE RUINED THE 
CROUTONS. The generalization in 'whole'-PART b ("anatomical generalizing" 
synecdoche; "SgII") must be of such a degree that it is notable, or else go 
unremarked. So long as croutons are considered a rather ornate and barely 
nutritious part of a meal, anatomical synecdoche is indeed in evidence; but, where 
an entire meal is to consist of, say, croutons and ketchup, the degree of 
generalization achieved in encoding will not be sufficiently remarkable to the hearer 
that it is apparent as a trope. 
The two terms involved in any visual anatomical synecdochic process also stand to 
each other in a relation of part to whole. As with its verbal parallel, two types of 
anatomical synecdoche result, one of which, however, is already accounted for 
within representation. 
5.2. Visual anatomical synecdoche {partJ-wHOLE b 
[part]-WHOLE b ("anatomical particularizing" synecdoche; "Sp II") accounts for the 
conceptual link between [foot] 4 FOOT (figure 9) and (WHOLE) PERSON b, and 
between [speedometer] 4 SPEEDOMETER (chapter II's figure Ig) and CAR b. 
I [foot] ~ FOOT I ~ PERSON b 
The constraints seen to operate within the equivalent verbal synecdoche will still be 
applicable; that is, the chosen part should be distinctive ([front seat] would not 
readily convey CAR b), and should emphasize aspects of the whole relevant to the 
context. Seeming exceptions to this last may occur as euphemisms if the whole to 
be conveyed is at all taboo (see §5.4. below). 
Provided that the spatial extension of the repraesentans is made explicit, [part]-
WHOLE b may be brought into line with chapter VII's characterization framework. 
Let A, in this example, correspond to *FOOT*. 
delinea ted: 
Figure 9 
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The response 'PERSON' transcends the boundaries of the delineated unit. In this 
respect, [part]-WHOLE b synecdoche may be likened to integration (chapter N, §4). 
Integration, however, required that the response portion correspond to an 
anatomical unit (spatially) including two or more of those deemed basic. In [part]-
WHOLE b synecdoche no second delineated unit constitutes the spatial extension (in 
this particular example, of course, there is no second delineated unit); [part]-
WHOLE b synecdoche integrates represented and unrepresented elements. This 
"plural" is to be distinguished (in principle) from a generic "plural" (§7). 
Thus [part]-WHOLE b will be said to constitute "n-ary integration". As with 
representational integration - though possibly at odds with many accounts of 
anatomical synecdoche (Kennedy 1982, for example) - the extension of the 
delineated unit need not be a contiguous extension, either on the paper or in reality 
(compare chapter IV's treatment of 'POSSESSIONS' (§4.1) and 'SATYR' (§5.2.2) 
above). All that is relevant, for our purposes, is that a response portion should 
transcend the boundaries of the delineated unit; to encompass, in (primary) 
integration, additional represented elements; in n-ary integration, additional 
unrepresented elements. Thus the response to figure 9 'FEET' may also be 
considered an instance of [part]-WHOLE b (but see §7 below on the "generic" 
account of 'FEET'). In this sense the tenns "part" and "whole" might be better 
rendered "less extensive" and "more extensive". 
5.3 Dispensing with [whole}-PART b 
The second type of anatomical synecdoche consists in the picturer's substitution of 
whole for part, and, ideally, in the viewer's corresponding inversion of the 
substitution. It is likely that [whole]-PART b is less frequently encoded than [part]-
WHOLE b, for the simple reason that a whole (or even a front projection of a whole) 
is often less readily depicted than a part. As with its verbal parallel, however, we 
may speak: of [whole ]-p ART b wherever the spatial extension of the represented 
unit includes that for which it potentially substitutes. Into Bugs Bunny's think-
bubble, for example, as he imagines the financial reward of some likely ruse, pops 
a vast pile of money; while the potential remuneration, realistically envisaged, may 
be only a couple of small coins in the foreground. The encoding of [whole]-PART 
b synecdoche may constitute, therefore, a type of visual exaggeration, appropriate 
to cartoons, and which may acquire, under the right circumstances, the highly 
persuasive quality to be found in the visual repertoire of the propagandist. A 
potential lack of clarity - namely, that it is not always apparent that only a part is 
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intended - may become a distinct advantage. In figure 10, a swastika-sleeved hand 
grasps what may be recognized as mainland Britain, "anchored" (Vestergaard and 
Figure 10 
delineated: 
SchrjiSder 1985) by the text, say, "Nazis parachute into East Anglia!" Here 
(disregarding the metaphorical grasping by the ungainly hand), [mainland Britain] 
substitutes for [East Anglia], while carrying with it a sense of "what if ... ". Note 
that text is required in order to inform the viewer of the synecdoche, even as the 
figure evokes possible consequences. 
1 [Britain] -+ BRITAIN 1-+ EAST ANGUA b 
Indeed, ambiguity will always accompany this visual trope, since representation of 
the whole necessarily entails simultaneous representation of the part; a [foot] 
spatially includes a [heel]; a [£1000] a [£1]. For this reason, the response to figure 
10, 'EAST ANGLIA' would not have been counter-indicated in the first place. This 
is not to say that this type of synecdoche may not have been incorporated into a 
picture; nor that its reverse may not have been achieved in interpretation. 
Confirmation of the occurrence of the latter - by no means impossible - would, 
however, require a degree of further questioning not undertaken with respect to the 
data for this study. 
In conclusion, [foot] ~ FOOT signifying HEEL b, may be said to consitute a valid 
instance of "n-ary fragmentation". To a hearer, however, the verbal response 
'HEEL b', is indistinguishable from [foot] ~ HEEL, verbalized as 'HEEL' (hence the 
sparsely dotted box in figure 11 below). For practical reasons alone, then, the 
single [whole]-PARTb synecdoche will not be considered further here; responses 
evidencing something of the sort being already dealt with as "(representationally) 
fragmented" responses (chapter VIT, §5.2.1). 
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Figure 11 
mode II representation n-ary signification 
fragmentation HEEL :IffiELb : -: -: -: -: -: -: -: -:. .......... 
~~~/~~//~~~/~//~////////~//// 
integrity FOOT /~////,/",/""",,///////// ///////////////////////////// ///////////////////////////// 
integration FEET PERSONb 
If synecdoche extended only to material "anatomy", as described above, we might 
have dispensed with the tropic digression; [whole]-PARTb being treated as 
"fragmentation"; and [part]-WHOLE b simply inserted into the framework ofn-ary 
indices as a separate category. In fact, under Sapir's account of what remains of 
synecdoche (see §6), there still seems little need, since, with the same accounting 
provisos, relevant response portions are already dealt with within "specificity" 
(chapter VI). The virtues of this particular trope, however, become apparent in the 
"double anatomical synecdoche". 
5.4 Double anatomical synecdoche 
"Double anatomical synecdoche" is simply the succession of one anatomical 
synecdoche by another. Having effected PERSON b via [foot] ~ FOOT ([part]-
WHOLE b), for example, an infonnant may leave it at that. Alternatively, PERSON b 
may be subjected to a further synecdoche; [whole]-PART b, or even a second 
[part]-WHOLE b; in principle, any synecdoche may follow any other. In practice, 
however, it is the complementary, or reverse, pairs which afford the most 
accountable, and the most rhetorically orthodox (see Dubois et al. 1970: 108), n-
ary significations. 
For example, [part]-WHOLE b synecdoche accounted for the conceptual link 
between [foot] ~ FOOT (figure 9) and (WHOLE) PERSON b: 
I [foot] -+ FOOT I -+ PERSON b 
The same could be said of [hand] (in figure 10 above, for instance): 
I [hand] -+ HAND I -+ PERSON b 
With a reversal of the latter, these may occur in succession: 
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II [fool] -+a FOOT I-+b PERSON 1-+' HAND 
"b" being [part]-WHOLE b; "e" being [whole]-PART b; that is, an integration 
followed by an "n-ary fragmentation" Admittedly, this is not very interesting; if the 
desired signification is HAND (figure 12b), why not simply draw a [hand]? Fair 
enough. But if the desired signification is taboo in any way (figure 12c), the 
double anatomical synecdoche affords a euphemistic (if in itself offensive) 
alternative. 
Figure 12 
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Even so, the double anatomical synecdoche seems limited in application. It should 
be remembered, however, that we envisaged above an interpretation of "whole" 
and "part" rather more cavalier than normal usage might dictate. It should also be 
remembered that the single synecdoche [part]-WHOLE b is said to constitute "n-ary 
integration"; and that, in integration, whether representational or n-ary, the 
extension of the delineated unit need not be a contiguous extension, either on the 
paper or in reality. With these points in mind, the scope of double anatomical 
synecdoche is considerably broadened (perhaps to the extent that the distinction 
between anatomical and taxonomic reconstructions begins to cloud). 
6 Taxonomic synecdoche 
The second type of synecdoche is "taxonomic" synecdoche (Sapir 1977), or "mode 
L" (Dubois et al. 1970), the significatory potential of which is heavily dependent 
upon what (again) is meant by "taxonomy". 
6.1 Verbal taxonomic synecdoche 
Wielded in the verbal realm, "taxonomic" synecdoche L accounts for those 
instances in which a superordinate term is used for a subordinate or vice versa. 
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Thus it may again be generalizing or particularizing, in that the term actually 
employed by the encoder will be more general or more particular than the term for 
which it substitutes. 
a) 'sub'-SUPER b ("taxonomic particularizing" synecoche; "SpI") 
For example, "He ate his artichoke and clam chowder Veronique" substitutes for 
HE ATE HIS SOUP. The significance of 'sub'-SUPER b will usually depend on the 
context. At a cookery convention, the discrimination above may be highly relevant, 
whereas, in other contexts, the use of such a trope may imply, say, "specialized 
knowledge" (think of James Bond, the connoisseur). 
b) 'super'-SUB b ("taxonomic generalizing" synecdoche; "SgI") 
For example, "What's in this stuff?" substitutes for WHAT'S IN THIS GOULASH? If 
the encoder's generalization is not sufficiently vague (stew - goulash), the terms 
will function as little more than synonyms. 
6.2 Visual strictly taxonomic synecdoche 
Following Sapir's understanding of "taxonomic" synecdoche, it might well be 
argued that we should disregard this as a viable visual trope, since those response 
portions for which it accounts are already treated within "specificity" (chapter VI). 
Mirroring the verbal trope, visual "taxonomic" synecdoche should be at the heart of 
the following four scenarios (1 and 2 being cases of [sub]-SUPER b; 3 and 4, cases 
of [super]-SUB b): 
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Figure 13 
a) 
Intended 
signified 
b) 
Substitution and 
representation 
c) 
Interpretation of 
representation 
d) 
Inversion of 
substitution 
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r~--~·---'r~--------~·--------~' r~--------·~-------'r~--~·----, 
1 MAMMAL b -+ DOG -+ [dog] I 
4 BEAGLE b -+ 
BEAGLE -+ [beagle] I 
MAMMAL -+ [mammal] 1 
DOG -+ [dog] 1 
[dog] -+ DOG I 
[beagle] -+ BEAGLE I 
[mammal] -+ MAMMAL 1-+ DOG b 
[dog] -+ DOG I -+ BEAGLE b 
Let us suppose that, in each case, I set out to signify a certain entity (a), but, feeling 
rhetorical, I opt for a visual trope, and commit the substituted entity to paper (b). 
You interpret each representation precisely as I have rendered it (c). Suspecting a 
trope, however, you invert the substitution (d), thus successfully echoing my 
intended signified (a) in your response. 
It will be immediately apparent that again we encounter peculiarly visual objections, 
inapplicable to verbal "taxonomic" synecdoche above. For instance, in case 1, 
since mammals do not all look alike, I am forced to draw a member of a particular 
shape-identified sub-class (chapter VI, §2.1); that is, to some extent, [sub]-SUPER 
b is compulsory. But, even if my [dog] actively discourages specification through 
the use of silhouettes, extreme stylizations, etc., without the intervention of a 
culturally symbolic prohibitive ring border (chapter VI, § 1.1), or some such device, 
you are given no indication that any trope was ever intended. Corresponding 
problems, which need not be spelt out, appertain to the rest. 
Such limitations are, of course, not limitations merely on the feasibility of my 
drawing either [mammal] or [prototypical dog]; nor only on that of my arousing in 
you the awareness of any substitution; nor even on that of my subsequently 
confirming that you are indeed aware that there was a substitution ('DOG b', in a 
verbal response, sounding much like 'DOG'); they are jundamentallimitations 
stemming from the simple fact that a dog is a mammal; that is, {'DOG'} is properly 
included in {'MAMMAL'} (chapter VI, §5.2). Consequently, a dog's mammalhood 
cannot be abstracted visually from [dog] in the way in which a [tail] may be erased 
from a pencilled sketch, or in the way a verbal statement ("Beware of the 
vertebrate!", for instance) may remain non-committal (see Bhattacharya 1984). The 
visual medium is not amenable. 
Figure 14 
mode IT representation n-ary signification 
[sub]-SUPER ANIMAL :ANrMALb':' :.:.:. :.: .:. ......... 
normal DOG ~~~~~~~//~///////////~/////// //////////////////////////', 
"""""""""""""" 
[super]-SUB BEAGLE : BEAGu:"b' . : . : . : . : . : . : . : . ........ 
That is to say, neither n-ary signification is very useful. Consistent with our 
account of the specificity of a verbalized repraesentatum; the response to: ~ 
(*DOO*), 'MAMMAL' - potentially, but (for the most part) unknowably, a [sub]-
SUPER b synecdoche - will simply continue to be considered an approximation in 
that it describes a class of referents wider than the specificity norm. The response 
'BEAGLE', potentially a [super]-SUB b synecdoche, will be deemed a narrow 
approximation with reference to the specificity norm. We shall, however, find a 
use for the strictly taxonomic [super]-SUB b as the second operation in a double 
synecdoche (§6.5 below). 
Yet, as things stand, taxonomic synecdoche is not a useful notion. On the one 
hand, the significations for which it accounts are already treated within 
"specificity", while, on the other, we are no nearer to explaining the n-ary link 
yielding COURAGE b , SLYNESS b, HYPOCRISY b, etc. With a closer look at the 
"taxonomy" involved, however, we find that further options become available. 
6.3 Taxonomic and "non-taxonomic" [subj-SUPER b 
Figure 15a pictures the head and shoulders of a man; his narrowed eyes, arched 
eyebrows, crooked smile, etc. enough, I hope, to persuade you of an inferrable 
devious turn of mind. The man's being 'SLY', not in itself directly representable, 
constitutes a static inferred characterization (chapter IV). 
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Figure 15 
a b 
'COURAGEOUS', likewise, may be inferred from a fairly unremarkable [annoured 
figure; fist to chest; impassive expression in the face of untold terrors, etc.], or, 
more conventionally, from a [lion]. 'SLYNESS' and 'COURAGE' themselves, 
however (divorced from a response portion such as 'THIS PERSON IS SHOWING 
GREAT COURAGE') are neither directly representable, nor (even indirectly) 
inferrable from a representation. Their invisibility, moreover, ensures that they 
pass through the representational methodological procedures without "qualification" 
at any stage. Yet despite our dismissal of a picture's capacity to represent invisible 
entities (chapter v, §2.1), 'SLYNESS' and 'COURAGE' both retain a valid and 
"traceable" relationship with the picture. It is to this relationship we now tum. 
6.3.1 Extending "taxonomic" (sideways) 
For Sapir, SLYNESS and COURAGE would be subsumed within anatomical 
synecdoche as above; constituting, that is, albeit counter-intuitively, valid parts of 
SLY MAN and LION respectively. In fact, Sapir (in the wake of Dubois et al. 1970) 
claims of anatomical synecdoche that a restriction of "part" to detachable visible 
portions "implies an exaggerated visual bias that distorts completely what we really 
conceive any object to be" (1977: 17). SLYNESS, according to Sapir, is as much a 
part of a SLY MAN as croutons are a part of a meal. 
That, as I read it, is not what Dubois et al. intend at all. Sapir has, I believe, 
construed "taxonomic" along the lines of our own label classification above 
(chapter v, §6); that is, based upon a Linnaean biological taxonomy, or some non-
biological equivalent. Admittedly, Dubois' examples tend not explicitly to 
discourage such an interpretation; hence Sapir's preoccupation with "specificity" as 
discussed above, and his subsequent classification of "courage" as an anatomical 
part of a lion (1977: 17). A zoological hierarchy, is, for Dubois, however, only 
one of an indefinite number of classificatory systems within which an entity may be 
located (1970: 99). 'SLY MAN' may be a member of many classes; not only the 
strictly taxonomic label classes (chapter III) {'MAMMAL'}, {'PRIMATE'}, and 
213 
{'MAN' }, for example; but also the reference class {' SL Y ENTITy'l} (cf. "partial 
overlap", chapter v, §6); 'LION' a member of {'CARNIVORE'}, {'LION'}, and 
perhaps {'COURAGEOUS ENTITY'} (see below). 
Inclusion within any reference class may be said to assign to each member a 
corresponding feature; a badge of membership, if you like. Membership of 
{'CARNIVORE'} and {'MAMMAL'}, for instance, will confer upon 'LION' the 
features "is a member of the class {'CARNIVORE'}", and "is a member of the class 
{'MAMMAL'}, which we may abbreviate "#Carnivore" and "#mammal" 
respectively. 'LION' will possess, therefore, as many such features as there are 
reference classes of which it is a member2. The result is a kind of portfolio of 
features, which, for 'LION', might run along the lines of #Carnivore, #5-digit front 
feet, #tawny yellow, #Courageous, #young-suckling, #animal, #air-breathing, 
#mammal, #Vertebrate, #Warm-blooded, etc. (although the latter six, being implied 
by #Carnivore, may be considered redundant3). 
Thus by disregarding, or conceptually "surpressing", those features which 
distinguish 'LION' from any other 'MAMMAL' (#carnivore; #5-digit front feet; 
#tawny yellow; #Courageous, etc.(but see §6.3.2 below», [lion] ~ LION may, in 
principle, signal the superordinate MAMMAL b; that is LION may be (n-arily) 
generalized to MAMMAL b. MAMMAL b continues, therefore, as a perfectly valid 
instance of taxonomic generalizing synecdoche (if only its verbal realization were 
apparent to a hearer). Alternatively, by adding to the catalogue above the feature 
#Indian, [lion] ~ LION may signal the Asiatic sub-species INDIAN LION b; that is 
LION may, with the corresponding accounting provisos, be (n-arily) particularized 
to INDIAN LION b. This much is already implicit in §6.2 above. 
But the signification: I [lion] ~ liON I ~ COURAGE b 
is also a valid instance of taxonomic generalizing synecdoche, achieved this time by 
suppressing all features of 'LION' bar one: #courageous; and by realizing the result 
verbally as best we can: 'COURAGE b'. 
1 Though I think" {,SLY ENTITY'} " will serve, I see no reason not to invoke a taxonomic 
version of Sapir's own (anatomical) justification above; and to render the class of which SLY MAN 
is a member: {'SLYNESS'}. "Entity" implies a degree of corporeality I believe is unnecessary. 
2 Compare Hervey's "class attributes" (1979: 37); noting, however, that these are properties of a 
class of denotata, established via common properties of its members. 
3 Compare Hervey, for whom non-redundant class attributes are those which result from cases of 
direct proper inclusion result of one denotation class within another (1979: 41). 
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Figure 16 
mode II representation n-ary signification 
[sub]-SUPER MAMMAL COURAGEb 
~/////~///////////////////// 
normal LION ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ //////////////////////////// 
[super]-SUB INDIAN LION :INI>IANLioN'~':::::::: : 
'COURAGE' (as a realization of the reference class each member of which possesses 
the sole feature "#courageous") may, therefore, in a sense, be said to be a part of 
'(COURAGEOUS) LION'. The part, however, is not anatomical. Indeed, 
'COURAGE' is only a part of '(COURAGEOUS) LION' in that the corresponding 
feature #courageous is a part of the portfolio of membership badges l . 
6.3.2 Characterization of {subj-SUPER b 
Although MAMMAL b, SLYNESS b and COURAGE b are alike in their being instances 
of [sub]-SUPER b taxonomic synecdoche, they may be said to differ in important 
respects. #mammal is implied by 'LION' in that {'LION'} is properly included 
within {'MAMMAL'}; #sly, however, is not implied by 'MAN'; #courageous may 
or may not be implied by 'LION'. That is to say, #mammal, #sly, and #courageous 
seem to be different types of features; #mammal, we may claim, is an essential 
feature of 'LION', whereas #courageous is not. We shall consider briefly the 
possibility of differentiating #mammal and #courageous on this basis, before 
proposing an alternative solution. 
Establishing a characteristic as essential is by no means an easy task. One might 
begin by asking whether the essential characteristics of a biological organism, for 
example, are not just those features which assigned it to a particular taxon in the 
first place. It was claimed (chapter v, §6.1) that these features, should be both 
stable and applicable to all members of the extension. Some stable and universally 
1 A certain amount of licence has been taken with Dubois et al.'s "decomposition sur Ie mode 2,". 
This licence has two facets. Firstly, their "decomposition" is into "semes", or "unites minim ales 
de sens" (1970: 94); that is, into sense components (cf. Katz's "semantic markers" (1966: 154)). 
The feature "is a member of the class {'MAMMAL'}", however, temporarily and conveniently 
obscured by the abbreviated form "#mammal", is not a component of meaning but a property of 
the referent (a "part" only in the sense of part of an ensemble of properties). The second point is 
that, whereas for Katz, "#mammal" (or rather "(mammal)") refers to a component of the sense of 
the English word "lion" (Katz 1966: 154-6), for Dubois et aI., the "seme" is a component of word 
or concept ("chaque mot ou concept peut etre en principe Ie croisement d'autant de series 
[endocentriques] qu'il contient de semes" (1970: 101 (my emphasis))). In both cases, however, the 
sense component is relatively "linguistically tied", with the result that "decomposition sur Ie mode 
I." might be viewed as "semantic synecdoche". 
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applicable characteristics may seem nevertheless non-essential. Even if all lions are 
courageous, this may just happen to be the case. #Courageous may be not an 
essential attribute but a "matter of contingent fact" (Lyons 1977: 195), or 
"universally accompanying characteristic" (Hospers 1967; see also Dahl 1975). 
Courage, however, is easily abandoned. Nevertheless, if we apply this criterion to 
a lion's seemingly essential quorum of features, say, #a canine set of teeth, #four 
legs, #fur, #live young-bearing capacity, etc., we find that they readily suffer a 
courage-like fate. A three-legged, vegetarian lion, bereft of teeth and fur, and no 
longer able to have cubs, is surely still a lion. If so, then none of these is defining. 
Even "sortal" characteristics (Levin 1977), such as #mammal, lose their essentiality 
if, as is advised, we are receptive to the possible as well as to the actual (Dahl 
1975) - say, the lion born of a chicken, and which, upon close inspection, turns 
out to be an automaton. A less open-minded, though more practical, approach 
would dismiss the logically possible, in favour of the known, typical, normal 
(Lyons 1977; Robinson 1950), and thus (ominously) "prototypical" (chapter v, 
§3.2) lion. If this seems sensible, it also spells ruin for the defining characteristic, 
since prototypes, like basic categories, are relative to each individual (chapter v, 
§3.1). To a rural Peruvian, the mammal-hood of "whale" and the pet-hood of 
"guinea pig" may be as far removed from the imaginable as that a donkey should 
lay an egg. 
A classification of [sub]-SUPER b significations according to the essentiality of the 
feature, then, is not feasible, since, on the one hand, if the prototypical is not 
evoked, the essential readily shades into the universally accompanying; and if, on 
the other hand, the prototypical is evoked, the validity of any characteristic becomes 
relative to the individual informant. 
An alternative approach which affords a more operable distinction between 
#mammal and #Courage hinges upon the double life of 'LION'. The first of these 
lives is as a referent (that is, a realized repraesentatum); the second is as a potential 
referent (that is, existing independently of representation as a member of a class of 
potential referents) (chapter v, §4.2). Only with regard to its second role is the 
essentiality of #Courageous, #mammal, #air-breathing, etc. an issue. With regard 
to its first, however, the features to be considered essential are already quite well 
circumscribed - answering the question "what makes 'LION' an acceptable 
representational correlate?", rather than "what makes 'LION' a lion?". They are 
dependent, therefore, not upon what lions do or do not tend to do, but on the 
information available in the repraesentans. The only essential features of 'LION' in 
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'[lion]' ~ 'LION' are that it should (a) function as the repraesentatum in a 
relationship of representation; and (b) acknowledge that the repraesentans does look 
like a lion. Feature (b), indeed, is that encapsulated in the notion of "label" (chapter 
v, §5). Thus the only features available to 'LION' as a label are #mammal, 
#Carnivore, #animal, etc. (that is, those marking membership of relevant strictly 
taxonomic zoological superordinate (and subordinate) classes), along with 
(trivially) #lion itself. Any further features are classified (as characterizations) not 
on the basis of their essentiality to lions in general, but on that of their visual 
motivation with respect to the repraesentans concerned. With respect to figure 13a, 
'AIR-BREATHING', for example, is an inferred characterization (that is, a non-
essential feature) (chapter VII, §2.2), even while #air-breathing may be essential to 
any underlying beast. 
What this means is that we may in principle pinpoint the source of a [sub]-SUPER b 
n-ary signification in terms of its visual motivation. The source of 'COURAGE b' is 
not 'LION', since 'LION' possesses, as a label, no features other than #mammal, 
#carnivore, #animal, etc. That is to say, there is no feature of 'LION', 
#Courageous, which could possibly be isolated through the suppression of all other 
features. For a feature #Courageous, and, consequently, a superordinate class 
{'COURAGEOUS ENTITY'}, to become available, the (primary) true characterization 
'COURAGEOUS' is presupposed1. Likewise, the response 'HAIRINESS' requires 
that the elementary characterization 'HAIRY' already have been achieved. In the 
process of accounting, however, we may anticipate that it will rarely be possible to 
ascertain informally the source of such a trope. 
Figure 17 
labels elementary inferred 
and asserted 
representation LION HAIRY COURAGEOUS 
n-ary [sub]-SUPERb :·:··AMMAib··:·: . . . . HAIRINESSb COURAGEb 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
1 In fact, COURAGE b, as an n-ary signification of [lion] ~ LION, should be classed as a 
motivated n-ary index understood by convention. The process involved in the reconstruction of the 
[sub]-SUPER b link, however, may be evoked in the explanation of other, non-conventional, n-
ary significations. 
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6.4 [superJ-SUB b 
The remaining taxonomic synecdoche is [superJ-SUB b. In instances of 
interpretative [superJ-SUB b, the reference class representationally selected is 
subsequently particularized through the adjunction of a feature (or features) of the 
type described above; to circumscribe an n-ary reference class properly included 
within the primary reference class. 
Looking back at figure 11, however, this trope (cases 3 and 4) smacks again of 
inoperability. Shape-related encoding difficulties combine with verbalization-
related accounting difficulties to dissuade us from an n-ary reconstruction, say: 
I [dog] ~ DOG I ~ BEAGLE b 
(of~, *DOG*) in favour of the representational "narrow approximation" on the 
norm: 
[bea.gle] ~ BEAGLE 
Other interpretative particularizations (the non-strictly taxonomic 'BLACK AND 
WHITE DOG', say), also potentially n-ary in principle, are far more readily dealt 
with as characterizations (chapter VII). 
Like [sub]-SUPER b, however, there is more to [super]-SUB b than meets the eye. 
It is the trope responsible for a particular type of unique reference; the treatment of 
which we shall postpone until §7 below. But the n-ary contribution of [super]-
SUB b also becomes apparent in the "double taxonomic synecdoche". 
65 Double "taxonomic" synecdoche 
Paralleling the operation of double anatomical synecdoche above (and the question 
of accounting feasibility), we shall confine initial discussion of double "taxonomic" 
synecdoche to only one series: that in which a [sub]-SUPER b is followed by a 
[super]-SUB b. 
To facilitate the reconstruction of the n-ary link, we shall again exploit the 
plausibility of the n-ary indices understood by convention, most particularly the 
venerable Esso tiger. As in §3.3 above, however, it should be noted that, although 
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the extended rationale may be "metaphorical", the conceptual short-circuit involved 
in such cases excludes Esso tigers and the like from double synecdoche proper. 
The verbal double taxonomic synecdoche of course is not uncommon. The 
advertisement urges that you "put a tiger in your tank", but the behaviour 
recommended involves not tigers but Esso petrol. "The old fox sold my shares 
before the crash", but my thanks go not to a fox but to my canny stockbroker, Mr. 
Green. 
Neither of these tropes can be explained in terms of a single synecdoche. The 
coupled terms in respective pairs, however, have something in common. In the 
case ofthe pair, "tiger" and "petrol", for instance, (the referent underlying) each 
term is reducible, via a "taxonomic" synecdoche, to STRENGTH (Vestergaard and 
Schr~er 1985). In respect of this particular feature, Esso petrol and tigers are 
alike. Following Dubois et al. (1970: 118), the relationship may be rendered: 
Figure 18 
the intersection being "partie commune it la mosruque de leurs semes" (ibid.: 107). 
Thus to achieve STRENGTH, given TIGER, interpreters must effect a generalizing 
"taxonomic" synecdoche. Successfully to construe ESSO PETROL, however, they 
must subsequently perform the reverse trope: a particularizing "taxonomic" 
synecdoche. 
This particular trope is readily translated into the visual realm. Given that: 
I [tiger] -+ TIGER I -+ STRENGTH b 
and: I [Esso petrol] -+ ESSO PETROL I -+ STRENGTH b 
are plausible instances of [sub]-SUPER b, the former's prefacing a reversal of the 
latter results in the trope: 
II [tiger] ~. TIGER I ~b STRENGTH I ~' ESSOPETROL 
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"~b " being, that is, a [sub]-SUPER b synecdoche; "~c " a [super]-SUB b 
synecdoche. Here again 'TIGER' is first generalized to 'STRENGTH b' 
(characterized as necessary to allow the desired feature to become available (§6.3.2 
above»; 'STRENGTH b' is subsequently particularized to 'ESSO PElROL c'. 
Similarly, since 'MAN' (characterized 'CUNNING') and 'pox' have in common the 
feature #Cunning, these may also participate as relata in the double synecdoche: 
II [man] ~a MAN I ~b CUNNING I ~( FOX 
"~b" being again a [sub]-SUPER b; " ~ c " a [super]-SUB b. 
Equally valid, though somewhat less evocative, are double synecdoches involving 
only strictly taxonomic features. Let unit A - *DOG*. 
in which: 
Figure 19 
Supposing a representational referent, 'DOG' and a feature, #mammal, just as 
'TIGER' was generalized to 'SlRENGTH b', 'DOG' may be generalized to 
'MAMMAL b'; just as 'SlRENGTH b' was particularized to 'ESSO PElROL c', 
'MAMMAL b' may be subsequently particularized to, say, 'PERSON c' - "No person 
allowed to enter". A more orthodox interpretation of figure 19, which nevertheless 
presupposes a characterization, would be the signification 'CAT c' via a feature 
#pet; people, or at any rate most people, being unaffected by the prohibition. 
II [dog] ~a DOG I ~b PET I ~( CAT 
Bhattacharya'S "classificatory symbol" (chapter VI, §2.1) may thus be redefined as 
a double synecdoche [sub]-SUPER b + [super]-SUB b; a more specific norm 
*BEAGLE*, moreover, allowing as an n-ary signification the representation ally 
counter-indicated CHIHUAHUA b via #dog (chapter VI, §5.1). 
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7 Unique reference 
The signification of a unique particular is necessarily an n-ary, rather than a 
representational, concern. Whether photographic or schematic, no realized 
repraesentans can direct the viewer to a specific realized repraesentatum through 
pictorial means alone (chapter VI, §2.2; chapter VII, §6.2). That said, there were 
claims in chapter m that unique correlates are not ruled out as interpretative options 
(§2.3); and hints in chapter VII (§2.3) that they might be dealt with within 
representation ('MR. GREEN'). 
Before reckoning with this discrepancy, however, it should be noted that any 
repraesentans conveys (at each interpretative instance) a unique repraesentatum 
which in tum corresponds to a unique referent. This is not the point at issue. The 
question is, rather, whether: 
1) the referent is unique in the sense that the reference class to which it 
ultimately belongs is understood to contain only a single member; 
2) the referent is definite in the sense that its verbalization by an informant 
conveys not only the intended singularity of the member, but also its 
identity (see chapter VII, §6); 
3) the corresponding reference class can reasonably be claimed to have 
existed prior to the significatory instance concerned (see §7.2 below)? 
4) that referent is non-conventionally specified (see §7.1 below) 
Let us term any referent which fulfils each of these criteria a "singular" referent. A 
singular referent, then, will be a definite, individual substance (Lyons 1977); a 
particular spatially locatable and temporally enduring material thing (Harre 1970a), 
present as a single Gestalt if present at all (Quine 1974). A definite individual 
fictional object, however, may also qualify. This supplement invites criticism 
(Goodman 1976, for example; but see also Harre 1970a; Hervey 1979). 
Nevertheless, since in chapter V (§6.1) a claim was made for the inclusion of the 
fictional and the mythological within the realms of the picturable, there seems little 
justification for their exclusion from the n-ary signifiable. 
Other referents, however, also unique in their way, may be isolated by their 
fulfilment of only some of the criteria above. On the basis of which criteria these 
are, five types of unique referent are distinguished. 
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a) that which is understood by virtue of a convention (§7.1); perhaps 
fulfilling (1), (2) and (3), but failing to fulfil (4); 
b) a "quasi-unique" referent: that achieved through "dubbing" (§7.1); 
fulfilling only (1), (2), and (4), and not considered an n-ary matter; 
c) that achieved through "ostension" (§); fulfilling only (2), (3) and (4), 
and requiring the introduction of "©", the class-member operator; 
d) specific indefinite reference; fulfilling only (1), (3), and (4); 
e) specific definite reference; or the "singular" referent; fulfilling all four of 
the criteria. 
7.1 The unique conventional referent 
Unique conventional referents fulfil each of the criteria (1) to (3) above. Since the 
n-ary link is ultimately conventional, however, these will be subsumed within the 
category of "motivated n-ary index understood by convention" (§3.3 above). 
A [lion], for example, cannot represent a MAN; and although we know little about 
the physical appearance of the writer of the second gospel, we know that Mark was 
a man. {'MAN} is commensurable with *LION* only superordinately (at the level 
of {'MAMMAL'}, say). The response to a [lion]: 'MARK, THE EVANGELIST', 
however, may be explained by the convention, instanced in the sculpture of 
Romanesque churches, whereby a [winged lion] is used to signify SAINT MARK. 
I [winged lion] -+ WINGEDIlON 1-+ SAINTMARKb 
Christ, on the other hand, was (structurally-speaking, and in his earthly 
incarnation) a man; the norm for figure 17a is *MAN*. The Oglala chief Wears-The 
Feather was also a man; and the norm for figure 17b too is *MAN*. 
Figure 17 
a b 
(figure 17b adapted from the North American Indian "Oglala Roster" of c.1886, reproduced in Gelb 
1952: 38) 
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Thus there is little representation ally to gainsay the responses to figures 17a and 
17b 'CHRIST' and 'CHIEF WEARS-THE-FEATHER' respectively - other than our 
conviction that unique reference is not possible within representation. 'CHRIST' 
and 'CHIEF WEARS-THE-FEATHER' would appear, then, in comparison to 'SAINT 
MARK', to be significations of a different kind; less dependent upon convention 
since there is, in each case, a healthy cluster of motivating visual features, and, 
correspondingly, less work for the convention to do. 
This difference may appear to be further enhanced by a conviction that we know 
what Christ looks like. Here is a snippet from an eye-witness account - a letter 
from Lentulus, Governor of Judea, to the Roman Senate: 
"A man of average or moderate height, and very distinguished. [ ] His hair is the colour of a 
ripe hazel-nut. It falls straight almost to the level of his ears [ ] In front his hair is parted into 
two, with the parting in the centre in the Nazarene manner. His forehead is wide, smooth and 
serene, and his face is without wrinkles or any marks. [ ] His nose and mouth are faultless. 
His beard is thick and like a young man's fIrst beard, of the same colour as his hair; it is not 
particularly long and is parted in the middle [ ] He is broad in the chest and upstanding; his 
hands and arms are fine. [ ] He is the most beautiful among the children of men." (Zardino de 
Oration (Venice, 1494), quoted in Baxandal11988: 57). 
Although the letter is a forgery, and Lentulus himself a fiction (ibid.), this 
description conforms well to (and has perhaps even played some part in 
perpetuating) the essentials of a [Christ], not only in Western art, but also in that of 
Peru, whether colonial or contemporary, academic or popular, urban or rural 
(Macera 1979). Yet any number of individuals will fit this description. If figure 
17a's posture and clothing are altered, and the halo removed, all that remains is a 
bearded man. 
'SAINT MARK', 'CHIEF WEARS-THE-FEATHER', and even 'CHRIST' too, all 
necessitate, ultimately, a convention; and this alone is sufficient to classify the three 
as n-ary motivated indices understood by convention. 
The conventional signalling of a unique referent is a phenomenon by no means 
confined to Western Christian and classical traditions. For the Maori, a particular 
represented tattoo-pattern identifies a specific ancestor (Adam 1949); red feathers 
indicate the Tahitian god Oro (Barrow 1979); the Mixtec king Eight-Deer Tiger-
Claw's name is "represented visually" (Bhattacharya 1984: 227); a [bearded 
horseman] may signify not only Santiago (St. James the Greater) but also the 
ancient Andean deity Wiraqocha (Macera 1979) (see also Wittkower 1977; Hall 
1974; Beigbeder 1989; Gelb 1952; Bowden 1992, etc.). 
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72 Dubbing 
"Dubbing" does not pinpoint a bona fide unique referent through its failure to fulfil 
criterion (3): that the reference class can reasonably be claimed to have existed prior 
to the significatory instance concerned. Of course, all reference classes exist 
independently of signification (chapter v, §4.2), but some reference classes may be 
said to fulfil this criterion only in retrospect. Thus, a response to figure 15a, 
'SENOR ARTHUSIUS QUATSCH', creates a reference class the existence of which is 
subsequently independent of signification. The informant is assumed to have 
selected a referent (say, 'MAN') corresponding to the repraesentans ([man]); and, in 
the interests of narrative colour alone, to have accorded that referent a name 
(,SENOR ARTHUSIUS QUATSCH') (cf. "nonce symbols" (Mulder and Hervey 
1980)); thus creating a stipulative reference class {'SENORARTHUSIUS 
QUATSCH'}. Perhaps a particular individual is intended; perhaps, alternatively, 
this is a whimsical stock response to certain types of entityl. In either event, the 
onus is on the accounter to determine the (temporal) priority of the reference class 
in question, and the plurality of its members. Failing this, the accounter 
hypothesizes a subtext which claims, for example, "this represents a dog, let's call 
him Fido", just as a children's story book may begin by (non-representationally) 
anchoring a picture "This is Bob. He lives on a farm". 
For example, Picture 21a (reproduced in Appendix A) is a [dog]. Though no less 
basic than chapter v's figure 1, it is possibly a little more South American in its 
mongrelism. Informant 12's response was 'TIFUN'. Here is an instance of my not 
being, in any of the senses above, acquainted with any singular referent concerned. 
Although attempts were made to remedy this, since my search for a real or a 
fictional singular Timn has been in vain, the response portion 'TIFUN' is classified 
as a static asserted characterization (chapter VII, §2.3). Thus an inability to trace a 
singular referent forces us to assume not only that the informant does not know 
Fido, but that there is no prior {'FJoo'} to know. Should new information - such 
as second informant's responding 'TIFUN' to the same picture - come to light, this 
classification may be revised. 
Indeed the signification of a unique referent presupposes an acquaintance with that 
referent. In principle, this acquaintance may be direct or indirect, visual or non-
visual. But whose acquaintance with the referent is presupposed - the interpreter's 
1 The ubiquitous hypothetical Fido being a case in point. 
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or the accounter's? Ideally, of course, it is the interpreter's acquaintance which is 
paramount; as a methodological necessity, however, it cannot but depend entirely 
on the accounter's (co-) acquaintance. This has its disadvantages. While every 
effort should be made to track down the signified individual concerned (cf. chapter 
VII, §2.3, and §3.3 of the present chapter), we should resign ourselves to the 
possibility that unique referents intended, and (from the informant's point of view) 
unambiguously signalled, will slip through the net. 
7.3 Specific definite reference 
That type of unique referent fulfilling all four criteria is specific definite reference 
(see chapter VII, §6). 
Picture 9 (a collage, reproduced in Appendix A) includes a photograph of what I 
take to be Adolf Hitler. Informant 44's response includes the following: 
El senor del- de la Republica de Alemania. Hitler! Ya, ya! Adolf Hitler - eso es 
This is the man from - from Germany. Hitler! Yes! Adolf Hitler - that's the one (Inf. 
44; Pic. 9) 
'AOOLFHITLER' fulfils all the criteria (1) to (4) above; there is no doubt that a 
singular referent is intended. Even this photograph, of course, cannot inform the 
viewer of the identity of the referent. Here at last, however, is a case where the 
informant, seemingly, does not need to be informed of the identity, because he 
already knows. 
Under these circumstances, a case might be made for a third extension to Kay's 
taxonomy (chapter VI, §6.1.1): the "unique label", thus admitting {'AOOLF 
HITLER'} as a valid label class. If I can recognize a dog, for instance, by its shape; 
if, moreover, being an ornithologist, I can recognize a lesser spotted woodpecker 
by its shape; why, then, may I not also, being of a certain age and background, 
recognize Adolf Hitler by his shape? This, however, does not specifically address 
the uniqueness of Adolf Hitler. "Recognizing Adolf Hitler by his shape" might be 
better expressed "recognizing an Adolf Hitler by its shape"; in acknowledgement of 
the plurality of the members of the class {'ENTITIES THE (PROJECTED) SHAPE OF 
HITLER'}; which class includes any entity, two- or three-dimensional, which 
visually resembles Adolf Hitler (Reich chancellor, 1933). To claim that this picture 
corresponds solely to the latter - even where the context seems to guarantee 
uniqueness (in a frame from Riefenstahl's film documentary "Triumph des 
Willens", say) - is not simply a choice from amongst valid alternatives; it is a denial 
of the validity of those alternatives. 
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The counter-intuitive element which will perhaps inevitably accompany this 
classification may perhaps be weakened by reference, yet again, to the causal nature 
of the photographic process. 
But singularity does not require photographic causality. So far as we are 
concerned, there is little to distinguish the 'ADOLF HIlLER' singular response from 
any non-photographic singular response - even one evoked by the most highly 
stylized of line drawings (cf. chapter v's figure 3 (Alfred Hitchcock): 
Kaylaq runa huch'uy Rolando kayqa' 
And this chap is little Rolando, this is (Inf. 32; Pic. 22a (also a fairly basic [man]), little 
Rolando being his son) 
or, erroneously - so it would seem - from a photograph. 
Picture 3 (reproduced in Appendix A) is a photograph cut from a Peruvian 
magazine. Against the backdrop of a snow-covered mountainside are (the upper 
halves of) three people, one of whom appears to be a ginger-haired man. This man 
is variously described as a TOURIST (Informant 50); a GRINGO (North American or 
European) (Informant 34); a STUDENT (Informants 26 and 43), etc. 
Here, however, are the beginnings of three other responses: 
Usted? 
Is it you? (Inf. 1; Pic. 3) 
Es uSled 10 que es eso? 
Is this one you? (Inf. 13; Pic. 3) 
Kaypichu kashanki qanqa manachu? 
Is this you here or not? (Inf. 18; Pic. 3) 
That is to say, three informants ask me whether the photograph is of me. It is not 
even a good likeness - I should say. Yet had these informants encountered Picture 
3 in my absence, the chances are that I should have seemed as unambiguously 
signalled as Adolf Hitler was to both Informant 44 and me. Thus the only 
difference between these responses to Picture 3 and Informant 44's response to 
Picture 9 is that, faced with the latter, I should opt for the same singular referent. 
To those who know Adolf Hitler well enough successfully to distinguish him from 
Charlie Chaplin (in "The Great Dictator") and Alec Guiness (in "Hitler: the Last Ten 
Days"), there may appear to be a clear distinction. 
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7.4 Specific indefinite reference 
Through its failure to fulftl criterion (2) above, specific indefmite reference is 
sharply distinguished in principle from specific definite reference above - if not so 
easily in practice (Lyons 1977). In the anticipation of serious accounting 
difficulties, then, we might abandon this type of unique reference. Yet when we 
come to examine the test responses we shall see that specific indefmite reference is 
to some extent recognizable when the response is provided in the form of a 
question. 
75 Ostension (minus the pointing) 
The final type of unique referent is that achieved by ostension. Traditionally, 
ostension requires the pointing of a fmger, or some other demonstrative act (Quine 
1974; Hospers 1967; Robinson 1950; Harre 1970a, etc.). Given fulftlment of 
criterion (2) above (that is, as to the identity of the referent), however, here we 
dispense with the necessity for pointing. What remains is the crucial non fulfilment 
of criterion (1); and, with it, the requirement that the ostended referent be an 
exemplification. Thus, although, on the one hand, there should be no doubt as to 
the referent's specific and definite signification, it is intended only as an 
exemplification. 
Confronted with Picture 13 (reproduced in Appendix A), for instance, Informant 
3's response began with the following: 
El hombre - por ejemp/o nosotros, dfgamos - por ejemp/o eso yo soy, no?' 
The man - for example, let's say us, - for example, say I'm him, ok? 
In this particular response, the hypotheticality of the link is undeniable; it is quite 
clear that Informant 3 does not believe the picture to be directed explicitly and solely 
at himself. Unlike the Hitler response above, this response neither pretends, nor 
intends, to signal a subordinate class; quite explicitly it selects a single member 
which acts on behalf of the whole class, without in any way exhausting, or losing 
sight of, its relationship with that class. Thus the arrow cannot in this instance be 
said to stand for a relationship of superordinate to subordinate; members are not 
subsets. Rather, the relationship is one of class to member1 - or rather: [class]~ 
MEMBERb. 
1 A relationship Sapir confuses with that of superordinate to subordinate (see above, §4.1). 
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This is a relationship we are so far in no position to account for. Yet it is crucial to 
the advertising industry. As viewers, we do not, on the whole, mistake people in 
adverts for ourselves. Nevertheless, we are urged to "see ourselves" as we could 
be, our lives enhanced by the workings of a patent wrinkle cream, or whatever. An 
Armed Forces recruitment poster, for example, complete with [soldier stomping 
through the undergrowth with a sense of achievement and a machine-gun], 
persuades me to "identify" with that soldier, in the sense of "execute a 
particularizing trope (of some sort) with myself as the n-ary signified". 
I [soldier] -+ SOlDIER I -+ ME b 
That I should presume to select myself from a reference class to which, strictly 
speaking, I do not belong, may even be held to create a tension resolved only by 
my enlisting. 
This relationship may only be interpreted as a "syndochical" relationship by further 
tampering with the notion of "part". Instead, I propose to introduce into §4's 
framework a third analytic mode: mode" © " (for want of a better mnemonic): a 
class-member operator. 
In fact Informant 3 is the only informant to make use of this type of signification. 
Nonetheless it is the reverse trope: member to class, which provides the most 
acceptable (or, let us say, the least unacceptable) account of the generic response. 
8 Generic reference 
As with [whole] ~ PART b and [superordinate] ~ SUBORDINATE b synecdoches, the 
class-member relation can operate in either direction; that is, not only may [class] ~ 
MEMBER b, but also [member] ~ CLASS b. 
It is what lies behind responses such as the following: 
Reloj -10 que marca hora 
A clock - that which tells the time (lnf. 2; Pic. 8) 
(chapter IV, §5) and it achieves what is commonly termed "generic reference", in 
that it does not refer to some indefinite non-specific "clock" but to a class (Lyons 
1977; Chafe 1970), or species (Allwood et al. 1993). Similarly, a response such 
as: 
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Clocks tell the time 
refers to no specific clock but to all (reasonably prototypical) clocks. This "plural" 
generic is to be distinguished in principle from the ("non-contiguous") n-ary 
integration. Imagine a picture of a castle, and that pictured in front of it there 
crouches a uniformed soldier who beckons, as it were, off-stage left. A response 
'SOLDIERS ARE ATIACKING' is unambigously n-arily integrated; SOLDIERS 
ATIACK may hint at a "plural" generic (see Chafe 1970 on the role of the verb); 
while SOLDIERS ATIACK CAS1LES makes the generic plural explicit. . 
Generic expressions are often grouped into "nomic", or law-like, statements, and 
accidental generalizations, according to whether the attributes predicated are 
essential or non-essential (Dahl 1975; Lyons 1977). Let us assume, however, that 
the truth-value of the proposition is not our concern, and that the imaginative or 
erroneous generic statement is as generic as any other (see Chafe 1970). A 
response DOGS FLY will fall within the same category as the response DOGS CHASE 
CATS, or DOGS HAVE FOUR LEGS (unlike our treatment of metaphor above, 
§6.3.2). All of these, moreover, will fall within the same category as THE DOG 
FLIES, A DOG CHASES CATS and A DOG HAS FOUR LEGS. 
A problem presents itself here; that is: should generic reference not belong within 
representation? Eco, for example, would appear to think so; since a '[horse]' "can 
correspond to a statement of the type fall horses have four legs and such visual 
properties .. .1" (Eco 1976: 216); and it is certainly Barthes' implication, where a 
certain type of picture "practises what we might call a certain philosophy of the 
object, i.e. reflects on its being, produces at once an inventory and a definition" 
(1982: 218). I think, however, that with an interpretation of the generic as 
[member] ~ CLASS b, we need only appeal to visual resemblance. While we may 
know what any number of individual dogs look like, the class of all possible dogs 
is not like an angel- a potentially visible entity; it is an entity to which the phrase 
"visual resemblance" is inapplicable. 
Nevertheless, we claimed in chapter VI (§4.1) that the relationship of representation 
exists, in any case, between a class of repraesentantes and a class of repraesentata. 
The generic class, however, is perhaps best viewed as a power set; that is, a set of 
sets, or a class of classes. Under this interpretation the class of repraesentata, 
{DOG}, say, may be considered a member of the n-arily and generically signalled " 
{{DOG}} ". 
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9 Summary table of n-ary signification 
The introduction of ostension and generic reference between them necessitates a 
final modification of figure 8 as follows: 
Figure 18 
"primary" n-ary indices 
II 
[part]-WHOLEb (natural) 
[whole]-PARTb 
pictures motivated L 
[subordinate]-SUPERORDINATE b 
[superordinate]- SUBORDINATE b 
© 
[member]-CLASS b 
[class] -MEMBER b 
conventional 
conventional 
in which the double synecdoche, whether taxonomic or anatomical, is understood 
to succeed the appropriate component trope. The results of the second application 
of the typology of indices are, to a certain extent, still visible. 
The possible variations on this framework are probably infinite. Although it is far 
from capable of describing a set of responses exhaustively, it is quite large enough. 
Moreover, the further our reconstructions wander from the representational level, 
the more arbitrary we inevitably become in accounting. Like chapter vn's final 
figure 15, figure 18 above may provide the bones of a score-sheet. 
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CHAPTER IX 
Conclusion 
This study has attempted to provide the beginnings of a framework for the 
assessment of verbalized responses to pictures. It was inspired by the 
interpretations of some fairly unelaborate pictures made by a number of 
individuals in a remote part of Peru. 
The realization of the necessity for such a framework came about gradually. 
Chapter I describes the events which fIrst led me in this direction: an interest in 
musical instruments; a picture of a musical instrument; an interest in pictures; a 
variety in interpretations I found surprising; a curiosity about the reasons for that 
variety. 
There followed a short chapter which reviewed an assortment of picture tests. 
These tests brought to light further differences in the ways pictures are 
perceived, as well as offering some potential reasons why perceptions might 
differ. But chapter II also raised the problem of the conventionality of the 
picture. We were unable to come to any fIrm conclusion on this point, and 
postponed until chapter V further discussion of the extent to which pictorial 
perception is culturally mediated. 
In chapter III we examined more closely the cultural context in which the picture 
test was administered, asking what cultural factors there were which might 
conceivably affect interpretations, and in terms of which any differences in 
informants' picture responses might be explained. We settled upon the degree of 
integration within Peruvian mainstream society, rated in terms of mobility, level 
of schooling, and degree of profIciency in Spanish, together with two five-point 
attitudinal indicators of traditional and non-traditional orientation. Informants 
were assigned ranks with respect to each of the above. Chapter IV attempted a 
matching of these rankings with some aspects of informants' responses to 
Appendix A's pictures. 
The trends in the responses, such as they were, seemed to suggest that 
individuals who interact relatively little in a Spanish-speaking, fast-moving, 
modern milieu, and who have little or no formal education, interpret pictures in a 
manner which is, on the whole, less complex than that of more integrated 
individuals. Explicitly, at any rate, the fonner seemed to pay less attention to 
pictorial context, and to incorporate movement to a lesser extent than did the 
more integrated infonnants. 
The method and the results suffered, however, from so many inadequacies - not 
least my own inattention to context - that little weight can be accorded these 
findings. We closed chapter IV with a brief consideration of how situational 
factors might affect both the fonn and the content of infonnants' responses. 
In addition to these deficiencies we found that our presentation had, throughout, 
been severely hampered for want of any systematic basis to the categorizations 
we made. It was in order to fulfil this role that the theoretical framework which 
follows was conceived. 
Chapter V began this task by offering a tentative definition of "picture" and 
locating it within a typology of indices, before returning to the question of the 
cross-cultural relativity of pictorial perception begun in chapter II. An 
examination of the notion of "visual resemblance" led us to the conclusion that 
pictorial perception and nonnal perception differ only in the relative contributions 
of muscular infonnation and in the consequent relative ambiguity of the 
stimulus. Such was the picture's ambiguity in fact, that it seemed wholly 
inadvisable to appeal to a single" correct" interpretation for use as a standard by 
which other interpretations might be judged. Instead we needed to stipulate a 
standard, yielded on the basis of three, somewhat arbitrary, decisions: a decision 
as to which of the valid representational alternatives we should back; a decision 
as to where should lie its represented spatial boundaries; and finally a decision as 
to what it should be called. We next acknowledged that none of these decisions, 
nor even together with their valid alternatives, exhausted the visual infonnation 
available; and that there was still plenty more to say in response to any picture. 
There followed a classification of types of response in tenns of their deviation 
from (our chosen interpretation of) the available infonnation, and their 
complexity in integrating and interrelating (our stipulated) pictorial units. 
The picture's capacity to refer, taken for granted in chapter V, was brought 
seriously into question at the end of chapter VII with the realization that pictures 
rarely have recourse to the type of deixis by which they might refer specifically 
and definitely. For a picture to convey this kind of information, its interpreter 
must transcend the level of representation to reach a post -representational, or n-
ary, level upon which a new range of significatory options becomes available. 
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A second application of chapter v's typology of indices provided an initial 
structuring of those options, subsequently elaborated throughout the course of 
chapter VITI. 
Such a framework as this would have relevance for the practice of pictorial 
communication. In principle, it might predict the type of picture most likely to 
succeed in conveying its message in a particular environment; though its 
usefulness in this respect might only approach a degree of "clinical usefulness". 
In principle, it might have implications for the legal profession, whose inability 
to distinguish, legally, between the "true",the "false" and the "deliberately 
misleading" in visual advertisements (or, as recently, on a Kelloggs cereal 
packet) is currently gaining attention (Zakia 1986). It might predict, moreover, 
the efficacy of some of the pictures in Appendix C. 
These are all contemporary Latin American posters found fixed to walls in Chile, 
Puno and on Amantanf itself. 
Taking Poster 3, for example, it seems quite likely, on the basis of chapter IV's 
findings, that an n-ary conventional signified would be forthcoming given [rose] 
~ ROSE. Whether that n-ary signified is LOVE b ,LIFE b or whatever, it also 
seems likely that this interpretation would be achieved with little regard for the 
[rosel's position between the [hands], and thus with little chance to consider 
how such a juxtaposition might affect the meaning. In Poster 2's case we might 
be reasonably confident that there will be no problem recognizing PEACEb, 
CHRISTb, and PERua-c?; - but reasonably unconfident of the likelihood of any 
fully coherent, contextually meaningful interpretation such as LET THERE BE 
PEACE IN PERU n, or CHRIST DIED ON THE CROSS SO THAT PERUVIANS MIGHT 
COME BY HIS PEACE n , or IF PERUVIANS 00 NOT EMBRACE CHRISTIANITY, 
THEN PEACE WILL BE FORFEITfl, or any other of the plethora of associations this 
poster might call forth. 
Extending a comparison intially only as far as nineteenth century Tasmania, the 
intended interpretation of chapter I's figure 1 seems a lot to have asked; the 
operations required are far more extended and more complex than those 
evidently achieved in any of the Peruvian test responses. The reader will not be 
surprised to learn that, if the Tasmanians understood the poster, they did not 
heed it. 
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Yet this is a type of picture still regularly put into service today, when words are 
not fast enough, or not big enough, or when the target audience is by and large 
illiterate. Hudson (1967) tells us how common (and how commonly 
misunderstood) was the "BEFORE ... AFIER ... " safety poster in 1960s South 
Africa; Ogilvy, if not a grandfather, then at least a father, of modern advertising, 
tells us that this same type of advertisement "[makes] its point better than any 
words" (1987: 137); Douglas, an "educational photographer" tells us of an 
Indian "IF ... , IF NOT ... " family planning poster, that "even when the language 
[the written Hindi] cannot be understood, the illustrations [ ... ] speak for 
themselves" (1982: 157). 
Ogilvy and Douglas, moreover, along with the consulted organizations 
mentioned in chapter I, are all in wholehearted agreement in their support of the 
Keep It Simple doctrine. The aid organization CORPUNO (who produced Picture 
2 and Poster 6) agree; the Chilean Alianza Cristana y Misionera (who produced 
Poster 7) agree; the magazine Rojas Escritas (who turned Villanueva's painting 
into a poster (Picture 19» agree. What they evidently do not agree upon is what 
"simple" means. 
It is this, the circumscription of the (meaningful) simple, towards which one 
might profitably work. The first job, however, would be to ratify the categories 
proposed - not in terms of the degree of their correspondence with accepted 
semiotic models, but in terms of a developmental paradigm - whether that 
paradigm be the classic Piagetian version or some more specific alternative. For 
example, no justification was offered above for the framework's ordering of the 
integrated and interrelated levels of complexity. One might appeal to notions of 
"articulation", or "diverse determination", say; but, as it stands, the structure is 
ultimately developmentally arbitrary. There are, however, hints in Elkind (1969) 
on how a developmentally standard "pictorial grammar of usage" might begin. 
Were such a thing ever to be made available, its home should not be the 
bookshelf of the lay viewer, for whom pictures will probably continue always to 
seem fundamentally unmysterious; rather, it should go to the makers of the 
posters with the aim of maximizing what little specific communicative potential 
there is. 
Finally, I think that none of the above really required a trip to Peru; and that 
posters such as the Pictorial Proclamation would stand little more chance of 
being understood in Edinburgh High Street than chapter I's figure 1 did in 
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nineteenth century Tasmania. But it is the high degree of literacy in this country, 
for instance, which (after all) relieves the picture of a great deal of 
communicative work. Even a couple of written words can do wonders for the 
picture's power to mean (Poster 8). Indeed hasty judgements as to what is, and 
what is not, self-evident may often already have had the benefit of a small but 
absolutely crucial textual anchorage. 
While there is still plenty for pictures to do, it would surely be no bad thing to 
know just how much they can, and whether there is any chance at all that they 
will. 
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Appendix A 
The Test-Pictures 
The following thirty-seven pictures are photographs of those displayed to 
infonnants and upon which infonnants' scores are based. 
1) Each picture is accompanied by a delineation of the units deemed anatomically 
basic. 
2) Although the occluded portions, "fade-out" and continuations beyond the 
frame indicated in crayon here are neither wholly consistently rendered nor by 
any means exhaustive, it would require only time and (much) more paper to 
achieve this. 
In their essentials, the pictures are reproduced here as they were displayed to 
infonnants. Note, however, that: 
1) with the exception of Pictures 4, 8 and 11, the pictures used are bigger than 
their reproductions; 
2) all the pictures used are less yellow and less murky than their reproductions; 
2) Picture 2 was displayed without the accompanying text; 
3) the borders of Pictures 16, and 20a to 25c have been trimmed slightly; 
Where I have not drawn the pictures myself, their sources are as follows: 
Picture 1 was taken from the title page of a book of Aymara poems 
Picture 2 is the leaflet produced by CORPUNO to advertise the hand-
operated pump illustrated 
Pictures 3, 9, and 10 are collages photographs cut from Peruvian magazines; 
Picture 4 appeared in the Puno review Hojas Escritas, under the title: 
"Vision Sistematica"; 
Picture 8 was cut from a Peruvian magazine; 
Picture 11 was cut from the Jehovah's Witnesses' pamphlet described in the 
introduction, and was originally accompanied by the words "EI 
ilia viene"; 
and that: 
Picture 18 is a version of Poster 4 (in Appendix C). Poster 4's schematic 
outline of Bolivia was replaced in Picture 18 with a (rather more 
schematic) outline of Peru; 
Picture 19 is a version of a painting by Leoncio Villanueva, adopted by the 
Asociaci6n Pro Derechos Humano - Peru; another poster, and 
accompanied by the words: "y cmindo estaremos con los demas, 
al borde de una maiiana eterna, desayunados todos". (My 
[bread], incidentally, is probably more unambiguously bread than 
the [bread] of the original on which Picture 19 is based.) 
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Picture 1 
A: *WOMAN* c: *HILL* 
B: *FACE* D: *HILL* 
X: *GROUND* 
Picture 2 
A: *WOMAN* E: *PERSON* 
B: *MAN* F: *SHEEP* 
c: * STRUCTURE * G: * BUILDINGS * 
D: *STUFF* H: *SHEEP* 
I: *PERSON* 
X: *GROUND* K: *PERSON* 
Picture 3 
A: *MAN* D: *WOMAN* 
B: *MOUNTAIN* E: * AEROPLANE * 
c: *MAN* X: * GROUND * 
Picture 4 
A: *MOUNTAINS* a: *PIG* a!: *FISH* 
B: *FACE* b: *PIG* b!: *FISH* 
c: *MAN* c: *LAMA* c!: *FISH* 
D: *LAMA* d: *LAMA* d!: * THING * 
E: *COW* e: * BUILDING * e!: *FISH* 
F: *DONKEY* f: *MAN* f!: *FISH* 
G: *MAN* g: *LAMA* g!: *BIRD* 
H: *MAN* h: *LAMA* h!: *BIRD* 
I: *WOMAN* 1: *WOMAN* i! : *FISH* 
J: *MAN* j: *MAN* J! *WOMAN* 
K: *WOMAN* k: *MAN* X: *GROUND* 
L: * BUILDING * 1: *MAN* 
M: *BUILDING* m: *LAMA* 
N: *MAN* n: *LAMA* 
0: *WOMAN* 0: *WOMAN* 
P: *LAMA* p: *COW* 
Q: *MAN* q: *MAN* 
R: *WOMAN* r: *MAN* 
s: *BIRD* s: *COWS* 
T: *BIRD* t: *MAN* 
U: * BUILDING * u: *FISH* 
V: *LAMA* v: *FISH* 
W: *LAMA* w: *FISH* 
X: *MAN* x: *FISH* 
Y: *WOMAN* y: *FISH* 
Z: *PIG* z: *FISH* 
Picture 5 
A: *MAN* B: *SCALES* c: *MAN* 
X: *GROUND* 
Picture 6 
A: *MAN* F: *STRUCTURE* K: *CROSS* 
B: *MAN* G: *HAMMER* 
c: *MAN* H: * STRUCTURE * X: *GROUND* 
D: *MAN* I: * STRUCTURE * 
E: *MAN* J: *LADDER: 
Picture 7 
A: * MOUNTAINS * G: * BUILDING * M: *MAN* 
B: * TREES * H: *MAN* N: * HILL * 
c: *TREE* I: *SHEEP* 0: *HILL* 
D: *BUILDING* J: *SHEEP* P: *HILL* 
E: *SHEEP* K: *SHEEP* 
F: *SHEEP* L: * ANIMALS * X: *GROUND* 
Picture 8 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *MAN* c: *MAN* E: *ARROW* 
B: *CLOCK* D: *CLOCK* F: *MAN* 
G: *CLOCK* 
Picture 9 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *WOMAN* D: *DOG* H: * STRUCTURE * 
B: *MAN* E: *MAN* I: *BOAT* 
c: *PERSON* F: *MAN* J: *TABLE* 
G: *WOMAN* 
Picture 10 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *WOMAN* E: *CHILD* I: * PEOPLE * 
B: *PERSON* F: *WOMAN* J: *THINGS* 
c: *CHILDREN* G: *MAN* K: *HELICOPTER* 
D: *WOMAN* H: * STRUCTURE * 
Picture 11 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *MAN* E: *MAN* I: *SPHERE* 
B: *WOMAN* F: *CLOUD* J: *STRucrURES* 
c: *MAN* G: * AEROPLANES * K: *WOMAN* 
D: *BOY* H: *ANIMAL* L: *WOMAN* 
Picture 12 
A: *MAN* D: *MAN* G: *PERSON* 
B: *MAN* E: *PERSON* 
c: *MAN* F: *PERSON* X: * GROUND * 
Picture 13 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *MAN* c: *IX)G* E: *CAT* 
B: *IX)G* D: *CAT* F: *MOUSE* 
Picture 14 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *MAN* G: *MAN* M: *BUILDING* 
B: *1REE* H: *1REE* N: *STICKS* 
c: *STUFF* I: *STUFF* 0: *WALL* 
D: *MAN* J: *WALL* P: *WALL* 
E: *1REE* K: *MAN* Q: *WALL* 
F: * BUILDING * L: *TREE* R: *WALL* 
Picture 15 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *MAN* B: *CROSS* c: *STOOL* 
Picture 16 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *PERSON* c: *MAN* E: *PERSON* 
B: *MAN* D: *SKELETON* F: *PERSON* 
Picture 17 
A: *MAN* D: * DOOR * H: *VEHICLE* 
B: *MAN* E: *CLOUD* I: *TABLE* 
c: *EQUINE* G: *BELL* X: * GROUND * 
Picture 18 
A: *HAND* D: *BIRD* G: *CIRCLE* 
B: * HAND * E: *PLANT* H: *STRUCTURE* 
c: *HAND* F: *STRUCTURE* X: * GROUND * 
Picture 19 
A: *FlSH* D: *HAND* G: *STUFF* 
B: *STIJFF* E: *STIJFF 
c: *WIRE F: *STUFF* X: *GROUND* 
Picture 20 
Picture 20a A: * FLOWER * 
Picture 20b A: *FLIES* 
Picture 20c A: * FLOWER * B: * FLIES * X: *GROUND* 
Picture 21 
Picture 21a A: *DOG* 
Picture 21b A: *AREA* 
Picture 21c A: * DOG * B: *AREA* X: * GROUND * 
Picture 22 
Picture 22a A: *MAN* 
Picture 22b A: *AN1MAL* 
Picture 22c A: *MAN* B: *ANIMAL* X: *GROUND* 
Picture 23 
Picture 23a A: *GIRL* 
Picture 23b B: *GRAVE* 
Picture 23c A: *GIRL* B: *GRAVE* X: * GROUND * 
Picture 24 
Picture 24a A: *LION* 
Picture 24b A: * CONDOR * 
Picture 24c A: * CONDOR B: *LION* X: *GROUND* 
Picture 25 
Picture 25a A: *MAN* 
Picture 25b A: * BOITLE * 
Picture 25c A: *MAN* B: *BOITLE* X: *GROUND* 
Appendix B 
The Visual Environment (i) 
Photographs 1 to 4 show views of Amantani including the interior of 
the new wawawasi, or playschool. 
Photographs 5 to 8 show views of Puno . 


Appendix C 
The Visual Environment (ii) 
Posters 1 to 4 were photographed in Amantani's community hall; 
Poster 5 and 6 in Puno; 
Posters 7 and 8 near Temuco in southern Chile. 
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AppendixD 
Supplementary Pictures 
Supplementary Picture 2 
Supplementary Picture 1 
Supplementary Picture 3 
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Appendix A 
The Test-Pictures 
The following thirty-seven pictures are photographs of those displayed to 
informants and upon which informants' scores are based. 
1) Each picture is accompanied by a delineation of the units deemed anatomically 
basic. 
2) Although the occluded portions, "fade-out" and continuations beyond the 
frame indicated in crayon here are neither wholly consistently rendered nor by 
any means exhaustive, it would require only time and (much) more paper to 
achieve this. 
In their essentials, the pictures are reproduced here as they were displayed to 
informants. Note, however, that: 
1) with the exception of Pictures 4, 8 and 11, the pictures used are bigger than 
their reproductions; 
2) all the pictures used are less yellow and less murky than their reproductions; 
2) Picture 2 was displayed without the accompanying text; 
3) the borders of Pictures 16, and 20a to 25c have been trimmed slightly; 
Where I have not drawn the pictures myself, their sources are as follows: 
Picture 1 was taken from the title page of a book of A ymara poems 
Picture 2 is the leaflet produced by CORPUNO to advertise the hand-
operated pump illustrated 
Pictures 3, 9, and 10 are collages photographs cut from Peruvian magazines; 
Picture 4 appeared in the Puno review Hojas Escritas, under the title: 
"Vision Sistematica"; 
Picture 8 was cut from a Peruvian magazine; 
Picture 11 was cut from the Jehovah's Witnesses' pamphlet described in the 
introduction, and was originally accompanied by the words "EI 
dia viene"; 
and that: 
Picture 18 is a version of Poster 4 (in Appendix C). Poster 4's schematic 
outline of Bolivia was replaced in Picture 18 with a (rather more 
schematic) outline of Peru; 
Picture 19 is a version of a painting by Leoncio Villanueva, adopted by the 
Asociaci6n Pro Derechos Humano - Peru; another poster, and 
accompanied by the words: "y cU!indo estaremos con los demas, 
al borde de una manana eterna, desayunados todos". (My 
[bread], incidentally, is probably more unambiguously bread than 
the [bread] of the original on which Picture 19 is based.) 
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Picture 1 
A: *WOMAN* c: *HILL* 
B: *FACE* D: *HILL* 
X: *GROUND* 
Picture 2 
A: *WOMAN* E: *PERSON* 
B: *MAN* F: *SHEEP* 
c: *SlRUCTURE* G: *BUILDINGS* 
D: *STUFF* H: *SHEEP* 
I: *PERSON* 
X: *GROUND* K: *PERSON* 
Picture 3 
A: *MAN* D: *WOMAN* 
B: *MOUNTAIN* E: *AEROPLANE* 
c: *MAN* X: *GROUND* 
Picture 4 
A: * MOUNTAINS * a: *PIG* a!: *FISH* 
B: *FACE* b: *PIG* b!: *FISH* 
c: *MAN* c: *LAMA* c!: *FISH* 
D: *LAMA* d: *LAMA* d!: * THING * 
E: *COW* e: *BUILDING* e!: *FISH* 
F: *DONKEY* f: *MAN* f!: *FISH* 
G: *MAN* g: *LAMA* g!: *BIRD* 
H: *MAN* h: *LAMA* h!: *BIRD* 
I: *WOMAN* 1: *WOMAN* i' . *FISH* 
J: *MAN* j: *MAN* J! *WOMAN* 
K: *WOMAN* k: *MAN* X: * GROUND * 
L: *BUILDING* 1: *MAN* 
M: * BUILDING * m: *LAMA* 
N: *MAN* n: *LAMA* 
0: *WOMAN* 0: *WOMAN* 
P: *LAMA* p: *COW* 
Q: *MAN* q: *MAN* 
R: *WOMAN* r: *MAN* 
s: *BIRD* s: *COWS* 
T: *BIRD* t: *MAN* 
U: *BUILDING* u: *FISH* 
V: *LAMA* v: *FISH* 
W: *LAMA* w: *FISH* 
X: *MAN* x: *FISH* 
Y: *WOMAN* y: *FISH* 
Z: *PIG* z: *FISH* 
Picture 5 
A: *MAN* B: *SCALES* c: *MAN* 
X: *GROUND* 
Picture 6 
A: *MAN* F: *S1RUCTURE* K: *CROSS* 
B: *MAN* G: *HAMMER* 
c: *MAN* H: * S1RUCTURE * X: *GROUND* 
D: *MAN* I: * S1RUCTURE * 
E: *MAN* J: *LADDER: 
Picture 7 
A: * MOUNTAINS * G: * BUILDING * M: *MAN* 
B: *1REES* H: *MAN* N: *HILL* 
c: *1REE* I: *SHEEP* 0: *HILL* 
D: * BUILDING * J: *SHEEP* P: *HILL* 
E: *SHEEP* K: *SHEEP* 
F: *SHEEP* L: * ANIMALS * X: *GROUND* 
Picture 8 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *MAN* c: *MAN* E: *ARROW* 
B: *CLOCK* D: *CLOCK* F: *MAN* 
G: *CLOCK* 
Picture 9 
X: * GROUND * 
A: *WOMAN* D: *DOG* H: * S1RUCTURE * 
B: *MAN* E: *MAN* I: *BOAT* 
c: *PERSON* F: *MAN* J: *TABLE* 
G: *WOMAN* 
Picture 10 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *WOMAN* E: *CHILD* I: *PEOPLE* 
B: *PERSON* F: *WOMAN* J: *THINGS* 
c: *CHILDREN* G: *MAN* K: *HELICOPTER* 
D: *WOMAN* H: *S1RUCTURE* 
Picture 11 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *MAN* E: *MAN* I: * SPHERE * 
B: *WOMAN* F: * CLOUD * J: *STRUCTURES* 
c: *MAN* G: *AEROPLANES* K: *WOMAN* 
D: *BOY* H: *ANIMAL* L: *WOMAN* 
Picture 12 
A: *MAN* D: *MAN* G: *PERSON* 
B: *MAN* E: *PERSON* 
c: *MAN* F: *PERSON* X: *GROUND* 
Picture 13 
X: * GROUND* 
A: *MAN* c: * DOG * E: *CAT* 
B: * DOG * D: *CAT* F: *MOUSE* 
Picture 14 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *MAN* G: *MAN* M: *BUILDING* 
B: *TREE* H: *TREE* N: *STICKS* 
c: *STUFF* I: *STUFF* 0: *WALL* 
D: *MAN* J: *WALL* P: *WALL* 
E: *TREE* K: *MAN* Q: *WALL* 
F: *BUILDING* L: *TREE* R: *WALL* 
Picture 15 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *MAN* B: *CROSS* c: *STOOL* 
Picture 16 
X: *GROUND* 
A: *PERSON* c: *MAN* E: *PERSON* 
B: *MAN* D: *SKELETON* F: *PERSON* 
Picture 17 
A: *MAN* D: *DCX>R* H: *VEHICLE* 
B: *MAN* E: *CLOUD* I: *TABLE* 
c: *EQUINE* G: *BELL* X: *GROUND* 
Picture 18 
A: *HAND* D: *BIRD* G: *CIRCLE* 
B: *HAND* E: *PLANT* H: *STRUCTURE* 
c: *HAND* F: *STRUCTURE* X: *GROUND* 
Picture 19 
A: *FISH* D: *HAND* G: *STUFF* 
B: *STUFF* E: *STUFF 
C: *WIRE F: *STUFF* X: *GROUND* 
Picture 20 
Picture 20a A: *FLOWER* 
Picture 20b A: *FLIES* 
Picture 20c A: *FLOWER* B: * FLIES * X: *GROUND* 
Picture 21 
Picture 21a A: * DOG * 
Picture 21b A: * AREA * 
Picture 21c A: *DOG* B: *AREA* X: *GROUND* 
Picture 22 
Picture 22a A: *MAN* 
Picture 22b A: *ANIMAL* 
Picture 22c A: *MAN* B: *ANIMAL* X: *GROUND* 
Picture 23 
Picture 23a A: *GIRL* 
Picture 23b B: *GRAVE* 
Picture 23c A: *GIRL* B: *GRAVE* X: *GROUND* 
Picture 24 
Picture 24a A: *LION* 
Picture 24b A: * CONDOR * 
Picture 24c A: * CONDOR B: *LION* X: *GROUND* 
Picture 25 
Picture 25a A: *MAN* 
Picture 25b A: *BOTILE* 
Picture 25c A: *MAN* B: * BOTILE * X: *GROUND* 
Appendix B 
The Visual Environment (i) 
Photographs 1 to 4 show views of Amantani including the interior of 
the new wawawasi, or playschool. 
Photographs 5 to 8 show views of Puno. 

Photograph 8 
Appendix C 
The Visual Environment (ii) 
Posters 1 to 4 were photographed in Amantani's community hall; 
Poster 5 and 6 in Puno; 
Posters 7 and 8 near Temuco in southern Chile. 
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AppendixD 
Supplementary Pictures 
Supplementary Picture 2 
Supplementary Picture 1 
Supplementary Picture 3 
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